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Abstract 
Effects of significant visual impairment (VI) in childhood are profound and far-reaching, impacting 
on most developmental areas. In recent years, there has been a particular emphasis on the 
effects of VI on social communication and social cognition, with a focus on a potential link with 
autism. However, the mechanisms underlying specific socio-developmental difficulties and the 
'autistic-like' presentation shown by some children with VI, as well as the mechanism by which 
many children with VI are able to overcome such developmental vulnerabilities, remain poorly 
understood and require further clarification. The goal of the research reported in the present 
thesis was to elicit further understanding of the developmental patterns of social functioning in 
children with VI, and gain a better appreciation of the role that language may play in these 
processes. The thesis focused on children with severe and profound degrees of congenital vision 
loss without additional impairments, as learning difficulties have been identified as a confounding 
factor. Their developmental outcomes were compared to those of a group of typically developing 
sighted children of similar age and ability. The children were assessed using parental/teacher 
questionnaires and a battery of developmental and experimental tasks targeting language, social 
communication, mental state understanding and discourse, and executive functioning. An 
important finding was a discrepancy between the structural language skills and pragmatic 
language use in children with VI. Additionally, a substantial proportion of children with VI showed 
socio-communicative profiles that were consistent with a broader autism phenotype. An 
investigation of the children's mental state language use, which was also reported, provided a 
useful context within which socio-pragmatic difficulties seen in children with VI in this research 
could be considered. A similar contribution was provided by a study of mother-child mentalistic 
language exchange, which emphasised specific strengths of socio-interactive environment of 
children with VI that future interventions can capitalise on. Furthermore, the developmental 
vulnerabilities imposed by VI were found to extend to a broader behavioural presentation in 
children with VI, including weaknesses in specific executive function domains. Such weaknesses, 
notably in cognitive shifting, were considered in the context of attentional mechanisms that may 
be particularly affected by vision loss in early development. A retrospective examination of 
attentional behaviours in pre-school development of children with VI helped to clarify these issues 
further, by shedding light on the potential precursors to the vulnerabilities in achieving social 
competence and adjustment in children with VI at school age. The findings are believed to offer 
original contribution to understanding the development of social functioning in children with 
congenital VI, and are hoped to contribute towards the diagnostic considerations and intervention 
strategies aiming to boost such children's developmental potential. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
VISION, VISUAL IMPAIRMENT (VI) AND DEVELOPMENT: GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Vision is involved in the development and functioning of most human processes. It is easy for any 
sighted person to take vision for granted; however it only takes closing one's eyes to fully 
appreciate the potency of its provision. It is a powerful sensory modality which integrates and co-
ordinates the information provided by other senses, allowing the features of the external world to 
be consolidated as a unified experience (Rock, 1985). It is therefore easy to see how a dominant 
role of vision in human perception is beneficial for young children who are learning about the 
world and themselves in relation to that world, particularly in pre-lingual stages of development. 
What is perhaps more difficult to appreciate are the experiences of children who are born with a 
severe or profound vision loss and how they come to learn about the world that they share with 
others. 
Children with congenital1 visual impairment (VI)2 provide a natural experiment for studying the 
role of vision in human development; however, understanding visual impairment itself and its 
impact on a child's life is not a straightforward issue, either psychologically or medically. Vision 
loss that has clinical and educational significance is a largely heterogeneous phenomenon in the 
aetiological and phenotypical sense, and even the terminology to describe individuals with this 
impairment both in the literature and practice has varied over the years (Cullinan, 1987). There is 
not a single cause or diagnosis of congenital VI, making children who are born with severely 
impaired or absent functional vision a highly heterogeneous population (Baird & Moore, 1993; 
Rahi & Dezateux, 1998). Furthermore, severe and profound congenital VI is thought to be 
relatively rare in childhood. There is a great variation in the incidence of severe VI in different 
1 Congenital VI implies that some part(s) of the visual system fail to develop normally or are damaged at some pOint 
during gestation or the perinatal period (i.e., the period around birth) (Sonksen & Dale, 2002). 
2 Both in the literature and everyday language, 'blind' is the most commonly used term to describe an individual with 
sight loss. While such term implies a total lack of Sight, most individuals who are labelled 'blind' have some, although 
profoundly or severely degraded, levels of vision. The term 'visual impairment' represents the heterogeneous nature 
of visual disorder more accurately and, for the purpose of the present thesis, it is used to refer to sight loss which has 
significant clinical and educational implications (see Chapter 2 for a further discussion). 
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parts of the world, with a greater prevalence occurring in developing countries compared to the 
developed world (Baird & Moore, 1993). However, in the UK it has been estimated that 4 to 5 in 
every 10 000 children are diagnosed with serious VI of significant clinical and educational 
concern in the first year of life, with the incidence increasing to nearly 6 per 10 000 by 16 years of 
age (Rahi & Cable, 2003). This relative rarity as well as diverse aetiology of congenital VI makes 
children with this impairment a particularly challenging model for psychological research, and in 
Chapter 2 some of the relating methodological issues are considered in further detail. Here it is 
important to mention that, in the study of children with congenital vision loss, theorists and 
researchers have over the years attempted to establish different levels of experimental rigour with 
an aim to paint an authentic picture of what the human brain provides to the developmental 
process, in the absence of visually-driven knowledge. However, even though methodological 
rigour seems like a reasonable scientific goal, the diverse presentation of children with congenital 
VI is powerful evidence that real life rarely provides the means for achieving such a goal. 
Nevertheless, children who are born with sight loss (both as a heterogeneous population and 
individually) provide a fascinating insight into human development when it takes a differential 
course. Despite many methodological obstacles, understanding such a course is of crucial 
importance, not only for illuminating the mechanisms that underlie typical vision-guided 
development, but also for understanding the impact that this specific disability may have on the 
lives of the children concerned and their families. 
What is therefore the extent of such impact? Extensive clinical and research evidence shows that 
developmental constraints imposed by severely impaired or absent functional vision in childhood 
are significant and complex. Poor developmental outcomes as a result of VI in childhood have 
been reported in most areas, including personal, emotional, social, motor and cognitive 
development (e.g., Bigelow, 2003; Cass, Sonksen, & McConachie, 1994; Fraiberg, 1977; 
McConachie & Moore, 1994; Sonksen & Dale, 2002). Importantly, in recent years, there has been 
a particular emphasis on the effects of visual impairment on social communication and social 
cognition, and given these particular effects, a number of researchers and clinicians have 
highlighted striking behavioural resemblances between children with congenital VI and sighted 
children with autism (see Pring, 2005 for a general overview). Such research has not only brought 
under the spotlight specific developmental challenges and needs of children with VI; it has also 
offered novel insights into the development of social functioning in typical circumstances and into 
the mechanisms that underlie the social impairments in sighted children with autism. Importantly 
however, the mechanisms underlying specific social difficulties and the autistic-like presentation 
shown by some children with VI, as well as the mechanism by which many children with VI are 
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able to overcome such developmental challenges and vulnerabilities, still remain poorly 
understood. The general rarity and heterogeneity of the population certainly contributes to the 
relative dearth of research with such children, maintaining the scarcity of knowledge of their 
developmental processes. Yet, gaining further insight and appreciation into the developmental 
trajectory of social communication and social cognition of children with VI is of great significance, 
from both psychological and clinical perspectives. Crucially, the goal of the research reported in 
this thesis is to provide a unique insight into the understanding of developmental patterns of 
social functioning in children with VI and to contribute to diagnostic considerations and 
intervention strategies aiming to boost developmental outcomes for such children. 
Before specific developmental patterns of children with VI are considered empirically in later 
chapters, the aim of this chapter is to provide a review of the literature concerning the research 
and theory of social functioning in child development. Starting with the origins of such functioning 
and leading to its later manifestations, this literature review will also consider the role of other 
specific factors that are thought to be involved in the trajectory of social functioning in childhood. 
More specifically, in the first and main part of the review, the developmental trajectory of social 
functioning in sighted children will be considered, before addressing the characteristics of such 
trajectory in children with VI. The latter part of the literature review will specifically address 
language and its relationship with important social milestones in child development, with a 
particular focus on its role in the development of children with VI. 
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL FUNCTIONING IN CHILDREN WHO ARE SIGHTED 
While vision has been given a central role in most developmental processes, its significance has 
been particularly emphasised in the development of socio-communicative skills and socio-
cognitive understanding. Therefore, the aim of the following section is to consider the theory and 
empirical evidence that highlights this particular role of vision in the development of pivotal social 
milestones in childhood. 
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Early social functioning 
Joint attention 
Infants enjoy rich and stimulating social lives from the earliest stages of development. Early social 
experiences are dyadic in nature, with an infant taking part largely in face-to-face interactions only 
with one social partner at a time. These early social interactions are characterised by what 
Trevarthen described as primary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1979), where infants demonstrate 
responsive conscious appreciation of the adult's communicative intentions and signalling by 
engaging in mutual eye-gaze, vocalization and rhythmic turn-taking patterns of behaviour (e.g., 
such as in social games like 'peek-a-boo'). From around six months of age, the new patterns of 
communication emerge, as the child moves from the purely dyadic interactions with one social 
partner into the world of objects. The main characteristic of these novel experiences, which have 
been conceptualised as secondary intersubjectivity (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978), is the infant's 
awareness that their experiences of objects, people and events can be shared with others. This 
transition from the infant's dyadic (child-caregiver) engagement to triadically shared (child-object-
caregiver) experiences marks one of the major milestones in socio-communicative development. 
The central component of this milestone is what is now commonly known as joint attention, 
referring to co-ordinated sharing of attention between the child, an adult and objects in space 
(Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Corkum & Moore, 1998; C. Moore & Dunham, 1995; Mundy, 
Kasari, & Sigman, 1992). Its behavioural manifestation encompasses a complex set of actions, 
such as eye-gaze directing and following, point following, showing and pointing, the purpose of 
which is to negotiate and share the mutual focus of interest with a social partner. Research 
evidence suggests that, in typical development, such behaviours emerge between six and 12 
months, and are consolidated by 18 months of age (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Markus, Mundy, 
Morales, Delgado, & Yale, 2000). 
Joint attention experiences that infants and their caregivers mutually share are largely driven by 
the visual modality, so they are often referred to as 'joint visual attention' (Corkum & Moore, 1995; 
Hobson, 1993; Tomasello, 1995). The dominance of eye-gaze behaviours in this process has 
largely been reflected in the empirical studies of joint attention in children (both in naturalistic and 
laboratory settings), where the child's ability to make eye-contact and monitor the direction of 
another's eye-gaze, with the purpose of initiating or responding to adults' bids of attention, have 
been taken as measures of joint attention competence (e.g., Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Scaife 
& Bruner, 1975). 
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Theoretical accounts of joint attention 
The visual nature of joint attention has also been emphasised in theoretical accounts of this 
process. As will be described in this section, while different accounts of joint attention postulate 
the involvement of different mechanisms that underlie the development of the ability to share the 
mutual focus of attention with others, the common theme that these accounts share is an 
emphasis on vision in both the emergence and manifestation of these experiences. 
The cognitive-modular account of joint attention highlights the involvement of cognitive 
mechanisms that are responsible for meta-representational functioning involved in the process of 
attention sharing (Baron-Cohen, 1995a). According to Baron-Cohen, these mechanisms (i.e., 
modules) enable the child to construct triadic representations that specify self and others 
attending to the same objects. This account highlights the importance of the 'intentionality 
detector' module (10), which enables young children to appreciate other people as intentional 
agents who have their own representations of objects and events in the world. Further emphasis 
in this account is on the role of an 'eye direction detector' (EOO) module, the function of which is 
to interpret visually mediated information (e.g., looking where someone else is looking). The 
child's representations of intentionality and their ability to follow the visual focus of others 
combine within the 'shared attention mechanism' module (SAM), which is responsible for the 
triadic sharing of attention between a child, a caregiver and a mutual focus of attention (i.e., joint 
attention) (Baron-Cohen, 1995a). 
In contrast to the cognitive-modular account, Hobson (1993; 2002) argues that joint attention has 
an affective origin, with affective sharing of experiences through smiles, facial expressions and 
gaze monitoring providing a basis for both dyadic and triadic interactions in which a young child 
takes part. The starting point in Hobson's interpersonal-affective account is the child's ability to 
apprehend other people as persons with attitudes. Central to this account is the concept of 
interpersonal engagement within the 'relatedness triangle' involving the child, the other and the 
referent (e.g., object) of mutual interest. Through experiences of many of these triangular 
relationships, the child learns that different people can have different attitudes toward the same 
referent and that the same person may produce different attitudes towards the same referent. 
Crucially, according to Hobson, the perception of the other's attitude, the affective component of 
that attitude, and the fact that the attitude is directed at a specific referent in the world, is 
dependent on the visual modality. Vision enables children to triangulate their own attitudes as 
well as the attitudes of others towards the visually-specified objects (e.g., through gaze-directing, 
gaze-following, pointing and showing), and provides them with the means for achieving 
psychological co-orientation and co-reference with other people. 
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Others have argued that joint attention has a more basic perceptual precursor, related to 
development of visual attention and the changes that attentional systems undergo in the first year 
of life (Corkum & Moore, 1995, 1998; Scaife & Bruner, 1975). For instance, while reflexive 
attentional orienting to sensory stimuli is typically present from birth, voluntary attentional control 
is generally poor until around the third month, when infants become able follow the cue of another 
person's eye-gaze, although this is only if the target stimulus is in the infant's visual field 
(Atkinson, Hood, Wattam-Bell, & Braddick, 1992; Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998). Between nine 
and 12 months, an important change in attentional capacity occurs as infants begin to use 
another person's head-turn and eye-gaze as an attentional cue, even when the target stimulus is 
not visible (Butterworth & Cochran, 1980; Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Corkum & Moore, 1998). 
However, it is not until 18 months of age that they are able to rely on the adult's eye-gaze alone 
to establish a joint reference with another person (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Corkum & Moore, 
1995). This evidence emphasises the importance of visual attention orienting to sensory stimuli 
and attentional control in the development of joint attention. 
Developmental implications of joint attention 
It is generally agreed that early joint attention experiences are of great developmental 
significance, as they provide optimal conditions for the general learning of young pre-lingual 
children. For instance, the socio-interactive context within which joint attention occurs is thought 
to provide a rich framework for the child's emerging symbolic understanding and word learning, 
thus acting as an important precursor to symbolic play and language development (Charman et 
aI., 2000; Mundy & Gomes, 1998; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986; Tomasello & Todd, 1983). The 
mutual exchange of interests, intentions and attitudes between the child and the interacting adult, 
towards each other and objects in their shared environment, is seen as providing a scaffolding 
mechanism upon the child's language learning takes place (Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). Indeed, 
the empirical evidence shows that the capacity of the child to respond to and follow the adult's 
focus of attention, as well as the time spent in joint engagement involving a caregiver, in early 
infancy is predictive of children's earliest gestural communication and linguistic competence and 
their later lexical acquisition (Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Markus et aI., 2000; 
Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). Importantly, joint attention is seen as providing a framework within 
which young children learn clues to different mental states and expressions of emotions, through 
observing the facial expressions, gestures and bodily postures that caregivers direct towards 
them and other agents in their environment. As such, joint attention is believed to act as a 
stepping stone for the development of more sophisticated forms of social functioning later on 
(Hobson, 2002; Tomasello, 1995). A specific social and cognitive achievement, thought to be a 
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direct consequence of joint attention ability, is now commonly known as theory of mind. This 
particular milestone in child development, which has been given a widespread attention over the 
past 25 years both in theory and empirical research, will be considered in the following section. 
Later social functioning 
Theory of mind 
Theory of mind, 'mind reading', 'mentalising' and 'understanding of others' minds' have 
synonymously been used in psychology to refer to the child's ability to understand and attribute a 
range of mental states to self and others in order to explain and predict their actions and 
behaviours (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993; Pemer & Wimmer, 1985; Wellman, 1990). In other words, 
to make sense of the sophisticated social environment that surrounds them, children must be 
able to understand that other people have intentions, desires, thoughts, beliefs and feelings which 
are different from their own and that such states of mind will influence people to act and behave 
accordingly. 
Theory of mind has been extensively studied in children using false-belief tasks, which 
developmentally have been categorised as those of first and second order. First-order false-belief 
tasks typically employ a character-based scenario (using puppets or pictures) in which a child is 
required to predict behavioural outcomes of a story character, based on that character's belief, 
which may be false. For example in the well-known Sally-Anne task (an adaptation of a task 
originally designed by Wimmer and Pemer, 1983), a child who has first-order false-belief 
understanding knows that Sally will look for her marble in the basket where she initially left it 
because she is unaware that Anne has moved it to another basket in her absence. That is, the 
child understands that Sally has a false belief about where the marble really is (Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1985). This is known as an 'unexpected transfer' false belief task. Another 
example of a first-order false belief task is the 'unexpected contents' type of task. In this task, 
where a child is presented with a familiar object that would usually contain familiar contents (e.g., 
a Smarties tube), but which now contains something unexpected (e.g., a pencil), a child who has 
false-belief understanding is able to correctly predict that the person who is unaware of the 
unexpected contents of the Smartie tube would think that the tube contains sweets (pemer, 
Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). 
Based on children's performance on variations of such tasks, it is now generally accepted that 
first-order theory of mind ability is typically acquired by the age of five (Ruffman, 2004; T ager-
Flusberg, 2001; Wellman, 1990). Second-order theory of mind however, is thought to develop 
between the ages of six and eight, when the child begins to develop understanding of more 
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complex and embedded mental representations (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Perner & Wimmer, 1985). 
To pass a second-order false-belief task, a child needs an awareness not just that people have 
beliefs about the world (which may be different from child's own beliefs), but also that they have 
beliefs about the content of others' minds (Le., about others' beliefs), and similarly, that these too 
may be different or false. An example of such a task is Perner and Wimmer's (1985) story of 
John, Mary, and the ice-cream man in the park. Here, the child is told that, while Mary goes home 
to get money to buy ice-cream, the ice-cream man tells John that he is going over to the church 
to sell ice-cream there. On his way to the church, Mary happens to see him and the ice-cream 
man tells her the same thing he told John. However, John does not know this, so later, when he 
goes to Mary's house and her mother tells him that Mary has gone out to buy ice-cream, John 
runs off to look for Mary. Perner and Wimmer found that, by the age of seven, children are able to 
predict correctly where John thinks Mary has gone (Le., the park) and they are able to justify their 
answer. 
Theoretical accounts of theory of mind 
A number of theories that have been proposed to explain a child's theory of mind have linked its 
development to specific visual precursors, such as joint attention and the processes occurring 
within this context. For instance, following the previously described cognitive-modular account of 
joint attention by Baron-Cohen (1995a), children's theory of mind ability has been viewed as a 
result of the functioning of an innate, specific neuro-cognitive module (Baron-Cohen, 1995a; 
Baron-Cohen & Swettenham, 1996; Leslie, 1987, 1994). According to Baron-Cohen, the theory of 
mind module (ToMM) is preceded by activation of the three previously mentioned modules that 
are involved in joint attention development, namely the intentionality detector (10), the eye 
direction detector (EOO) and the shared attention mechanism (SAM). Importantly, all of these 
modules become available to the child at different developmental stages, following a specific 
developmental sequence. The first module that becomes available and which allows 
interpretation of intentionality (10), feeds into the module that allows following the visual focus of 
others (EOO). The functioning of the EOO module in turn leads to activation of the SAM module, 
which enables the child to grasp the skill of sharing attentional focus with others and gives rise to 
joint attention behaviours and interactions. Activation of the SAM ultimately feeds to the ToMM, 
which is responsible for the child's developing appreciation of others as intentional agents with 
attitudes, thoughts and beliefs of their own. 
Leslie (1987) argued that earliest representations of ToMM can be seen between 18 and 24 
months of age when the child begins to engage in pretend play. Pretend play involves the 
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capacity to comprehend simultaneously multiple representations of an object (i.e., understanding 
that one object can stand for another, that pretend properties can be attributed to real objects and 
that pretend interaction can be carried out with a non-real object) (Leslie, 1987, 1994). To 
understand pretence, children need to understand something about other people's minds. For 
example, in order to play along when their mother pretends a banana is a telephone, a child must 
have an understanding that the mother is projecting the thought of a telephone onto a banana. 
Therefore, pretend play is evidence of child's metarepresentational capacity and understanding 
that thoughts, and not reality, guide people's behaviours. 
Like Leslie, Harris (1992; 2000) emphasised the role of pretence in children's theory of mind. 
According to Harris, children's understanding of the mind involves introspective awareness of 
their own mental states and they can use this awareness to infer the mental states of other 
people. According to Harris, children develop theory of mind understanding by simulation or role 
taking, and pretend play provides the context within which this ability develops. Through practice 
in role taking and the increasing ability to use pretence by observing the behaviour of others, 
children improve their simulation skills and learn to draw complex analogies between themselves 
and other people. This in turn facilitates the acquisition of sophisticated socio-cognitive 
knowledge and the understanding of other's subjective minds. 
A different theory of mind account postulates that in their attributing of mental states children 
need to resort to a theory to predict and explain behaviour (e.g., Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Gopnik 
& Wellman, 1994; Perner, 1997). This is known as the 'theory-theory' account. According to this 
account, throughout the course of development, and in addition to a powerful innate 
representational system, children also develop, change and qualitatively reorganize their theories 
of the world, and they do so on the basis of the input they receive (Meltzoff, 1999). Through the 
developmental progression of theories (i.e., a developmental sequence by which different mental 
states are understood), the child develops a fully-fledged representational theory of mind at 
around the age of four (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). Central to the theory-theory account provided 
by Meltzoff and Gopnik is imitation (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993). Children 
are born with an innate predisposition to imitate others who they perceive are like them, and the 
evidence for this comes from the studies of infants being able to imitate adults' facial gestures 
days and weeks after birth (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Meltzoff & Moore, 1983). However, in 
order to imitate, the child is required to see the adult's actions (e.g., facial expressions and 
gestures), use this visual perception as a basis for an action plan, and execute the motor output. 
Through visual imitation, children model not only another person's motor acts but also their 
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intentions, emotional attitudes and reactions towards specific objects or events. It is therefore 
clear how vision provides a premise for the development of joint attention and understanding of 
others' minds. 
Atypical social functioning 
Autism3 
Theoretical and empirical advances in the understanding of the development of social milestones 
such as joint attention and theory of mind in the past 20 years have largely been a consequence 
of the clinical emergence of autism. Autism is a pervasive neuro-developmental disorder 
characterized by disturbances in social and communicative development and imagination (Wing 
& Gould, 1979). Although biologically based, with a strong genetic component, the disorder is 
defined and diagnosed on the basis of the triad of behavioural difficulties, namely in social 
interaction, communication, and repetitive behaviours and restricted interests (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). 
Autism has been extensively researched, which resulted in a number of prominent accounts, the 
aim of which was to predict and explain the triad of impairment that is characteristic of the 
disorder. These accounts are beyond the scope of the current thesis and their detailed 
descriptions can be found elsewhere (Frith, 1996, 2003). However, one account of autism that is 
pertinent here, postulates that individuals with autism have a deficit in theory of mind. That is, the 
cognitive mechanisms responsible for understanding and attributing mental states to others are 
impaired in autism, giving a rise to the specific socio-interactive and communicative impairments 
that characterise the disorder (Baron-Cohen, 1995b, 2000). The evidence for the theory of mind 
deficit in autism comes from the numerous studies assessing false-belief understanding in such 
children, who have been consistently found to fail these tasks when compared to matched 
typically developing controls (Baron-Cohen et aI., 1985; Happe, 1995; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & 
Leekam, 1989). The poor false-belief comprehension of children with autism is particularly 
striking, considering that it is generally independent from other skills that involve similar types of 
reasoning, but which exclude mental state concepts (e.g., comprehension of false photographs, 
Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Additionally, many high-functioning children and 
adults with autism have difficulties at the level of theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, 
& Robertson, 1997; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991) and non-autistic children with learning 
3 It is generally agreed that autism is a spectrum disorder, with a clinical picture that varies in severity across 
diagnosed individuals. In this thesis, the term 'autism' will be used throughout to refer to the spectrum of the 
condition. 
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difficulties (e.g., Down Syndrome) generally do better by comparison (Baron-Cohen et aL, 1985). 
It therefore appears that the poor theory of mind performance of children with autism cannot be 
explained in terms of their general intellectual abilities, although general linguistic competence 
can make a significant positive impact (Bowler, 1992; Happe, 1995). 
Importantly, the core theory of mind deficit in autism has been related to the disruptions in joint 
attention in early childhood and the lack of behaviours such as gaze and point following, showing 
and declarative pointing (Charman, 2003; Dawson et aL, 2004; Hobson, 1993; Leekam, L6pez, & 
Moore, 2000; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1994). Absence of these behaviours in children with 
autism forms one of the criteria for diagnosing the disorder (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). One argument is 
that poor joint attention in children with autism is indicative of the damage to the cognitive 
mechanism/ module that is responsible for developing triadic representations of self and other 
attending to the same object, and subsequently impairing the ability to form mentalistic 
interpretations of other's actions (Baron-Cohen, 1995a). As they are unable to represent another 
person's attention or interest towards the external world, children with autism are unable to 
participate in joint attention and the relevant behaviours. Consequently, this leads to the 
impairments in socio-communicative and socio-cognitive skills for which joint attention provides a 
stepping stone. As a result, children with autism have marked difficulties in symbolic 
understanding and pretend play (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Charman et aL, 1997), language (Tager-
Flusberg, 2000), and theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 2000). Another explanation for the failure to 
engage in acts of joint attention in autism is the breakdown in interpersonal engagement and the 
affective, intersubjective experiences with others (Hobson, 1993, 2002). Thus, joint attention 
impairment in autism is not only confined to the triadic interactions (child-person-object), but is 
also seen at a more basic dyadic face-to-face level of interaction with another person. Without 
this innate predisposition, a child with autism is unable to comprehend attitudes of other people 
and relate to external events as shared. Similar to the previous argument, this lack of affect-
driven joint attention experience in autism is also detrimental for the child's development of social 
interaction, symbolic understanding and concept of the mind (Hobson, 2002). 
According to Hobson (1993) the failure to relate to other people's relatedness to the world is a 
defining feature of children with autism. Descriptively, such children generally seem socially aloof 
and distant. Thus, in many ways they appear as if they are unable to see the social world that 
surrounds them and within which different mental states and feelings arise (Cass, 1998). Keeping 
this insight in mind, it is now important to consider those children who are unable to see their 
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social surroundings due to a significant loss of vision at birth, while autism will be considered 
again later in this chapter in relation to these children. 
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL FUNCTIONING IN CHILDREN WITH CONGENITAL VI 
Following the underlying principles of the aforementioned developmental theories of joint 
attention and theory of mind, which emphasise the involvement of vision, it is reasonable to 
assume that any significant and long-term disruptions to visual processes will have a detrimental 
effect on the development of such functions. This certainly has implications for the development 
of children who are born with severely or profoundly impaired functional vision for whom, in 
absence of the shared attention mechanisms (Baron-Cohen, 1995a), visual imitation (Meltzoff & 
Gopnik, 1993) and visually-driven, triangular interpersonal engagement (Hobson, 1990) the social 
communication and social cognition are likely to be vulnerable developmental areas. The theory 
and empirical evidence illustrating the related developmental patterns in children with VI will 
therefore be reviewed in the following section. 
Early social functioning 
Joint attention 
It has been suggested that, despite the dominance of the visual modality in development of joint 
attention, its acquisition is possible in children with VI. Baron-Cohen (1995a) argued that even 
though lack of vision may hinder the development of the SAM, this mechanism is amodal, and is 
able to build triadic representation in other non-visual modalities. In children who are visually 
impaired, for instance, SAM can function through auditory and tactile modalities and a child 
without functional vision may construe a representation of another person's attention on an object 
of interest by feeling that person's hand on that object. Similarly, Hobson (1990; 1993; 2002) 
hypothesised that joint attention is possible in children with severe and profound VI, emphasising 
the role of social experience in facilitating the child's joint engagement with other people and the 
possibility of an alternative non-visual route for achieving co-reference with others in such 
children. However, both theoretical accounts imply that, although joint attention can be attained 
via non-visual means in children with serious VI, its emergence and manifestation is likely to be 
delayed. 
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Empirically, however, very little is known about the development of joint attention in children with 
VI. The empirical study of joint attention in children in general has been so heavily influenced by 
the dominance of eye-gaze behaviours, facial expressions and visual gestures in this process 
that our knowledge of its non-visual aspects is extremely limited. Consequently, we cannot be 
certain of the full extent to which joint attention experiences may (or may not) be disrupted in 
children with VI. In fact, given the scarcity of research with such children, the way in which they 
develop joint attention is virtually unknown. 
In typically developing sighted children, joint attention ability is believed to develop 
spontaneously, evolving out of a natural context of routine child-caregiver interactions, and the 
caregiver's sensitivity and responsiveness to the child are the key ingredients to the child's 
developing interpersonal engagement (Recchia, 1997; Sandler & Hobson, 2001). Vision is likely 
to facilitate the caregiver's involvement, the manifestation of which is likely to be different for 
children whose attention cannot be directed through eye-contact and visual gestures. However, 
the poor theoretical and empirical understanding of this aspect of development of children with VI 
does not automatically imply that the interactions between children with VI and their parents are 
devoid of affective sharing and social enjoyment. In fact, some evidence suggests that joint 
attention between children with VI and their parents can be established through alternative (Le. 
tactile, auditory, kinaesthetic) modalities (Bigelow, 2003; Preisler, 1991; Urwin, 1978). However, 
the nature and the function of these non-visual behaviours in children with VI are still poorly 
understood and there is generally conflicting evidence regarding parental responsiveness to their 
visually impaired child's attentional cues. 
In a longitudinal study, Preisler (1991) observed the patterns of social interaction between 10 
infants with profound visual impairment and their mothers, across the children's first year of life 
(Le., 3-12 months of age). Preisler noted that the early communicative patterns between the 
children with VI and their mothers very much resembled the dyadic experiences of primary 
intersubjectivity in sighted children, as described by Trevarthen (1979). More specifically, these 
interactions were characterised by the dyads concentrating on establishing an affective bond; 
while being largely unaware of the external world, the infants were responsive to their mothers 
and engaged in proto-conversations by exchanging smiles, showing lip movement in an 
articulation-like manner and imitating speech. Preisler also observed instances of infant hand 
movement that were co-ordinated with the mother's speech, a behaviour which, in sighted 
children, normally occurs in combination with mutual eye-contact between mother and infant 
(Trevarthen, 1979). Additionally, these infants with VI showed signs of intentionality, by exhibiting 
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repeated body movements and hand gestures in play and body-touching games with the parent. 
Based on these observations, Preisler noted that vision may not be a necessary condition for 
certain aspects of social interaction to develop. Importantly however, around the children's first 
birthday, they had notable difficulty with establishing secondary intersubjectivity, the experience 
of which marks the ability to engage in triadic joint attention (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). 
Although they could share themselves with their mother, aided by the mother's affect attunement, 
the children were unable to co-ordinate their attention at the same time towards an object in the 
external world. Interestingly, Preisler noted that the infants with VI were attentive to the sounds in 
the environment and reacted to these by establishing frozen bodily and facial postures. However, 
while these subtle signs, in addition to distinctive body pointing towards the sound, may provide 
the means of attention directing from the visually impaired child's perspective, such behaviours 
may be too subtle and ambiguous for parents to interpret or notice (Preisler, 1991). 
In relation to this, drawing from their study on social characteristics of play in children with VI, 
Rogers and Puchalski (1984) commented that both partners in the child-mother interaction, where 
the child is visually impaired, are disadvantaged. While the child is deprived of visual information 
and the lack of effective communication by the mother, who cannot interpret the child's signals, 
the mother is deprived of the positive and responsive cues from her child that would let her know 
that she is doing the right thing. This study strongly highlighted the poverty of responsive social 
exchanges and initiations in mother-child dyads in the case of children who are visually impaired, 
in contrast to the interactions of sighted children and their mothers. Presumably, this 'vicious 
circle' of impoverished parent-child responsiveness is likely to be both a cause and a result of the 
impoverished joint attention capacity seen in children with VI. 
However, in a study of two infants with congenital profound VI, Urwin (1978) showed that the 
nature of caregiver-child responsiveness was largely adaptive. Once the mothers discovered 
particular cues that elicited the response of their child with VI, they were able to use these cues 
repeatedly: "(They) used phased touching routines to alert the babies' attention; they would trace 
their fingers around the babies' mouths, blow on their faces, and encourage them to explore their 
own body parts. (They) would mock-imitate the babies' fusses, coughs, splutters and sneezes to 
'dramatize' the babies' actions" (Urwin, 1978, p. 88). However, despite the effective socio-
interactive routines that facilitated the dyadic relationships between the children with VI and their 
mothers, both infants studied by Urwin showed difficulties and delays in their triadic interactions 
that required them to incorporate objects into their interactions with the adult and to establish 
reversible exchanges of actions on objects. Neither child exhibited spontaneous 'showing' 
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behaviours to initiate joint interaction with the mother. If any reverse actions of 'giving and taking' 
emerged, they were largely the result of specific training provided by the mother. Therefore it 
seems that, while affective sensitivity and non-visual resourcefulness provided by the primary 
caregiver plays an invaluable role, severe lack of vision is still likely to affect the child's 
intersubjective engagement and joint attention capacity. 
In a more recent study, Bigelow (2003) focussed specifically on non-visual actions that may be 
suggestive of joint attention in children with VI, differentiating three types of behaviours. The first 
type of behaviours were those that are preliminary to joint attention, but may not necessarily lead 
to it, such as using the adult as a social tool, and instrumental and self-stimulating behaviours 
that may be interpreted as communicative gestures. The second type included behaviours that 
may be liberally construed as joint attention, but may be somewhat questionable as true joint 
attention behaviours. These are involved in comprehension and production of language, such as 
spontaneous labelling of objects and actions, and using adult's verbal instructions to engage with 
objects. Finally, the third cluster of behaviours investigated by Bigelow were those that might be 
conservatively suggestive of joint attention and may be less questionable indicators, in that the 
child's actions are more clearly indicative of their awareness of the adult's role in their mutual 
interaction with objects (e.g., repeated giving and taking of an object, labelling of an object at the 
request of an adult, and joint manipulation of an object). While the interpretation of these 
behaviours (particularly the first two types) may often be ambiguous, Bigelow argued that they 
may serve a different function in children with VI compared to sighted children, and should be 
considered in the context of their development. For instance, while using adults as social tools 
may not necessarily be indicative of intention to share focus of attention in sighted children (e.g., 
children with autism, who typically do not engage in joint attention, often show such behaviour), 
this behaviour may serve a function of locating desired objects for a child who is visually 
impaired, hence providing an adult with a valuable attention-directing cue. Bigelow assessed the 
occurrence of these behaviours over a period of time in two infants with profound congenital 
visual impairment, using a series of object search tasks that involved presenting the infants with 
silent and continually sounding toys and observing the infants interacting with the toys and the 
familiar adult. 
The theoretical background underlying this investigation was that in sighted children, joint 
attention development is closely tied with the development of self-knowledge, particularly the 
knowledge of self in relation to environment (Neisser, 1991). This knowledge in children with VI is 
shown to be largely dependent upon their understanding of space and objects (Bigelow, 1992, 
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1995). Children with VI need to develop the understanding that objects that they attempt to reach 
do exist and have a permanence of their own and which is independent of self. They have to 
learn where they are in relation to such objects and where the objects are in relation to one 
another as well as to understand that they can use their bodies to explore these objects. 
Typically, vision guides the co-ordination and understanding of relations between objects in the 
environment and self-position in space (Rieser & Rider, 1991). However, such co-ordination and 
understanding in children with VI is only likely to be possible after they have mastered the 
concept of object permanence and the ecological self (Bigelow, 1995, 2003). Bigelow (2003) 
observed that the two children she studied supported this developmental pattern; the three types 
of joint attention behaviours only began to occur in the two children with VI once they developed 
their sense of ecological self and began to reach for objects in their environment. Furthermore, 
there was a developmental sequence of joint attention behaviours. The preliminary joint attention 
behaviours, such as the infant's use of the adult's bodies to find desired objects, emerged before 
the more liberally construed (e.g., object labelling) and conservatively construed (e.g., giving and 
taking game) joint attention behaviours, which occurred in a close parallel with one another. 
Importantly however, the children examined by Bigelow achieved these milestones later (i.e., 13-
19 months in one child and 17-29 months in the other) than sighted children, whose self-
knowledge and joint attention are established before the first year of life. Importantly, the 
achieved joint attention episodes between the children with VI and their parents were always 
initiated by the caregiver. Even though they actively participated in the maintenance of joint 
attention episodes initiated by the adult, the children studied by Bigelow did not instigate triadic 
interactions themselves. 
The findings so far (Bigelow, 2003; Preisler, 1991; Urwin, 1978) support the hypothetical stance 
(e.g., Hobson, 1990; 1993, 2002) that joint attention experience in the absence of visual 
stimulation, although delayed, is possible for children with VI, implying that the role of vision in 
these processes is not absolute. Children with severely impaired or absent functional vision 
depend developmentally on tactile information and memory, as well as auditory input such as 
sound changes, air currents, echolocation (Millar, 1988), and verbal guidance by others (Urwin, 
1978). Such experiences must, at least to an extent, allow them to learn to co-ordinate the spatial 
placement of objects and to establish a shared focus on such objects with others. However, 
despite the evidence of joint attentional engagement in children with VI, it generally appears that 
the nature of such engagement is qualitatively different from what is known about the joint 
attention capacity of sighted children, and this is particularly evident at the level of triadic 
interactions of secondary intersubjectivity. Additional studies, with larger samples, are certainly 
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necessary to further our understanding of joint attention and the processes underlying its 
development in children with VI. However, delayed attainment of specific joint attention 
behaviours in children with VI is suggestive of such children's developmental vulnerability which 
is likely to extend to further social developments. More specifically, given the importance of joint 
attention for the subsequent social achievements such as theory of mind, these achievements in 
children with VI are likely to be compromised (Hobson, 1990; 1993, 2002). The aim of the 
following section is to consider these developments in more detail. 
Later social functioning 
Theory of mind 
In line with Hobson (1990; 1993; 2002), several studies to date have shown that children with VI 
indeed have a specific difficulty in theory of mind understanding. The first such study was carried 
out by McAlpine and Moore (1995). Here, the first-order false-belief understanding was assessed 
in a group of 16 children with varying degrees of VI using two tactile versions of the unexpected 
contents tasks (perner et aL, 1987). The study was descriptive in nature as the wide range of 
ages and levels of verbal impairment in the sample prevented the use of standard statistical 
procedures. Additionally, it did not include a sighted control group to which to compare the 
performance of the children with VI. However, descriptions at the level of individual children 
showed that some children with VI, and in particular those whose VI was of greater severity, were 
unable to pass false-belief tasks which are typically expected to be mastered by sighted children 
of similar mental ability (perner et aL, 1987). However, McAlpine and Moore noted that some 
children with VI were able to complete the two tasks correctly, although such performance was 
confined solely to those children whose verbal mental ages were greater than 11 years and 
whose VI was of lesser severity. Despite its methodological drawbacks, the study by McAlpine 
and Moore provided the first suggestive evidence that children with congenital and profound VI 
may be subject to a delay in theory of mind development, in line with the role of related visual 
precursors proposed by Hobson. Importantly, the study paved the way for more controlled 
studies, which were consistent in showing that a subset of children with congenital VI, who do not 
have any additional impairments, experience difficulty with standard false-belief tasks at mental 
ages older than four. 
For instance, Minter et aL (1998) addressed some of the methodological problems of McAlpine 
and Moore's study by testing first-order false belief understanding in a larger and more 
homogeneous group of children in terms of the severity of their VI (i.e., those who had light 
perception or less) and by employing a sighted control group matched to their VI sample on 
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chronological and verbal mental age. The 21 children with VI in this study all had verbal mental 
ages above four years. The VI and the sighted control groups were presented with a variation of 
the unexpected contents task (perner et ai., 1987) and a variation of the unexpected transfer task 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983), both using the tactile presentation to suit the VI group. The results of 
the study confirmed the previous findings by McAlpine and Moore that a substantial number of 
children with congenital VI may indeed have a difficulty with first-order false-belief understanding 
at mental ages older than four years. However, there was a discrepancy in the VI groups' 
performance across the two tasks, with particularly notable lower performance on the unexpected 
contents task. It has been argued that the version of the unexpected contents task adapted by 
Minter et al. for this purpose may have underestimated the VI group's false-belief awareness, as 
it introduced an object (i.e., warmed tea-pot) which could be perceived as dangerous by children 
with VI, who have to explore such stimuli manually (Green, Pring, & Swettenham, 2004). In 
everyday circumstances children with VI may be more likely to identify materials such as 
hamburger wrappers and a teapot on the basis of aroma and heat, rather than their shape and 
this is likely to affect their judgement of what someone else would think is inside an odourless 
container. For this reason, the failure on the unexpected contents task involving a teapot or a 
hamburger wrapper may reflect a modality-specific perceptual problem in children with VI, 
confounding their theory of mind performance on this specific false-belief task (Peterson, 
Peterson, & Webb, 2000). 
Following from this, Peterson et al. (2000) attempted to test more sensitively the discrepancy 
between unexpected contents and unexpected transfer task performance in children with VI, by 
using two variations of each type of task used in the study by Minter et al. (1998). Rather than 
carrying out a comparison study with a control group, Peterson et al. (2000) were interested in 
systematically investigating developmental change in false-belief understanding in children with 
VI, over the period of five to 12 years. They assessed two groups of children with differing levels 
of VI and across differing ages (averaging at six, eight and 12 years). The findings of the study 
showed that, while the majority of the six year olds failed all four false-belief tasks, false-belief 
performance improved with age, although significant difficulties could be seen in some eight year 
olds and to a lesser extent in the 12 year olds. However, while age was found to be a significant 
and unique contributor in false-belief performance in this VI sample, the level of visual impairment 
was not so, and the pattern of theory of mind delay was seen across the range of severity of VI. 
Peterson and colleagues suggested that in children with VI, the limited access to non-social cues 
(e.g., facial expressions and eye-contact), which are important for discerning the conversational 
information on conversational partner's attentional focus and emotional attitude, restricts the 
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child's opportunity to appreciate what is in other's minds, impacting on their theory of mind. They 
argued that the theory of mind difficulties seen in children with VI, as a consequence of a 
restricted access to early socio-conversational experience, are a direct result of vision loss, rather 
than a delayed language or a lack of conversation partners, although this link was not specifically 
addressed by the study. 
More recently, Green et al. (2004) assessed false-belief task performance of a group of 18 
primary-school-aged children with congenital and total sight loss, and no other impairments. In 
order to control for intellectual level, lacking from the previous studies, the children with VI were 
individually matched to a group of sighted controls by age, verbal IQ and verbal mental age. All 
the children were assessed on three first-order false-belief task adapted from the previous studies 
on theory of mind in children with VI. The findings by Green et al. supported the previous studies' 
findings that children with congenital and profound vision loss have a difficulty with first-order 
false-belief task, when compared to developmentally-matched sighted controls. Interestingly, 
however, the verbal ability level significantly distinguished children with better and poorer false-
belief understanding in this study. Importantly, further investigation by Green in her PhD 
(Green/nee Cupples, 2001) revealed that many of the congenitally blind children she studied 
were able to catch up with their sighted peers on more advanced theory of mind tasks, once they 
mastered basic false-belief. However, as well as lending support to the general pattern of delay in 
theory of mind development observed in children with severely restricted vision, Green also 
identified a subset of children with VI who have-long term difficulties in the area. 
Such findings were most recently supported by Roch-Levecq (2006) who also demonstrated that 
primary school aged children with congenital and profound vision loss who have normal 
intelligence have a significantly poorer false-belief understanding than developmentally matched 
sighted controls. Interestingly however, in addition to poorer false-belief task performance, the 
children with VI in this study were found to be less accurate in conveying emotions facially to 
adult observers than were sighted participants. Similar findings were reported by Galati and 
colleagues (Galati, Miceli, & Sini, 2001), who found that voluntary expressions of emotion 
distinguished children with VI from sighted children, although their spontaneous expressions did 
not. Such findings can be explained in terms of the breakdown in primary intersubjectivity 
(Trevarthen, 1979) and what Hobson (2002) called affectively-charged interpersonal engagement 
(discussed previously in this section, see p. 17). Interpersonal engagement is perceptually (i.e., 
visually) and affectively driven, with an innate predisposition towards the bodily appearances and 
behaviour of others (Hobson, 1991), and visual imitation is a manifestation of such predisposition 
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(Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993). Accordingly, lack of vision hinders a child in developing 
representations of other people's mental states, resulting in both ambiguous facial emotional 
expression and delayed false-belief understanding (Roch-Levecq, 2006). 
While the majority of the studies on theory of mind in children with VI assessed first-order false 
belief understanding, Pring, Dewart and Brockbank (1998) used the Strange Stories paradigm 
(designed by Happe, 1994) to assess their advanced theory of mind understanding. The task 
consists of presenting children with a number of stories about everyday situations where the story 
protagonists say things that they do not literally mean (i.e., tapping advanced mental state 
elements, such as sarcasm, misunderstanding, persuasion, pretence and deceit). Pring et al. 
(1998) found that the children with congenital VI were poorer than age-matched sighted controls 
in predicting whether the protagonist's statements were true and in giving contextually-
appropriate mental state justifications for these statements. This suggested that the previously 
observed socio-cognitive difficulties, based on the children's false-belief performance, persist into 
later childhood in children with congenital VI (i.e., age 9-12). The authors also reported a 
significant relationship between the children's general intellectual levels and the frequency of their 
appropriate mental state justifications, suggesting that children with VI who are intellectually more 
able may also be more able to compensate for difficulties in their social cognition than children 
with lower intellectual levels (the finding supported by Green et aI., 2004). However, as the 
children in this study were not matched on cognitive ability, it remains unclear whether the 
difference between the VI and the sighted children may have been confined to the lower ability 
group. Nevertheless, the study by Pring et al. is the only one to date that has shown that children 
with congenital VI have a difficulty with advanced theory of mind understanding. 
Connections with autism 
From the theoretical and empirical evidence given thus far, it is clear that children with congenital 
VI are vulnerable to impoverished socio-communicative and socio-cognitive outcomes. What is 
particularly striking about the presentation of difficulties in social functioning in children with 
congenital VI is that many of these features are shared by sighted children with autism. The 
similarities between the two populations are both fascinating and alarming, and have been an 
intriguing topic of interest both in research and clinical and educational practice for over 15 years 
(Pring, 2005). 
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The seminal research that has highlighted the resemblance between the two populations was 
carried out by Hobson and colleagues (R. Brown, Hobson, Lee, & Stevenson, 1997; Hobson, 
Lee, & Brown, 1999). In a systematic observation of children with VI without a diagnosis of 
autism, using autism screening checklists, R. Brown et al. (1997) found that the children 
displayed a range of 'autistic-like' clinical features, including poor sociability and communicative 
competence, repetitive and restricted patterns of play, unusual sensory preoccupations, unusual 
mannerisms, stereotypies and echolalia. Interestingly, while a broad range and severity of such 
features were observed in a group of children with VI and higher intellectual ability relative to a 
group of sighted non-autistic controls, the lower ability group of children with VI was found to be 
virtually indistinguishable from a group of sighted children with a diagnosis of autism (see also 
Hobson et aI., 1999). The spectrum of autistic-like features in children with VI has also been 
reported elsewhere (Hobson & Bishop, 2003; Pring & Tadic, 2005). 
A number of other studies have also reported autistic-like patterns in specific behavioural and 
cognitive domains. More specifically, difficulties have been found in the area of social interaction 
and communicative competence (Preisler, 1991; Rowland, 1983; Trester & Brambring, 1992; 
Urwin, 1983); emotional expressiveness and emotional recognition (Dyck, Farrugia, Shochet, & 
Holmes-Brown, 2004; Minter, Hobson, & Pring, 1991; Trester & Brambring, 1992); symbolic (i.e., 
pretend) and functional play (M. Bishop, Hobson, & Lee, 2005; Fraiberg & Adelson, 1977; M. 
Hughes, Dote-Kwan, & Dolendo, 1998; V. Lewis, Norgate, Collis, & Reynolds, 2000; Troster & 
Brambring, 1994); behavioural mannerisms, rituals and stereotypes (Brambring & Troster, 1992; 
Chess, 1971; Troster, Brambring, & Beelmann, 1991); uneven profile of cognitive abilities, 
including difficulties with abstract thinking (Tillman & Osborne, 1969); autistic-like developmental 
regression (Cass et aI., 1994; Dale & Sonksen, 2002) and repetitive and unusual patterns of 
language use (i.e., echolalia and pronoun reversal) (Andersen, Dunlea, & Kekelis, 1984; Dunlea, 
1989; Fraiberg & Adelson, 1977; Wills, 1979). 
It is important to mention that autistic-like clinical features in children with congenital VI were 
initially observed in small groups of children with specific diagnoses such as congenital rubella, 
Leber's Amaurosis and retinopathy of prematurity (Chase, 1972; Chess, 1971; Ek, Fernell, 
Jacobson, & Gillberg, 1998; Keeler, 1956; Rogers & Newhart-Larson, 1989). However, the 
prevalence found across different aetiologies implies that such psychopathology in children with 
congenital VI is not confined to any specific ophthalmologic disease (Fraiberg, 1977; Keeler, 
1956; Mukaddes, Kilincaslan, Kucukyazici, Sevketoglu, & Tuncer, 2007). Additionally, the studies 
investigating the association between autistic-like features and specific VI aetiologies have shown 
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that such associations are often mediated by brain damage, severity of VI and associated 
intellectual impairment, implying that they are not likely to be a result of a specific diagnosis per 
se (Ek et aI., 1998; Mukaddes et aI., 2007). Others have also advocated general caution in 
interpreting autistic features in children with VI, as it is uncertain to what extent these can be put 
down to lack of sight per se or instead are a result of brain damaging events, social-emotional 
deprivation or other environmental factors that may coincide with visual problems (Cass, 1998; 
Fraiberg, 1977; Keeler, 1956; Warren, 1994). However, even though the autism-like picture may 
often seem more prominent in those children with VI and intellectual impairment (Cass, 1998; 
Hobson et al., 1999) and those children with VI in whom there is a known brain damage (Ek et al., 
1998; Mukaddes et aI., 2007), crucially the occurrence of such a phenotype has also been seen 
in children with VI without any known additional disabilities (R. Brown et aI., 1997). More 
specifically, R. Brown et al. observed that, even though there was a tendency of low ability 
children with VI to score higher on autism checklists, there was a considerable overlap in the 
clinical presentation of low and high IQ children with VI. However, even though 37% (nine out of 
24) of their VI sample (including both low and high IQ children) met the DSM criteria for a 
diagnosis of autism, only 8% of children (two out of 24) were clinically judged as being classically 
autistic. Thus, it generally appears that the autism presentation in children with VI is a broad 
constellation of relevant clinical features that vary in severity, rather than the case of a clear 
distinction between those children who have autism and those who do not. 
Interestingly, despite the striking resemblance in socio-developmental outcomes between the two 
populations of children, researchers and clinicians further speculate that the quality of social 
impairment and of affective engagement and communication with others in the two groups of 
children may not be fully comparable. For instance, despite a considerable overlap in the clinical 
presentation of autistic-like children with VI and sighted children with autism, R. Brown et al. 
(1997) noted that the socio-affective impairment in most of the autistic-like children with VI that 
they studied was less profound relative to sighted children with autism. In a fine grain 
investigation of the same children with VI studied by R. Brown et al. (i.e., those children with VI 
who were judged as autistic-like using the DSM criteria for autism), Hobson et al. (1999) 
observed that a minority of children with VI who were autistic-like, compared to the majority of 
sighted controls with autism, showed abnormalities in the way they related to people, their 
emotional expression, and the quality of affect. Conversely, a majority of the children with VI were 
found to engage in instances of pretend play, compared to a minority of children with autism. 
More recently, it has been shown that even socially impaired children with VI were able to show 
levels of social relating that are generally absent in sighted children with autism (Hobson & 
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Bishop, 2003). Therefore, while the clinical presentation of some children with VI may indeed be 
similar, even identical, to autism in sighted children, the nature of autism in children with and 
without sight is potentially qualitatively different (Cass, 1998).4 
Hobson was the first to provide a comprehensive theoretical account for the clinical similarities 
between autism and congenital sight loss, by proposing that the impairments in social relations, 
communication and symbolic play seen in the two groups may be traced to a shared 
psychopathology (Hobson, 1990, 1993,2005). Both groups of children experience problems with 
perceptions of other people's attitudes which are outwardly directed to a shared visually-specified 
world. However, children with congenital VI are unable to see visual evidence of their social 
partner's attitudes (e.g., facial expression manifesting fear in response to a fear-eVOking event), 
whilst children with autism seem to be unable to process this kind of information, despite a 
functioning visual channel. Although the causal mechanisms in terms of sensory and perceptual 
processes are clearly distinctive in the two populations, both are equally challenged in their ability 
to understand the relationships between attitudes, and the objects and events in the shared 
world. Therefore, whilst particular genetic and neurological factors may be necessary for autism 
to occur (Bauman, 1999), visual deprivation of this specific kind of social perspective-taking in 
children who are visually impaired is likely to contribute to related social and cognitive difficulties 
and delays (including difficulties with joint attention and theory of mind), predisposing them to 
autistic-like psychopathology (Hobson, 2005; Hobson et aI., 1999). 
The mechanisms underlying the pathogenesis of autism in children with VI still require further 
empirical consideration and further research is necessary to clarify the related mechanisms. 
However, Hobson presents a convincing case that specific socio-developmental factors may be 
responsible for the autism-like picture in children with VI, and that VI per se is likely to predispose 
a child to socio-developmental impairments that lead to the autistic-like syndrome (Hobson, 1990, 
1993, 2005). It is likely that social impairments seen in some children with VI who meet the full 
criteria for diagnosis of autism may indeed be a reflection of actual autism coinciding with vision 
loss, without an inherent connection with the lack of visual input. However, the wide spectrum of 
severity of autistic-like features and the quality of social impairment, observed even in those 
4 It is estimated that up to a third of all children with significant levels of VI present with a disorder that is very similar 
to autism in sighted children. However, there are major difficulties with defining diagnostic criteria for autism in 
children with VI, given the likely differences in the aetiology of the disorder in the two groups (Cass, 1998). 
Nevertheless, in clinical practice, some children with VI may also receive a diagnosis of autism, although the exact 
prevalence of dual diagnosis is unknown (N. Dale, personal communication). 
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children with VI who are not classically autistic, implies that there is something special about 
severe vision loss that plays a role in pathogenesis of autistic-like syndrome in children with VI 
(Hobson & Bishop, 2003). Finally, understanding of this role and the related mechanisms that 
underlie the autistic-like psychopathology in children with VI is of great importance, not only for 
understanding the developmental needs of such children, but also for understanding of autism in 
general, and for appreciating the mechanisms that underpin typical development. 
Summary of social functioning in children with VI 
Thus far, this chapter has dealt with the nature and potential causal mechanisms of socio-
communicative and socio-cognitive impairments in children with VI, leading on to the clinical and 
empirical concern regarding the behavioural as well as cognitive resemblances with sighted 
children with autism. However, as implied in the section above, the quality of social impairment in 
children with VI and sighted children with autism does seem to differentiate the two groups. More 
specifically, although there may be a common final pathway that leads to similar difficulties which 
characterise both groups of children, it is likely that the actual causal mechanisms contributing to 
pathogenesis of the syndrome of autism in the two populations are distinct (Hobson, 2005). In line 
with this, Baron-Cohen (2002) recently commented that the resemblance between children with 
VI and sighted children with autism may 'be no more than a surface similarity' and warned that 
'we should be careful not to assume that just because two church bells are ringing simultaneously 
they are causally connected by the same rope' (p. 792). For this reason, it is also important to 
consider that, despite the generally vulnerable socio-developmental outcomes in children with VI, 
the developmental trajectory of social milestones such as joint attention and theory of mind in 
such children appears to be different from the trajectory seen in sighted children with autism. 
More specifically, the picture of joint attention and theory of mind development in children with VI 
depicts a delayed trajectory rather than a deficient one, which potentially contrasts the classic 
presentation of autism where disruptions to early joint attention behaviours and lack of theory of 
mind have been seen as core deficits. The trajectories of social functioning in the two populations 
are inherently complex and it is likely that along those trajectories various underlying processes 
and mediating mechanisms exert their influence on the children's developmental outcomes. 
However, while such mechanisms may indeed be involved in both groups, they may serve 
potentially different functions for the two populations of children. In children with VI in particular, 
compared to children with autism, such mechanisms may in fact playa compensatory, rather than 
a mediating role, stepping in the place of a missing information channel. The theory and research 
evidence exploring this hypothesis will be discussed in further detail in the following section. 
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LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL FUNCTIONING 
One particular developmental mechanism that appears to distinguish children with VI and children 
with autism is language. More specifically, whilst impairments in language development and 
functioning are one of the defining features of autism (Rapin & Dunn, 2003; Tager-Flusberg, 
1993), for children with VI language is generally believed to be an area of strength (Landau & 
Gleitman, 1985; Perez-Pereira & Conti-Ramsden, 1999; Warren, 1994). The relationship between 
developments in language and social functioning in both groups of children is an important topic 
for both empirical research and clinical intervention. Importantly, however, while much is known 
about the aspects of this relationship in autism (Fisher, Happe, & Dunn, 2005; Happe, 1995; 
Tager-Flusberg, 2000), the interaction between the acquisition of language and social milestones 
remains largely unexplored in children with VI. For instance, impairments in early socio-
communicative experiences of joint attention in autism may explain why language is delayed and, 
in fact, why some children with the disorder never acquire language (Tager-Flusberg, 2000). On 
the other hand, despite difficulties with early joint attention, and some reported idiosyncrasies in 
initial language acquisition, children with VI seem to develop language with relative ease (Landau 
& Gleitman, 1985; Perez-Pereira & Conti-Ramsden, 1999). In fact, once it is developed, language 
appears to be the most salient channel through which children with VI acquire knowledge and 
experience the world (Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Peters, 1994). Thus, language seems an 
important topic for research and intervention with children with VI. The aim of the following 
section is to consider the evidence which relates to the role that language plays in the 
development of such children and, more specifically, to consider its relationship with their socio-
communicative and socio-cognitive development. Before this role of language for children with VI 
can be addressed explicitly, the function of language in social milestones will be first considered 
with regards to sighted children. 
Evidence from sighted children 
The relationship between language and social functioning is likely to be complex and the nature 
and causality of this relationship has been the subject of ongoing debate amongst researchers 
(reviewed in Astington & Baird, 2005; de Villiers, 2000; Slade & Ruffman, 2005). While early 
social experiences and non-verbal communication in pre-lingual development are regarded as 
important predecessors to language acquisition, growing language repertoire and comprehension 
of various linguistic concepts is likely to have a facilitating effect on the child's development of 
social cognition. Additionally, it is possible that other cognitive and environmental factors playa 
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significant role in mediating the relationship between the two processes. The intrinsic intertwining 
and causality between language, social milestones and many potentially mediating factors is an 
important topic for further research, but one which is beyond the scope of the current thesis. 
Nevertheless, it is important to consider some empirical evidence regarding this relationship. 
Language and early social communication 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, joint attention has been given a central role in the 
development of language. This is because language is a socially learned skill and joint attention 
provides a crucial socio-communicative format within which such learning occurs (Adamson, 
Bakeman, & Deckner, 2004; Tomasello, 1995). Joint attention behaviours such as eye-gaze 
alternation and non-verbal gestures generally precede the acquisition of first words, thus it is easy 
to appreciate how they may be necessary for language acquisition (Butterworth & Grover, 1990). 
Indeed, a substantial body of research has linked early joint attention experiences with language 
development over time in typically developing sighted children (Carpenter et aI., 1998; Charman 
et aI., 2000; Mundy & Gomes, 1998; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). For example, it has been shown 
that the capacity of the child to respond to and follow the adult's focus of attention early in infancy 
significantly predicts their later vocabulary growth (Markus et aI., 2000; Mundy, Fox, & Card, 
2003; Mundy, Kasari, Sigman, & Ruskin, 1995), while the time spent in joint attention early on is 
generally found to be related to receptive and expressive language over time (Mundy et aI., 1995; 
Tomasello & Farrar, 1986; Tomasello & Todd, 1983). The reverse relationship also holds as 
receptive language at 12 months has been found to be predictive of the time spent in joint 
attention at 18 months (Markus et aI., 2000; Tomasello & Todd, 1983). Importantly, the caregiver 
has been given the central role in the relationship between joint attention and language 
development (Bruner, 1983) and the social responsiveness and communicative style employed 
by the caregiver in the joint attention episode have been found to be related to increased 
vocabulary acquisition in the child (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). 
Support for the longitudinal association of early joint attention and later language ability also 
comes from several studies with children with autism (Charman et aI., 2003; Charman et aI., 
2005; Mundy, 1995; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1990; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999; Stone & Yoder, 
2001). In fact, these studies have demonstrated the predictive value of joint attention capacity in 
later language development by consistently showing that in children with autism, greater ability to 
initiate and respond to joint attention in preschool years predicted language outcomes up to eight 
years later. For that reason, joint attention has been highlighted as an important target for 
intervention in autism (Charman et aI., 2003) and recent evidence suggests that training joint 
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attention skills in autism leads to significant improvements in language developments (Drew et 
aI., 2002; Kasari, Paparella, Freeman, & Jahromi, 2008). 
Language and social cognition 
Given that language as a developmental process is borne explicitly out of a social context, it is 
easy to appreciate its facilitative effects on subsequent social development. Research with 
typically developing children has consistently supported a strong link between language and 
children's developing social cognition, the implicit understanding being that a child's developing 
knowledge of their own and others' mental states must be facilitated through language and 
communication, both verbal and non-verbal (Astington & Baird, 2005; Tager-Flusberg, 1993). 
With regards to theory of mind in particular, language has been seen as playing a fundamental 
role and numerous studies to date have demonstrated a significant correlation between 
standardized language measures and performance on theory of mind tasks in children (Astington 
& Jenkins, 1999; Cutting & Dunn, 1999; C. Hughes & Dunn, 1997). Although the causality of this 
relationship has been a matter of some disagreement, it seems likely that language plays a 
causal role in children'S theory of mind development, rather than vice versa. More specifically, 
research evidence shows that linguistic abilities in children predict their theory of mind 
performance at different time points, whereas the reverse relationship generally does not hold 
(Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003; Watson, 
Painter, & Bornstein, 1998). The causal role of language in theory of mind is also supported by 
research with children who are autistic and children born with hearing impairment (HI). For 
instance, children with autism with better linguistic competence show better theory of mind 
outcomes than children with autism with lower language ability and generally require a higher 
language level than typically developing children to pass false-belief tasks (Fisher et aI., 2005; 
Happe, 1995; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994b). Similarly, children with HI who are born of 
hearing impaired parents, and are therefore exposed to sign language from the earliest stages of 
development, do not show theory of mind delays and difficulties, which are typically observed in 
children with HI born of hearing parents and who acquire sign language somewhat later 
(Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1999,2000; P. A. Russell et aI., 1998; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). 
Whereas researchers are in general agreement that the role of language is fundamental to 
children'S developing social understanding, there has been an ongoing debate regarding what 
particular aspects of language playa greater role in children's theory of mind. With regards to 
understanding of false belief in particular, some researchers have argued that it is syntactic 
ability, which involves combining words into sentences, that enables children to attribute mental 
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states to self and others, because understanding of the word sequences in a sentence is mirrored 
in the child's understanding of the sequence of events in the false-belief scenario (Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002). Conversely, others have argued that semantic 
knowledge plays a more significant role in understanding false belief, as this is suggested to be 
dependent on understanding the terms used to refer to cognitive mental states such as 'think' and 
'know' (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; C. Moore, Pure, & Furrow, 1990; Olson, 1988). More recently, 
Ruffman and colleagues have demonstrated that general language ability, which incorporates 
both semantic and syntactic knowledge, in fact reflects on children's understanding of false belief 
(Ruffman et aI., 2003; Slade & Ruffman, 2005). These authors have argued that the early 
knowledge of mental states (e.g., knowing, thinking, believing), which is implicit and often 
manifested through behaviours such as eye-gaze (Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & Connolly, 2001), 
provides children with the terminology for thinking explicitly about mental states. As both syntax 
and semantics develop in tandem, and are closely interlinked in normal language development, 
they may both assist in theory of mind development by allowing the child to refine their implicit 
intuitions about other people's beliefs and intentions into explicit theories about those states 
(Ruffman et aI., 2003) 
Language as a social function 
Given that language is a skill learned essentially under social circumstances, language itself can 
be viewed as a social function. Therefore, to gain a better appreciation of its role in children's 
social understanding, it is essential to try and distinguish social aspects of language from general 
linguistic competence that is mirrored in children's understanding of syntax and semantics (i.e., 
from structural language). 
An important social function of language, commonly referred to as pragmatic language ability, 
involves the ability to use and interpret language appropriately in social situations in order to 
achieve successful communication both by verbal and non-verbal means (D. V. M. Bishop, 2005; 
Rapin, 1996). In everyday social interaction non-verbal pragmatic skills such as facial 
expressions, gestures and body postures provide a useful context for conveying and interpreting 
language and the speaker's communicative intentions. Verbal pragmatics, on the other hand, 
underlie the ability to appropriately apply conversational rules such as initiating, responding, turn-
taking, and maintaining meaningful conversation. Importantly, these skills are involved in keeping 
track of speaker's and listener's mental states; hence they are by definition related to theory of 
mind (Astington & Baird, 2005) and are believed to be at the heart of social functioning (Tager-
Flusberg, 2000). 
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Another inherently social aspect of language that has been regarded as a key component of 
children' social cognition is mental states discourse (reviewed by de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006; 
Symons, 2004). It is now widely believed that the use of language that represents thoughts, 
desires and feelings in children's conversational discourse may be an important indicator of their 
theory of mind ability (Baron-Cohen, 2000; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Harris, de Rosnay, & Pons, 
2005; Tager-Flusberg, 2000). In research with typically developing children, correlations between 
the comprehension and frequency of use of cognitive and emotion terms and the performance on 
false-belief tasks have been consistently demonstrated (J. R. Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 
1996; C. Hughes & Dunn, 1997, 1998). Moreover, it has been argued that use of mental state 
terms in children's language precedes their mastery of false-belief tasks (Bartsch & Wellman, 
1995; Harris, 1996; Wellman, 1990), supported by the evidence that children's early references to 
desires and thoughts are in fact predictive of their subsequent false-belief performance (C. 
Hughes & Dunn, 1998). 
Children's ability to engage in such discourse has been closely linked to their conversational 
interactions with family members and peers (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 
1991; C. Hughes & Dunn, 1997; C. Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki, & Berridge, 
1998). More recently, however, specific emphasis has been placed on the quality of mother-child 
discourse, and maternal mental state language input in particular. In relation to this, extensive 
research evidence now links such input to a child's level of social understanding (de Rosnay, 
Pons, Harris, & Morrell, 2004; Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998; Meins et aI., 
2003; Meins et aI., 2002; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 
2007; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). Importantly, a number of more recent studies have 
provided strong evidence that the role of maternal mental state input is in fact a causal 
mechanism in children's growing social knowledge of the mind (Meins et aI., 2003; Meins et aI., 
2002; Ruffman et aI., 2002; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). More specifically, such studies have 
shown that the mother's early mental state talk in their conversational interactions with their 
children is a unique predictor of the children's theory of mind task performance over time, as the 
direction of this relationship remains even after potential mediators (i.e., mothers' educational 
level, children's ages, language ability, children's own use of mentalistic language and their early 
theory of mind) are controlled for. Thus, the continuous exposure to mental state language 
provided by the primary caregiver provides a unique contribution to children's developing theory 
of mind and is likely to continuously promote their socio-communicative competence and 
understanding. 
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Social language in atypical circumstances: Insights from autism 
Pragmatic communication impairment is a cardinal feature of autism (Lord & Paul, 1997; Norbury 
& Bishop, 2002). For example, sighted individuals with autism are impaired in making contextually 
appropriate inferences and inferences about social scripts (Dennis, Lazenby, & Lockyer, 2001) 
and show difficulties with comprehending figure of speech (Happe, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1999), narrative humour (Ozonoff & Miller, 1996) and contextual understanding of questions 
(Loukusa et aI., 2007). Interestingly, such pragmatic language difficulties have been observed 
even in those individuals with autism who have good linguistic competence and structural 
language skills (Landa, 2000; Lord & Paul, 1997). Tager-Flusberg (1993; 1999; 2000) reviewed 
evidence which showed that individuals with autism at all ages have difficulty taking into account 
the listener's perspective, which affects their ability to engage in conversation in a sustained or 
meaningful way. They also have difficulty conforming to conversational rules, such as initiating 
and engaging in reciprocal conversations, and tend to talk about their own interests, without 
regard to their listener's interests or role in the conversation. Impaired pragmatic communication 
in autism echoes the poor theory of mind profile that characterises the disorder. In line with this 
profile, it is therefore not surprising to find reduced mental state discourse skills in autism. It has 
been shown that children with autism rarely use such language in their spontaneous 
conversational discourse or in their descriptions of pictures involving action and deception 
(Baron-Cohen et aI., 1985; Tager-Flusberg, 1992, 1995). Lack of reference to mental states in 
conversational discourse in autism has also been observed in adulthood and those individuals 
with autism with good language competence (Dennis et aI., 2001; Happe, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999). On the other hand, subsequent studies have argued that mental state discourse is 
not necessarily impoverished in autism; the apparent lack of references to mental state terms 
may be a reflection of the restricted narrative techniques employed by individuals with autism, 
where such individuals are less likely to refer to mental states within a causal framework and to 
use pragmatic devices to engage the listener (e.g., supplying a conversational partner with 
contingent relevant new information, character speech, sound effects, repetition, empathic stress) 
(Capps, Kehres, & Sigman, 1998; Capps, Losh, & Thurber, 2000; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 
1994a). A significant correlation between reduced use of such pragmatic devices and 
performance on theory of mind tasks in autism has been empirically demonstrated (Capps et aI., 
1998; Capps et aI., 2000). 
There clearly is a link between social language abilities and social understanding in sighted 
children with autism. It is possible that such fundamental impairments in children with autism are 
at least to an extent mediated by specific linguistic mechanisms that may complement their social 
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knowledge, given the better socio-cognitive outcomes in those children who are verbally able 
(Happe, 1995; Tager-Flusberg, 2000). However, while such children may rely on verbal 
scaffolding and the explicit teaching of others in order to deal with the demands of socio-cognitive 
tasks, the social understanding they may develop is likely to be superficial and insufficient for 
successfully dealing with the demands of the real-life social world and socia-interactive 
relationships with others (Dennis et aI., 2001; Klin, 2000). 
Implications for children with VI5 
Following the research reviewed so far, a crucial question that forms the backbone of the present 
thesis arises: Is there a special role for language in the development of children with VI, and more 
specifically, what is the mechanism that language may provide for their social functioning in 
particular? 
Language development in children with VI is likely to be a somewhat controversial topic. The 
evidence linking early socio-communicative experiences and language development in typically 
developing sighted children and children with autism implies that disruptions to joint attention 
experiences in VI may impede development of specific language skills in children with VI. 
Consequently, delayed theory of mind outcomes in children with VI may be seen as a direct effect 
of, not only impoverished and vision-deprived early social interaction, but also of subsequent 
difficulties in language development. Yet, whether language is an area of potential difficulty for 
children with VI has been widely disputed. Language has in fact been highlighted as an area of 
particular strength in development of such children. Perez-Pereira and Conti-Ramsden (1999) in 
particular have argued that, in VI, the role of language is a compensatory one, providing a 
mechanism by which the visual information is transformed into verbal one. In a number of 
investigations that these authors have undertaken with individual children with VI and their 
families, these authors (and collaborators) have indeed demonstrated that the general 
characteristics of language acquisition and progression of linguistic competence in children with 
VI closely resemble the characteristics of language development in sighted children (e.g., Conti-
Ramsden & Perez-Pereira, 1998, 1999; Perez-Pereira, 1994; Perez-Pereira & Castro, 1997). 
5 The issues raised in this chapter are a focus of the empirical investigations presented in this thesis. Thus, while in 
the present chapter only a brief exposition of the relevant literature may be provided, in-depth review will be given in 
the introductions of the subsequent chapters. 
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On the other hand, some contrasting evidence suggests that the initial language development of 
children with VI is characterized by specific delays and irregularities (Andersen et aI., 1984; 
Dunlea, 1989; Fraiberg, 1977; McConachie & Moore, 1994). For instance, it has been shown that 
the emergence of first words and related development of word meaning is delayed in children 
with VI due to limited experiences compared to sighted children (Andersen et aI., 1984; Dunlea, 
1989). Similarly, referential language (e.g., use of personal nouns and spatial terms) has been 
found to be an area of difficulty for children with VI, as such language is thought to be particularly 
dependent on the utility of vision. More specifically, visual experience helps to resolve the 
ambiguity which occurs when words take on different meanings depending on the location and 
identity of the speaker (e.g., spatial terms like 'here' and 'there' and pronouns like 'I' 'he' and 
'she') and young children with VI tend to confuse such terms (Fraiberg & Adelson, 1977; Mulford, 
1983). However, it has been argued that, even though some language differences between 
children with VI and children who are sighted may indeed occur (particularly as a result of the 
child's unique perceptual experiences), the language of children with VI is not devoid of content 
or meaning, and there is in fact little evidence that it is impaired in any way (Landau & Gleitman, 
1985). Such literature is explored in more detail in Chapter 3 of the thesis where the pertinent 
issues are of specific relevance. However, it is important to mention that despite possible 
idiosyncrasies in the early language development of children with VI, it is generally accepted that 
if any initial difficulties do exist early on they tend to be resolved by the school age when the 
language of such children appears to be indistinguishable from that of sighted children (Landau & 
Gleitman, 1985; Mills, 1993; Warren, 1994). 
However, our knowledge about the language of children with VI is largely limited to the 
development and function of structural language, particularly in pre-school development, whilst 
very little is known about the social language use of children with VI and, more specifically, how 
such language may reflect their social competence and knowledge in later childhood. In fact, the 
existing studies on pragmatic language in children with VI, drawing upon investigations of very 
small numbers of children and often only individual cases, are largely inconclusive. While some 
evidence suggests that pragmatic language development in children with VI in fact is an area of 
vulnerability (James & Stojanovik, 2007; Mills, 1993), others have failed to find significantly 
different outcomes from those observed in sighted children (Perez-Pereira, 1994; Perez-Pereira & 
Castro, 1992). This area of language in children with VI certainly merits further investigations and 
is given detailed attention in Chapter 3, where the relevant literature is discussed further. 
Crucially, mental state discourse in children with VI remains largely unexplored and is given more 
detailed attention in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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To address the social language use of children with VI, it is important to consider the environment 
within which the use of such language is learned, because the social language characteristics of 
children with VI are likely to be a consequence of that environment rather than of the visual 
impairment per se (Warren, 1994). Within this environment, emphasis is generally given to the 
socio-interactive style of the parent-child relationship and on the parental language input in 
particular. While the general language input provided by a caregiver is important for any child, this 
specific contribution by the caregiver may be of particular importance to a child with VI, who may 
rely on this input as an essential source of information that is otherwise easily available to 
children who are sighted. In the case of children who are sighted, the exchange of communicative 
intentions between mother and child is not likely to be dependent on the verbal channel, given the 
abundance of non-verbal communicative means such as gestures, facial expressions and eye-
gaze behaviours (i.e., joint attention) (Hobson, 2002; Stern, 1985). However, mothers and their 
children with VI may particularly rely on the verbal modality for sharing of thoughts, interests and 
feelings about the external world with each other (Perez-Pereira & Conti-Ramsden, 1999; Urwin, 
1978). However, this may not always be easy. Naturally, part of communicative competence 
involves the sensitivity to the needs and perspectives of the interactional partner. Sighted children 
can learn to respond contingently to their mother's previous turn in conversation and attend to 
their mother's interests by maintaining eye-contact, and this is likely to facilitate their mother's 
responsiveness. On the other hand, for children who are visually impaired, monitoring their 
mother's intentions and communicative approach may be more difficult, hence they may appear 
more passive than sighted children (Kekelis & Prinz, 1996). This passivity in turn may impact on 
the parent, who may indeed be at a disadvantage when trying to interpret the subtle social cues 
given by the child (Preisler, 1991; Rogers & Puchalski, 1984). However, the few studies that have 
explored the conversational interactions between children with VI and their mothers are 
inconclusive. For instance, some authors have argued that mothers' language input to their 
visually impaired children is restricted and impoverished compared to mothers with sighted 
children and may be a direct consequence of a different parent-child communication style, where 
attention in a child with a significant sight loss cannot be caught and directed by eye-contact 
(Andersen, Dunlea, & Kekelis, 1993; Kekelis & Andersen, 1984; Kekelis & Prinz, 1996; V. Moore 
& McConachie, 1994). However, others have shown that that the parents of children with VI are 
able to develop alternative strategies when conversing with their children (Behl, Akers, Boyce, & 
Taylor, 1996; Perez-Pereira & Conti-Ramsden, 1999,2001). The extent of mental state language 
input to children with VI, as well as their productive output, is yet to be addressed by research 
and is considered in further detail in Chapter 5. 
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AIMS AND OVERVIEW 
It is clear that children with VI, both as a model experimental group or individually, have so much 
to offer to developmental science. Although the clinical existence of autism itself may have been 
an important catalyst for the emergence of the prominent theories of the mechanisms that are 
involved in the processes of social functioning, it is likely that children with VI may provide an 
equally useful, and potentially unique, theoretical and methodological model for investigating such 
mechanisms. Without a doubt, there is so much more that can be learned from autism in sighted 
children; however, it is possible to isolate a similar contribution to the theory and clinical practice 
which is exclusively provided by considering the development of children born with VI. 
Thus far, in theoretical terms, the aim of the present thesis was to consider the empirical 
evidence of the developmental trajectory of social functioning in children with VI, while drawing 
upon the prominent theories and research evidence concerning such functioning in typically 
developing sighted children and children with autism. However, the present literature review has 
not delved into the methodological challenges, which are an integral part of research with children 
with VI and which contribute to its general scarcity. For this reason, Chapter 2 is solely devoted to 
this purpose. 
In empirical terms however, and drawing upon the theoretical and methodological issues raised in 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the present thesis has six general aims. The first such aim is to shed 
further light on the language abilities of children with VI, with a view to understand the potential 
role that these may play for their social functioning. Whilst previous studies have shown that good 
verbal ability is facilitative of developmental (including social) outcomes of children with VI, such 
studies have failed to isolate the true contribution of language from a child's general intelligence. 
This issue is therefore addressed by the research presented in Chapter 3. Another aim of the 
research presented within Chapter 3 is to provide further understanding of the quality of social 
and communicative impairments in children with VI by addressing the nature of the autistic-like 
socio-communicative phenotype in children with VI, and to gain an insight into the aspects of 
language that may explain the variation within such a phenotype in these children. 
The third aim of the thesis is to provide an insight into the socio-cognitive competence of children 
with VI, which extends beyond the false-belief paradigm and places emphasis on their mental 
state language. No studies to date have examined the use of such language in children with VI. 
As an indicator of theory of mind in particular, the use of mental state terms in children with VI 
46 
may be of particular importance, as the only measure of such knowledge in children so far has 
been their false-belief task performance. The dichotomous nature of false-belief tasks may not 
lead to an authentic representation of real-life social knowledge, and children are likely to show 
more variation in the degrees of theory of mind capacities than the false-belief paradigm allows. 
Thus, false-belief tasks may, to an extent, trivialise or even underestimate the social 
understanding of children with VI, whereas their use of mental state language when making 
judgements of social events may provide a more realistic assessment of their social knowledge. 
This hypothesis is explored in Chapter 4. 
The fourth aim is to investigate the context within which social language learning occurs for 
children with VI and focuses particularly on maternal mental state language input to such children 
during a mother-child dialogue. Mother-child mental state discourse has not previously been 
investigated in children with VI. Although a small number of studies examining mother-child 
dialogue exist with such children, these are largely limited to very young, often pre-lingual 
children, providing a reduced context from which to sample the mother-child mental state 
discourse. The research presented in Chapter 5 explores this particular aspect of the socio-
interactive learning environment in children with VI. 
The fifth aim, which is addressed in Chapter 6, is to pinpoint the potential role of other underlying 
mechanisms that may account for developmental outcomes in children with VI, and which remain 
crucial in the socio-communicative and socio-cognitive development of sighted children. More 
specifically, while the cognitive mechanisms of attention and executive function are highlighted as 
crucial in socio-developmental outcomes in typical development (see Chapter 6 for a more 
detailed review of the literature), the contribution of such mechanisms remains unknown in 
children with VI. 
The sixth, and last, aim of the thesis is to consider the relationships between the outcomes 
across the four experimental chapters, with a view to fuse different aspects of the developmental 
picture presented by the children with VI who participated in this research. The correlational 
analyses which address this aim are presented in Chapter 7. 
While the aims of the thesis are presented here at a relatively general level, the theoretical and 
methodological underpinnings of these aims, and with specific questions pertinent to those aims, 
are given more detailed consideration within the relevant experimental chapters. Finally, a 
synthesis of the findings across these chapters, linking to the theoretical accounts that underlie 
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those investigations, is presented in the general discussion in Chapter 8. The aim of this 
synthesis is to highlight the unique contribution of the present research to understanding of 
developmental needs of children with VI and the implications that they have for child development 
in general. 
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Chapter 2 
Visual Impairment (VI): Methodological Considerations 
SUMMARY 
Rigorous inclusion criteria are crucial when investigating developmental outcomes of children with 
VI, as these outcomes must be considered in the context of the child's vision loss, rather than any 
other underlying, non-sensory impairment. However, the methodological difficulties of adopting 
such criteria impact directly on both the quantity and quality of research carried out with such 
children, and existing studies are notably rare and methodologically limited. The aim of this 
chapter is to consider the methodological challenges contributing to the scarcity of research with 
children with VI and with a view to understand the conflicting evidence that may have ensued as 
a result of these challenges. 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF VI CHARACTERISTICS ON RESEARCH METHODS 
Low prevalence 
Given the relative rarity of the population (Chapter 1, p. 14), it is not surprising that one of the 
main methodological difficulties in research with children with congenital VI is obtaining an 
adequate sample size. For that reason, the majority of VI related developmental research is 
generally grounded in investigations of small numbers of children and often only individual cases. 
In addition to relatively low prevalence of congenital VI, modest study samples of children with VI 
are also a result of attempts to control for other potentially confounding effects that are inherently 
associated with presentation of visual impairment (see section below). Even though small 
samples are generally at risk of compromised experimental power and reduced generalisability of 
the findings, investigations of few or individual children with VI can provide a rich and more 
detailed insight into their developmental processes, as long as appropriate measures are taken to 
ensure a high quality of sampling. Such measures are considered throughout this chapter. 
49 
Population heterogeneity 
Aetiology of VI 
VI is associated with high heterogeneity, the main source of which is the diverse aetiology of the 
impairment. Congenital causes are now predominant, as the incidence of visual loss caused by 
acquired disease in childhood (e.g., corneal infections) has been reduced with economic 
development (Rahi & Dezateux, 1998). Congenital causes of VI in childhood are i) genetic 
disease (e.g., albinism), ii) intrauterine events (e.g., congenital rubella), and iii) perinatal disease 
(e.g., oxygen deprivation at birth and retinopathy of prematurity - growth of abnormal blood 
vessels in the retina associated with premature birth), with genetic and perinatal disease being 
the most common in the developed world (Baird & Moore, 1993; Rahi & Dezateux, 1998). 
For the purposes of research investigating the impact of congenital VI on development, 
heterogeneity introduced by diverse aetiology (and associated confounding effects) can be 
dramatically reduced by applying an appropriate taxonomy for the classification of visual 
disorders. One such taxonomy has been developed by the clinical team at the Developmental 
Vision Clinic (DVC) at the University College London, Institute of Child Health and Great Ormond 
Street Hospital for Children NHS Trust, London, UK from which the participants for the research 
reported in this thesis were recruited (Dale & Sonksen, 2002; Sonksen & Dale, 2002).6 According 
to the DVC taxonomy, the site of origin of the congenital visual disorder is classified as cerebral 
(posterior visual pathways and visual nervous system) or peripheral (the globe, the retina and the 
anterior optic nerve) and is established through ophthalmologic diagnostics. Based on the DVC 
records (in Dale & Sonksen, 2002; Sonksen & Dale, 2002), cerebral congenital disorders of the 
visual system (i.e., cortical VI) are the most common and are associated with additional 
disabilities, including learning difficulties and cerebral palsy (see also Good, Jan, Burden, 
Skoczenski, & Candy, 2001). Congenital disorders of the peripheral visual system (CDPVS) 
account for about 30% of children with VI. The CDPVS group is subdivided into two groups. The 
first group is referred to as Potentially Complicated CDPVS and it involves children in whom the 
peripheral eye disorder is a part of a diagnosed paediatric disorder including underlying damage 
to the central nervous system. Examples of Potentially Complicated CDPVS are cataracts in 
Down Syndrome and retinal dystrophy in peroxysomal disorders (i.e., a group of congenital 
diseases characterized by the absence of normal peroxisomes in the cells of the body, such as 
6 The DVe is a specialized tertiary-level clinic to which young children with severe visual disorders of heterogeneous 
aetiology are referred (by paediatricians or ophthalmologists) for specialist assessment and management of their 
vision and development. 
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Joubert Syndrome). The second group is referred to as Potentially Simple CDPVS and involves 
children in whom there is no known involvement of the central nervous system in the visual 
disorder diagnosis. Because of the lower expected incidence of confounding variables in this 
group, compared to the children with cortical VI and those with Potentially Complicated CDPVS, 
children with Potentially Simple CDPVS are proposed to be a model group for clinical and 
developmental research (Sonksen & Dale, 2002). This is thought to be a particularly rare 
subpopulation; the exact prevalence is unknown but estimated as 350 born annually in the UK 
(Sonksen & Dale, 2002). Example diagnoses falling under the Potentially Simple CDPVS 
classification are: glaucoma, micropthalmia, aniridia, coloboma, Norrie's Syndrome, cataracts, 
Leber's amaurosis, cone dystrophy, albinism, optic nerve aplasia and optic nerve hypoplasia. 
Degree of vision loss 
Another challenge in assessing the developmental impact of VI in childhood stems from the lack 
of consensus in definitions and measurement of severity of vision loss that have been used both 
in research and practice. Traditionally, categories such as 'blind' and 'partially sighted' have been 
used in educational and legal contexts and have been assigned to children and adults based on 
distance visual acuity measurements, such as the Snellen chart or, more recently, log MAR. The 
Snellen chart, for instance, estimates the power of the eye to distinguish fine detail (e.g., letters) 
at different distances. For example, a normal eye can read the top letter (which is approximately 
one centimetre high) on the 6-metre chart from a distance of 6 metres; thus in the UK normal 
vision is expressed as 6/6 (also known as 20/20 in the USA). According to the World Health 
Association (WHO, 1980) 'partially sighted' individuals (i.e., moderate to severe VI) have visual 
acuity ranging from less than 6/18 (i.e., they can see less at 6 metres than what a normal eye 
sees at 18) down to 3/60, whereas a 'blind' person (i.e., profound VI / total lack of sight) has a 
visual acuity ranging from 3/60 down to no light perception. 
However, the visual acuity tests, such as Snellen and log MAR, do not provide criteria that grade 
the degrees of visual impairment which are below the lowest limits of such measures, and are not 
suitable for use with younger children. This has important implications for meeting the needs of 
individual children with VI. Few of these children are completely blind, although their existing 
vision levels cannot be measured by the traditional acuity methods (Hatton, Bailey, Burchinal, & 
Ferrell, 1997). For this reason, visual impairment may be viewed more appropriately as a 
continuum of decreasing visual function. Thus, while very broad categories like 'blind' and 
'partially sighted' may be appropriate for grouping children with VI for legal and educational 
purpose, they may not be useful (nor accurate) when used in clinical and empirical context. In this 
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respect, for considering the impact of differing levels of vision loss on the developmental process 
of a child with VI, more narrow grading of the levels of visual function may be more appropriate 
(H atton et al., 1997). 
Sonksen and colleagues (Sonksen, 1983, 1993) developed the Near Detection Vision scale 
(NOV), which allows for formal grading of vision levels that are below the standard acuity 
measures. The measure was specifically developed for the purpose of meeting the 
developmental needs of infants and young children with significant levels of VI and grouping them 
meaningfully for developmental research. According to the NOV, significant visual impairment in 
childhood can be categorised as profound (PVI) or severe (SVI), distinguishing children with and 
without 'form' vision (Le., awareness of visual targets that do not reflect light). On the NOV scale, 
PVI status implies the absence of 'form vision' and is defined as having the ability to perceive light 
reflecting objects (e.g., a spinning silver tinsel ball) size 12.5 cm at the distance of 30 cm or less. 
Conversely, SVI status implies the presence of 'form' vision and is defined as having the ability to 
perceive a non-light reflecting objects (e.g., a spinning woolly ball) size 12.5cm from a distance of 
30 cm or better. While the PVI population is relatively homogenous in terms of their vision loss, 
children with SVI vary with respect to their levels of form perception. However, the available level 
of form vision in this group is still severely degraded and below the standard acuity measures 
(i.e., below distance equivalents of Snellen 6/30), hence children with SVI are considered 
clinically to be a vulnerable group. 
Previously, researchers have attempted to control for the potentially confounding effects of the 
varying levels of vision loss by specifying the inclusion criteria at the level of congenital and total 
sight loss (i.e., light perception or less from birth / PVI only) (e.g. Green et aI., 2004; Hobson et 
aI., 1999; Minter et aI., 1998). Such rigorous selection criteria do seem vital in studies 
investigating the effects of vision on specific developmental outcomes. However, in such studies, 
systematic screening of the vision levels of children with VI was usually based upon teacher and 
parental reports and case notes. It can therefore never be certain whether the 'pure' samples of 
children with 'congenital and total blindness' reported in the previous research were in fact 
homogenous, or whether they were likely to have included also children with some useful levels 
of, however degraded, form vision (e.g., those with SVI). 
Another reason for this uncertainty is the fact that VI in childhood tends to present as an 
unpredictable factor, owing to the maturational processes of the visual system (Atkinson, 1984; 
Day, 1997). As a result of visual maturation, some children with profound VI may obtain useful 
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levels of form vision - giving them an SVI status - in the course of their development, as was the 
case with 8% of the preschool sample studied by Dale & Sonksen (2002). Similarly, visual levels 
of children with SVI may significantly improve, particularly if appropriate intervention strategies 
designed to promote such development are implemented in the first year of life (Sonksen, Petrie, 
& Drew, 1991). On the other hand, the vision levels of some children born with SVI remain 
suboptimal and can degrade to the profound level (Sonksen et aI., 1991). Hence, unless the 
nature of the visual diagnosis implies that no visual perception is possible (e.g., anophthalmia -
absence of eyes; or bilateral optic nerve aplasia - absence of optic nerve), a certain risk of 
changing presentation of vision level in the samples of children with VI remains. 
Co-occurrence with intellectual impairment 
Another dominant source of heterogeneity in the VI population is the high co-occurrence of 
intellectual impairment with VI, which may also co-exist with an additional disability (e.g., cerebral 
palsy, hearing impairment) (Cass et aI., 1994; Reynell, 1978; Sonksen & Dale, 2002; Teplin, 
1995). It has been estimated that between 30% and 70% of children with VI have a co-occurring 
disability, with intellectual impairment being the most frequent (C. A. Mervis, Boyle, & Yeargin-
Allsopp, 2002; G. T. Scholl, 1986). Co-occurrence of additional disabilities, including cognitive 
abnormalities, is almost always present in children with cortical VI (Good et aI., 2001). Hence, as 
argued earlier, the incidence of intellectual impairment can be significantly lessened by excluding 
such children from research designs (Dale & Sonksen, 2002; Sonksen & Dale, 2002). For 
instance, Dale and Sonksen (2002) reported an incidence of learning difficulties of 17 % in their 
group of children with Potentially Simple CDPVS, compared to previously reported incidence of 
60-70% in samples with VI of more heterogeneous aetiology (Hirst, Poole, & Snelling, 1993; C. A. 
Mervis et aI., 2002; Robinson, 1977). Naturally, for the purposes of research, another way of 
reducing sample heterogeneity imposed by the presence of children with intellectual impairment 
is excluding such children. 
Issues involved in developmental matching 
Another way of dealing with heterogeneity introduced by intellectual impairment in children with VI 
is to ensure that appropriate developmental matching to a suitable control and/or comparison 
group is carried out, although this is likely to be a challenging task. For instance, the concept of a 
control group in research with children with VI is likely to be both theoretically and practically 
problematic. In investigations of developmental processes of children with VI, including a suitably 
matched group of sighted children is generally seen as a useful method for obtaining a reference 
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point to which to compare the outcomes of children with VI. However, in tests that require manual 
exploration, it has been proposed that utilising a blindfolded sighted group can act as a useful 
control condition, the method that has been successfully applied in research with blind adults 
(e.g., Roder, Rosier, & Spence, 2004) and in a few studies with school age children with VI (e.g., 
Hermelin, 1972; Landau, Spelke, & Gleitman, 1984). However, blindfolding sighted children 
(particularly at a younger age) may not only be practically difficult; this condition is likely to 
impose extra demands on sighted children and introduce an additional confounding factor. More 
specifically, blindfolding may place sighted children in a perceptual situation that is unnatural to 
them, potentially leading to incomplete exploration and underestimating their ability (also Perez-
Pereira & Conti-Ramsden, 1999). Indeed, there seems to be an inherent theoretical difficulty in 
attempting to control for lack of sight and the unique sensory experience of children with VI. 
Additionally, such sensory experiences are likely to differ between individual children with VI, 
depending on how little or how much residual vision they may have. For this reason, as an 
alternative to a blindfolded sighted control group, it may be more useful to compare children with 
differing levels of VI (e.g., PVI vs. SVI), as well as to a suitably matched comparison group of 
sighted children. 
However, acquiring a developmentally matched sighted comparison group in research with 
children with VI can be challenging for two reasons. First, while the developmental levels of many 
children with VI, especially in the early years, reflect a lag in comparison to sighted norms, these 
levels may be seen as appropriate when the severity of the child's VI is taken into account 
(Reynell, 1978, 1979). What is especially interesting about this 'lag behind sighted norms' in 
children with VI is its potential to be overcome in later school years (Landau & Gleitman, 1985; 
Mills, 1993). More specifically, whereas the discrepancy with sighted norms may be particularly 
noticeable in the early development of children with VI (Reynell, 1978), the developmental profiles 
of the two groups appear to even out by school age as the children with VI 'catch up' with their 
sighted peers in a number of areas, most notably in language (Landau & Gleitman, 1985). The 
learning levels of some children with VI may always remain suboptimal, the reasons for which are 
beyond the scope of the current thesis. However, the 'catching up' phenomenon observed in 
many children with VI implies an inherently different developmental trajectory relative to children 
who are sighted (Warren & Hatton, 2003). This is generally problematic when utilizing a 
comparison group, particularly in the early, preschool years, when the slower rate of learning in 
the child with VI may be directly related to the severity of their visual impairment, rather than an 
underlying cognitive deficit (Reynell, 1978, 1979). 
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This links into the second challenge relating to developmental matching: the lack of appropriate 
measures for assessing developmental levels of children with VI. Most developmental tests and 
assessment materials used in research and clinical practice are not designed with children with VI 
in mind. Typically, these tests rely on visual stimuli which, while particularly useful with preschool 
and prelingual children, cannot be used with children with significant degrees of VI. Furthermore, 
reliable non-visual tests that are appropriate for use with both visually impaired and sighted 
children are exceptionally rare. 
The most common way of matching children with VI and sighted children for the purpose of 
developmental research is by using tests of verbal intelligence. For children with developed 
linguistic skills, the verbal subtests from the Wechsler scales of intelligence for both pre-school 
and school children (i.e., the WPPSI and the WISe) (Wechsler, 1989, 1992) have been 
consistently shown to provide a reliable measure of the language-based intelligence in children 
with VI. However, using only verbal tests for assessing intelligence is not without its problems, as 
intelligence involves skills and abilities that cannot be tapped by purely verbal means (Warren, 
1994). A small number of intelligence tests tapping haptic/performance abilities have been 
developed particularly for children with VI, such as the Blind Learning Aptitude Test, (Newland, 
1979) and the Intelligence Test For Visually Impaired Children (Dekker, 1993), and these have 
been shown to provide a useful method in the educational context. However, the psychometric 
properties of these tests are relatively weak, and they may not be suitable for use with sighted 
children (i.e., they have not been tested or normalised using sighted samples); hence they may 
not be appropriate for research studies requiring comparison groups (Warren & Hatton, 2003). 
Furthermore, tests of verbal intelligence such as the Wechsler scales are not suitable for young 
prelingual children with VI or those children whose language and cognitive levels are below the 
basal levels of such tests. The only test that has been designed specifically for this purpose is the 
Reynell-Zinkin Developmental Scales for Young Visually Handicapped Children (Reynell, 1979; 
Reynell & Zinkin, 1979). The Reynell-Zinkin scales (RSZ) are widely used in clinical and 
educational contexts for monitoring the developmental progress of young, pre-school children 
with differing levels of VI in the area of language, sensory-motor understanding and social 
adaptation. They rely on age equivalents, which are derived from comparison with other 
standardised scales for such children (e.g., Maxfield & Buchholtz, 1957), and as such provide 
semi-standardised norms. Importantly, separate norms are used for blind, partially Sighted and 
sighted children, thereby providing a useful monitoring tool and a guide to developmental stages, 
and allowing for the consideration and implementation of appropriate teaching as early as 
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possible. However, even though they are the most commonly used test of intellectual ability and 
progress of young children with VI, the RZS have never been psychometrically validated, thus 
they are generally lacking in reliability. Additionally, they have been found to overestimate the 
cognitive levels of children with VI, particularly in the area of verbal comprehension (Dale & 
Sonksen, 2002; Timer-Van de Vosse & Hamers, 1994), reflecting further the lack of appropriate 
psychometric properties of the RZS. 
THE CURRENT METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In the research reported in this thesis, a number of steps have been undertaken to ensure 
appropriate levels of experimental rigour, so the potential confounding effects of extraneous 
variables discussed above could be suitably addressed. Although more detailed accounts of the 
specific methods employed in individual aspects of the present research will be provided in the 
later chapters, a general overview of the current methodology will be given in the following 
section, so that these steps can be clarified. 
An overview of the general method 
For the purpose of the research presented here, the aim was to recruit a group of children with 
congenital PVI and SVI who met the Potentially Simple CDPVS criteria specified by Sonksen and 
Dale (2002). An additional inclusion criteria was that these children would be in their primary 
school years (approximately between ages 6 and 12) during the period in which the present 
thesis would be undertaken. Subsequently, in conSUltation with the DVC team, a group of 34 
children meeting these criteria were identified and put forward for inclusion in the present 
research? Most of these children attended the DVC for continuous clinical assessment and 
guidance throughout their pre-school years, while a minority visited the clinic only once. Out of 
the 34 children whose parents were approached for participation in this research, only 18 
consented to participate at the time of the present research. To meet developmental matching 
criteria (see below), three of the 18 children were subsequently excluded from the part of the 
research that involved comparison with a typically developing group of sighted children at school 
age. 
7 To avoid biased sampling, the children were identified consecutively through the DVC records, strictly following the 
inclusion criteria. 
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The main body of the thesis therefore comprises of research carried out with 15 children with VI 
in their school years. The design that is largely adopted throughout the thesis is independent-
samples, whereby the developmental outcomes of the VI group (n = 15) have been compared to 
developmental outcomes of age and ability matched sighted children. In addition to the research 
carried out on concurrent developmental outcomes of this group, in a later part of the thesis (see 
Chapter 6, Part 2) a retrospective approach is undertaken, tracing back to most of the initially 
identified sample of 348, which also included the 15 children who have been seen at school age. 
The purpose of this was to explore the early (Le., pre-school) developmental patterns in a wider 
presentation of children with Potentially Simple CDPVS by incorporating a cross-sectional design, 
whereby the outcomes of those with PVI and SVI could be compared to one another, as well as 
to a group of developmentally matched sighted children. 
Reducing heterogeneity 
In the present research, aetiology-related heterogeneity, which has been related to the high 
incidence of additional disabilities and intellectual impairment among children with congenital VI, 
has been decreased by excluding children with cerebral VI and children with Potentially 
Complicated CDPVS (Sonksen & Dale, 2002). However, in terms of the degree of VI severity, the 
current sample of 15 children remained a heterogeneous group. On the other hand, despite their 
varying levels of congenital VI, in clinical terms, all the children had a level of VI that was 
considered sufficiently significant to pose a developmental concern. Furthermore, in favour of the 
current methodology, each child's VI history had been clinically documented over their preschool 
years (including a formal functional vision assessment by the DVC paediatrician), so each 
individual child could be characterised very precisely with respect to the level of their VI. Thus, 
the group variation that may potentially be influenced by the children's differing levels of VI has 
been addressed by consulting individual children's clinical records and taking their varying levels 
of VI severity into account when interpreting the results. Importantly, the group was strongly 
homogeneous in terms of their cognitive levels (see below), a feature typically lacking from other 
similar studies. 
8 During the children's clinic attendances spanning their preschool years, in addition to the database containing the 
information on children's vision levels and cognitive development, a database of video recordings of the clinical 
assessments in which children participated was also set up and archived - with parental consent - for the purposes of 
clinical research and training. Video data were available for 31 out of 34 children with VI who were identified as 
prospective participants. 
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Decision on developmental matching 
Matching on verbal IQ and chronological age was seen as the most appropriate method for 
between-group comparisons with a typically developing group of sighted children in the school-
age phase of the research. Three of the 18 children for whom consent was obtained for this part 
of the research were excluded due to the children's intellectual impairment. These children were 
assessed at the DVC where their intelligence was estimated to be below the normal range (VIQ :5 
70). This lead to the rest of the group (n = 15) being strongly homogenous in terms of their verbal 
reasoning, with none below the average range. 
However, the retrospective study of the VI children's early developmental outcomes included a 
more cognitively varied sample of children. As described earlier in this chapter, the rate or 
learning of a child with VI in the early years, although behind sighted norms, may be appropriate 
for that child's VI level (Reynell, 1979). Hence, it was decided that developmental matching at this 
early developmental stage to a sighted group would be most suitable if carried out on actual 
ability levels, that is matching on mental age equivalents using the raw scores, but not on 
chronological age (C. B. Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2004). This is because finding a child with 
normally developing vision who matches the child with VI on both chronological and mental age in 
the pre-school stage is not only practically difficult, but may also introduce a different, yet 
potentially more challenging methodological problem, in that the reasons for developmental lag in 
the sighted child are likely to stem from inherently different, non-sensory origins (e.g., a genetic 
condition/disability such as Down syndrome). 
Statistical considerations 
In common with the previous research with children with VI, the present research design also 
reflects the methodological challenge imposed by a small sample size. Small samples are 
associated with increased and heterogeneous variances and the data distributions are more likely 
to deviate from normality (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2001). For this reason, on those occasions where 
the data distribution may require such consideration, non-parametric tests have been used in the 
present research as an appropriate alternative to parametric analyses. 
Importantly, small sample size is the major contributor of reduced power in experimental design 
(Campbell, Julious, & Altman, 1995; Florey, 1993). Reduced power in empirical research is 
associated with an increased probability of Type I Error (i.e., false positive) (Howell, 2002). The 
most common method for controlling the Type I Error rate in multiple comparison designs is 
employing a mathematical correction such as Bonferroni, which adjusts the study-wide 
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significance value to keep it constant at .05 and subsequently reduces the probability of a 
spurious (i.e., false positive) result (Howell, 2002). However, this method has been criticized as 
being too conservative and insensitive, reducing the likelihood of false positives at the cost of 
rejecting a truly significant result (i.e., Type " Error) (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995; Bland & 
Altman, 1995; Perneger, 1998), the phenomenon to which a study with a small and rare clinical 
sample, such as the present one, is relatively susceptible (Perneger, 1998). For this reason, 
corrections for multiple comparisons or correlations have not been carried out in the present 
research. However, certain precautionary steps have been taken to acknowledge the likelihood of 
false discovery rates, while not capitalising on Type" Error. Results found to be significant at p :::; 
.01 were generally considered, whereas those found to be significant at p :::; .05 were interpreted 
only if they were pertinent to the specific research hypotheses or questions that the present 
research aimed to address (see individual chapters). In cases of multiple comparisons, the results 
significant at p :::; .05 have also been accompanied by the calculation of effect sizes, as were 
those found not to be significant (p > .05). The inclusion of effect size calculations is increasingly 
being advocated in empirical research (McCartney & Rosenthal, 2000). Use of these statistics is 
not only helpful in determining whether the phenomena of interest may truly be absent or due to 
lack of power (Cohen, 1992, 1994). It may also be more meaningful in assisting the making of an 
informed judgement about the practical importance of a given finding, rather than a binary choice 
between a significant and non-significant result (Folger, 1989; McCartney & Rosenthal, 2000). 
This is because the mechanical yes/no decisions, based on a clear-cut index of probability, 
although practical, are independent of the content and may oversimplify the practical importance 
of a given finding (Folger, 1989; McCartney & Rosenthal, 2000). To aid the interpretation of the 
given findings, a number of conventions for the estimates of effect sizes have been established. 
However, in the present research Cohen's conventions for the estimates of effect size 'd ' have 
been adopted as follows: Small effect - d = .20; Medium effect - d = .50; and Large effect - d = .80 
(Cohen, 1992, 1994). The calculation of effect sizes has been carried out using G*Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
Ethical considerations 
The recruitment of children with VI who took part in the research reported in this thesis and the 
relevant methodological procedures with these children and their families were carried out in strict 
guidance with the research protocol approved by the NHS Research Ethics Committee, 
University College London, Institute of Child Health and Great Ormond Street Hospital, London, 
UK, and the Research Ethics Committee at Goldsmiths, University of London, UK. 
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Chapter 3 
Language and Social Communication in Children with Congenital VI 
SUMMARY 
The research presented in this chapter sheds light on language and social communication in 
children with congenital VI. This was done by examining language and socio-communicative 
profiles of a group of children with VI who have normal intelligence in the context of i) a structured 
language assessment, and ii) a parental report of everyday communicative behaviours, and by 
comparing these profiles with the profiles of a group of typically developing sighted children of 
similar age and verbal intelligence. The findings suggest a discrepancy in presentation of 
language ability in children with VI. That is, relative to their good and potentially superior 
structural language skills, children with VI showed poorer use of language for conversational and 
social purpose. The pragmatic language difficulties in the VI group were observed within a 
broader socio-communicative profile, which in a substantial proportion of children with VI in this 
study appears to be consistent with the pattern found in sighted children with autism. 
INTRODUCTION 
The developmental impact of visual impairment on social communication and social cognition has 
been well documented. As discussed in Chapter 1, empirical evidence suggests that children who 
are visually impaired from birth experience difficulties in early social relations (Preisler, 1991; 
Recchia, 1997; Rowland, 1983) and have delayed theory of mind understanding (Green et aI., 
2004; McAlpine & Moore, 1995; Minter et aI., 1998; Peterson et aI., 2000). It has also been 
highlighted that the pattern of these difficulties seen in children with VI often bears striking 
resemblance to the pattern of difficulties experienced by children with autism (R. Brown et aI., 
1997; Hobson & Bishop, 2003; Hobson et aI., 1999; Pring, 2005). 
Theoretically, such difficulties in both children with VI and sighted children with autism have been 
attributed to disruptions in interpersonal engagement in early childhood and a breakdown in 
understanding that one's experiences of the world can be shared with others (Hobson, 1990, 
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1993). Crucially, in both groups of children, poor social outcomes in early development involve 
interruption to processes (i.e., dyadic and triadic joint attention) and behaviours (i.e., eye-gaze 
directing and following) that are driven by the visual modality. However, according to Hobson 
(2002), whilst children with autism fail to understand how other people 'relate' to the world for the 
reasons that extend beyond vision, the difficulty to understand how other people relate to the 
world in children with VI is likely to be a consequence of their inability to 'see' these relationships 
(p. 192). 
The important role of vision in social interaction has been implied by numerous research studies 
of joint attention development in young children (see Chapter 1). Consequently, it can be 
hypothesised that lack of visual input for children with congenital VI may ultimately have a 
detrimental effect on their socio-communicative competence and socio-cognitive outcomes and 
contribute to a presentation of autism-like characteristics. Importantly, however, such difficulties 
are not evident in all children who are visually impaired. The same studies that highlight the 
impact of VI on specific social milestones also identify some children with VI who show the level 
of social engagement (Urwin, 1978) and theory of mind competence (Green et aI., 2004) that 
seems to be comparable with sighted children's achievements. This implies that children who are 
visually impaired can achieve relatively normal social development. Thus, it appears that, while 
vision may be the main means for social relating for children who are sighted, children with VI 
may be able to rely on alternative strategies to achieve social relations with other people. 
With this in mind, language has generally been seen as playing a powerful role in the 
development of children with VI (Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Perez-Pereira & Conti-Ramsden, 
1999; Warren, 1994; Warren & Hatton, 2003). Perez-Pereira and colleagues have maintained 
over the years that language provides an important tool for children with VI, who rely on it and 
benefit from it to a greater extent than do children who are sighted. According to these authors, 
language allows children who are visually impaired to participate in social interactions by 
providing them with a mechanism which compensates for the absence of visual input and 
transforms the visual world into a verbal one (Perez-Pereira, 1994; Perez-Pereira & Castro, 1997; 
Perez-Pereira & Conti-Ramsden, 1999). The idea that language may be of crucial importance in 
promoting the ability to communicate and reason within a social context for children with VI has 
also been supported by others (e.g., Hobson, 1993). 
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Support for the role of language in social communication and social cognition in children with VI 
comes from the research described in more detail in Chapter 1. For instance, in her longitudinal 
examination of theory of mind in children with VI, Green (Green et aI., 2004; Green/nee Cupples, 
2001) found that children with VI with an initial theory of mind delay were able to 'catch up' with 
their sighted peers when followed up approximately a year later, indicating that with an 
advancement of language, the social cognition of children with VI receives a positive boost. 
Crucially, research by Green et al. (2004) and also Minter et al. (1998) yielded the findings that 
the children with VI who passed a standard theory of mind task had significantly higher verballQs 
and verbal mental ages than did those who failed it. In a similar way, R. Brown et al. (1997) found 
that children with VI who had higher verbal ability (VIQ > 70) showed fewer autistic-like 
behaviours on the Childhood Autism Rating Scale (CARS) (Schopler, Reichler, & Renner, 1988) 
than did children with VI with lower verbal ability (VIQ < 70). Thus, it is argued that linguistic 
competence may be an important factor, which mediates social outcomes in children with VI (R. 
Brown et al., 1997; Hobson, 2005). 
In children with VI, these studies clearly demonstrate that language, at least in the form of verbal 
IQ, distinguishes those children who show better from those who show poorer socio-
communicative competence and socio-cognitive outcomes. However, the contribution of the 
mechanisms that language provides for such children requires further clarification. For children 
with VI, language-based measures are commonly used to assess general intellectual level, 
making it difficult to isolate the contribution of language irrespective of a child's general cognitive 
ability. The same issue arises from grouping children with VI with a wide range of intellectual 
abilities in research studies; thus, the better social outcomes of children with VI who have higher 
compared to those with lower verbal intelligence (as shown by Green et aI., 2004; Minter et aI., 
1998; and R. Brown et aI., 1997) may not be fully appreciated as a consequence of better 
language per se as much as a result of a higher intellectual level. It is likely that the 
developmental interaction between language, cognition and social outcomes in general is a 
complex one, and the overlap between these processes in a child with severe vision loss may be 
especially remarkable and adaptive (Peters, 1994). The aim of the current research is to attempt 
to understand the contribution of the mechanisms that language provides for children who have a 
congenital VI, by examining a wider presentation of language in a group of children with VI with 
normal intelligence. 
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Language is a complex system, consisting of a rich network of functions and skills that provide 
building blocks for communicative and social interaction. While structural language skills, such as 
articulation of speech, use of grammar, vocabulary level and conceptual understanding of the 
vocabulary in question, may enable a person to converse fluently, they are not sufficient for 
achieving successful socio-communicative interaction with another person. For this, one must 
also master pragmatic language skills, that is, the ability to use language appropriately in a given 
context. Vision is implicated in language development in general as visually-driven joint attention 
experiences in early childhood are seen as providing a framework within which language learning 
occurs (Charman et aI., 2000; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986). For this reason, visual input may be of 
particular importance in the development of pragmatic language skills which are a cardinal 
feature of social communication. It is clear that important aspects of pragmatic language are 
carried out in the visual modality, with an emphasis on non-verbal behaviours that have a 
communicative purpose, such as the use of gestures, bodily postures and facial expressions to 
convey meaning and intentions. It is therefore important to consider long-term language 
outcomes for children with VI in order to ascertain whether visual impairment per se is likely to 
give rise to any lasting difficulties in either structural or pragmatic language development. 
With regards to the structural language skills of children with congenital VI, research generally 
shows that these are developed with relative ease. A number of studies have demonstrated some 
specific delays and irregularities in early vocabulary acquisition and production, syntactic 
knowledge, and the acquisition of semantic concepts in children with VI (Andersen et aI., 1984; 
Dunlea, 1989; Fraiberg, 1977; McConachie & Moore, 1994). But on the other hand, many 
researchers argue that the early presentation of structural language in children with VI is largely 
in line with that of sighted children (Landau & Gleitman, 1985; McGinnis, 1981; Mulford, 1988; 
Perez-Pereira & Castro, 1997; Urwin, 1983), even though their expressive language generally 
tends to be ahead of their receptive language (Reynell, 1978; Reynell & Zinkin, 1979). Despite 
some conflicting evidence, the prevailing view amongst the researchers in the field is that the 
early language of children who are visually impaired from birth is not necessarily deviant, but 
simply different from the language of sighted children (Andersen et aI., 1984; Landau & Gleitman, 
1985; Mills, 1993; Mulford, 1988; Perez-Pereira & Castro, 1997; Urwin, 1983); and whatever the 
delays and differences in early language structure, they generally seem to be overcome by 
school age (Landau & Gleitman, 1985; Reynell, 1978). Despite following what seems like an 
alternative route of language development, children who are visually impaired ultimately seem to 
arrive at the same point as do Sighted children (Mills, 1993). Interestingly, the majority of 
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evidence concerning language structure in children with VI concerns the early years whereas 
language ability at school age (and in adulthood) has been largely ignored. 
The picture is also less clear regarding language use for social and pragmatic purpose in children 
with VI. It has been suggested that the pragmatic language of children with VI has features that 
are similar to those of children with pragmatic language impairment (PLI) (Mills, 1993). Such 
features involve the extensive, and sometimes inappropriate, use of questions (Erin, 1986; 
McGinnis, 1981; Mulford, 1983), an absence of communicative gestures (Preisler, 1991; 
Rowland, 1984; Urwin, 1978) and the extensive use of imitative speech, repetitions and verbal 
routines (Dunlea, 1989; Norgate, Collis, & Lewis, 1998; Perez-Pereira, 1994; Perez-Pereira & 
Castro, 1992). It has been argued that such features of the pragmatic language use of children 
with VI may have an important function in promoting their cognition and social interaction by 
providing an adaptive strategy by which to gather information (Erin, 1986), analyse speech 
(Kekelis & Andersen, 1984; Perez-Pereira, 1994; Peters, 1994), reduce memory load (Spiedel, 
1989), and avoid isolation (Peters, 1994). However, a number of researchers emphasise a 
concern revolving around these language features in children with VI (e.g., stereotypic speech 
and echolalia) which are largely seen in children with autism and thus contribute to the 
presentation of an autism-like syndrome in children VI (R. Brown et aI., 1997; Fraiberg, 1977; 
Hobson, 1993; Wills, 1979). 
Based on the evidence from aforementioned studies, involving mostly preschool children with 
congenital VI, it generally appears that structural language is an area of relative strength for 
children with VI, whereas their pragmatic skills may be challenged. More recently James and 
Stojanovik (2007) demonstrated irregularities in the language presentation of a group of eight 
children with congenital VI (age-range 12-17 years) based on parental ratings of language and 
communicative behaviours using the Children's Communication Checklist (D. V. M. Bishop, 
2003). The checklist targets both structural and pragmatic language behaviours observable in an 
everyday context, as well as social interaction skills evident from everyday language use, the 
impairment of which (in addition to pragmatic abnormalities) is a cardinal feature of children with 
autism (Lord & Paul, 1997). When examined with reference to the developmental norms for 
typically developing sighted children, the pattern of language presentation in the group of children 
with VI in James and Stojanovik's study suggested a discrepancy between certain aspects of 
structural language and pragmatics, with the group's use of context and non-verbal behaviours 
for communicative purpose falling below normal range limits. Additionally, a substantial proportion 
of children appeared to show a communicative profile that warranted further clinical investigation. 
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However, the study was largely descriptive and of a preliminary nature, and even though an 
attempt had been made to exclude children with an intellectual impairment in this study, the 
children's intellectual capacity was not systematically assessed and their profiles were not 
examined in comparison to a developmentally matched sighted group. The mismatch between 
structural and pragmatic language ability in children with VI with normal intelligence, and who do 
not have an additional diagnosis of autism or pragmatic language impairment, needs to be further 
substantiated with research. 
The primary objective of the current study was to provide further investigation of the language 
ability and communicative behaviours of children who are born with severely impaired vision. In 
order to examine variation in language skill, independent from overall intellectual level, the current 
study a) focused on children with a significant congenital vision loss who have normal 
intelligence, b) utilised a comparison group of typically developing sighted children matched on 
verbal IQ, c) used a standardised test designed specifically to assess language function in 
children in the context of a structured assessment, and d) utilized a parental report of language 
and communicative behaviours in an everyday context. Language function and behaviours of the 
children with VI in this study were also examined in the context of a broader socio-communicative 
profile, in order to provide further insight into the nature of autistic-like presentation of children 
with VI with normal verbal intelligence. The outcomes of children with VI were compared to the 
outcomes of children who are sighted in order to see the extent to which the two groups differ and 
to gain further appreciation of specific strengths and weaknesses that may characterise the VI 
group. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
In line with the theoretical framework outlined thus far, the objective of the research presented in 
this chapter was to test the following experimental hypotheses and address some specific 
questions relating to those hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Language competence, as measured by a standardised test of language 
function, will differentiate children with VI from children who are sighted. 
Question 1 (Q1): Will this difference be confined to a particular language domain (i.e., receptive 
vs. expressive)? 
Question 2 (Q2): Will this difference vary as a function of a specific language skill (i.e., 
standardised language subtest)? 
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Question 3 (Q3): Is the performance on the test of language function independent of the measure 
of verballQ in children with VI? 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Children with VI and children who are sighted will show different social and 
communicative profiles, as assessed by parental reports. 
Question 4 (Q4): Will this difference vary as a function of a specific socio-communicative skill 
(i.e., communication checklist scale)? 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): There will be a discrepancy between language structure and pragmatic 
language in children with VI, compared to children who are sighted on a parental communication 
checklist? 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Socio-communicative profiles of children with VI, compared to the profiles of 
their verbal ability matched sighted peers, will be reminiscent of profiles typically seen in sighted 
children with autism. 
Question 5 (Q5): Can severity of VI and the level of language competence explain the variation in 
the severity of such profiles in the VI group? 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The pattern of specific socio-communicative weaknesses in the VI group will 
be consistent across different measures (i.e., cross-measure correlations). 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Fifteen children with congenital visual impairment and 26 children with normally developing vision 
took part in the current research. The children with VI were recruited with parental consent 
through the Developmental Vision Clinic at the Great Ormond Street Hospital, London, UK where 
they had been referred to for developmental and functional vision assessments in their early 
years. All but one child from the VI group attended a mainstream school in England. The Sighted 
children were recruited with parental consent through primary schools in South East London and 
Kent, UK. For the purpose of developmental matching, the inclusion criteria for the sighted 
children were: age (6 - 12 years) and verballQ within the normal range (VIQ ~ 80). The majority 
of children in both participant groups came from white British families (over 50%), although the VI 
group included a somewhat larger proportion of children from a variety of ethnic backgrounds (VI 
- 47 %; Sighted - 31%). 
The children with VI all had a degree of vision loss which was present from birth and was of 
peripheral, rather than cerebral origin. The inclusion criteria based on the origin and the site of the 
VI, which was adopted from the taxonomy by Sonksen and Dale (2002), is described in more 
detail in Chapter 2 (i.e., Congenital Disorders of Peripheral Visual System 1 CDPVS). The group 
consisted of children with varying levels of congenital VI, deemed sufficiently clinically severe to 
pose a developmental concern (Dale & Sonksen, 2002; Sonksen & Dale, 2002). This included 
children whose VI was profound - PVI (light perception or worse 1 no form vision) and those 
children whose VI was severe - SVI (visual acuity of worse than 6/30; some limited form vision, 
but severely degraded). Even though the children with differing levels of VI were grouped 
together for a comparison with the control group in the current study, the heterogeneity of the 
sample in terms of the degree of vision loss has been taken into consideration in the 
interpretation of the subsequent results. None of the children with VI had a known additional 
diagnosis (e.g., severe hearing impairment or autism). Individual child characteristics, including 
level of vision loss in the early years and specific diagnoses are summarized in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Individual characteristics of children with VI 
N ID Age Gender Visual diagnosis VI level 
02 6:08 M Familial exudative vitreo-retinopathy and SVI 
Norrie's Syndrome 
2 04 7:00 F Leber's amaurosis PVI 
3 07 9:02 M Bilateral micropthalmia and optic nerve PVI 
aplasia 
4 09 7:00 M Bilateral optic nerve hypoplasia PVI 
5 10 12: 11 F Bilateral optic nerve hypoplasia PVI 
6 16 8:03 F Bilateral microphthalmia PVI 
7 17 11 :04 M Bilateral Aniridia and glaucoma with Peter's SVI 
anomaly in one eye 
8 18 6:06 F Leber's amaurosis SVI 
9 19 9:11 M Bilateral micropthalmia with multiple corneal PVI 
opacities 
10 20 8:05 F Multiple opacities and sclerocornea SVI 
11 23 8:07 M Leber's amaurosis SVI 
12 25 7:03 F Persistent primary hyperplastic vitreous SVI 
13 26 8:01 F Bilateral mycropthalmia and sclerocornea SVI 
14 31 10:11 F Leber's amaurosis SVI 
15 32 6:06 F Leber's amaurosis SVI 
The VI data reported in Table 3.1 were obtained from the archived clinical records, which contain 
each child's history of comprehensive formal functional vision assessments by a paediatrician 
across the preschool years. Based on these early assessments five children had a consistent PVI 
(no presence of form vision) and six had a consistent SVI (presence of form vision) through their 
early years. It is worth noting that four children obtained some useful form vision (SVI) after an 
initial PVI in the first year of life (Participant IDs: 02, 18, 19 and 20). Interestingly, one of these 
children (Participant ID: 19) experienced a total vision loss approximately two years after gaining 
a level of useful form vision (Le., SVI) in the first year of life. Cases like these highlight the 
difficulty of fully accounting for a degree of vision level in research with children with congenital VI 
(the related methodological considerations were discussed in Chapter 2). No formal screening for 
the severity of VI was carried out at the time of the current research and the vision levels in the 
68 
Table 3.1 are those obtained from the latest preschool assessment of functional vision that 
children underwent before their participation in this study.9 
The children with VI and the sighted children in the study were matched on verbal IQ (VIQ), age 
and gender (see Table 3.2). Independent-samples t tests showed that that the two groups did not 
differ significantly in terms of their VIQ (t (39) = -.105; P = .917) or Age (t (39) = -.502; P = .618). Chi-
square tests revealed that the two groups were comparable in terms of gender ratio, with more 
girls than boys in each group (x' (1) = .702; p = .754). 
Table 3.2: Matching characteristics of the VI and Sighted groups 
Matching criteria VI Sighted p value 
N= 15 N= 26 
VIQ / WISC-III 
Mean (SD) 105.9 (10.7) 106.3 (11.1) .917 
Range 84 - 128 80 - 130 
Age 
Mean/ months (SD/ months) 103.1 (23.0) 106.5 (20.3) .618 
Range/years 6:06 -12:11 6:02-11:11 
Gender ratio (Female/Male) 9/6 14/12 .754 
Materials 
Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children-III / WISC-1I1 
Verbal scales from the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1992) were used for the purpose of developmental 
matching. The WISC is a widely used children's intellectual test that measures intellectual abilities 
in both Verbal and Performance areas. The Verbal subtests primarily measure the child's ability 
to solve verbal problems using verbal and auditory skills, whereas the Performance subtests 
primarily measure the child's ability to solve visual and constructional problems using non-verbal, 
or only partially verbal skills. 
The WISC-III consists of 13 subtests which are divided into 2 scales: Verbal Scale and 
Performance Scale. The Verbal Scale consists of 6 subtests containing language based items, 
9 The greatest development to the visual system occurs across the early years of life and the visual level is usually 
stable by the early school years (Sonksen, 1993). 
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whereas the Performance Scale contains 7 subtests that use visuo-motor items that are less 
dependent on language. Due to their visual content, the items on the Performance Scale are not 
suitable for children with severe VI. The Verbal Scale items are commonly used with such 
children to obtain an index of the children's general ability and VerballQ (VIQ) respectively. Thus, 
in the current study the VIQ was derived from 5 verbal subtests presented in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: WISC-1I1 verbal subtests 
Subtest Subtest description 
Information A test of general factual knowledge that relies 
on long-term memory. 
Similarities A measure of abstract/logical reasoning 
requiring the ability to understand categories 
and relationships between category domains. 
Vocabulary A measure of expressive language/verbal 
fluency. An example question would be to ask 
the child to describe a concept in their own 
words 
A measure of knowledge of appropriate social 
Comprehension behaviour and judgement. 
Digit Span a A test of verbal, short-term working memory. 
The examiner reads a sequence of single digits 
and the child is asked to repeat the numbers 
verbatim, forwards and backwards. 
The sequences start with 2 digits (2 trials) and 
increase to up to 8 digits. 
Item example 
How many days are there in 
a week? 
How are guitar and piano 
alike? 
What does brave mean? 
What would you do if you 
lost a ball that belongs to 
one of your friends? 
N/A 
a Digit Span is a supplementary subtest, used here instead of the core Arithmetic subtest. 
The administration and scoring of the subtests was carried out in the accordance with the WISC-
III manual. The raw scores on each subtest were given scaled values, the sum of which is 
standardised in order to obtain an index of child's verbally based intellectual level (i.e., VIQ). The 
standard scores on individual subtests are based on normalized standard scores with a mean of 
10 and a SD of 3. The composite standard scores (e.g. VIQ) have a mean of 100 and SD of 15. 
The Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals-3/ CELF-3 
The CELF-3 (Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2000a) is a standardised clinical tool used for the 
identification, diagnosis and evaluation of language skill deficits in school age children, 
adolescents and young adults. It consists of 11 subtests (8 core and 3 supplementary) that 
provide measures of receptive and expressive language in areas of morphology, syntax, 
semantics and memory. However, most of the CELF-3 subtests require the visual presentation of 
stimuli, which are unsuitable for use with children with visual impairment and for that reason only 
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the non-visual subtests (2 core and 2 supplementary ones) were used with the current sample. 
Six age-appropriate subtests must be completed by each child in order to obtain a Receptive (3 
subtests), an Expressive (3 subtests) and a Total Language composite score (sum of Receptive 
and Expressive language score). However, as only four non-visual subtests were used with the 
current sample, the Receptive and Expressive Language scores were calculated as a pro-rata of 
two subtests for each language domain. Importantly, this significantly reduces the reliability and 
value of the CELF-3 as a clinical tool, and although the obtained composite scores are 
investigated here for research purposes, they would have to be treated with caution if they were 
to be interpreted clinically. 
The details of the individual subtests are given below. The administration and scoring of each 
subtest was carried out in accordance to the CELF-3 manual. As for the WISC, the standardized 
CELF-3 scores are based on normalized standard scores with a mean of 10 and a SO of 3. The 
composite standard scores have a mean of 100 and SO of 15. 
CELF - 3 Receptive language subtests 
Word Classes (WC) is a core subtest on the Receptive language scale of the CELF-3, used to 
assess the ability to perceive relationships in the meaning of words and to form word 
associations. These relationships may be categorised by part-whole and semantic class features 
and by synonyms and antonyms. The stimuli consist of 10 three-word items and 24 four-word 
items. These are read out to children and the children are asked to judge which two of the three 
(e.g., simple, happy, easy) or four words (e.g., horse, plane, ship, boat) that they heard go 
together best. The children are given a score of 1 for each correct response and a score of 0 for 
each incorrect or unanswered item. 
Listening to Paragraphs (LP) is a supplementary subtest on the Receptive language scale of the 
CELF-3, used to assess comprehension, recall and interpretation of factual, inferential, sequential 
and predictable information. The stimuli consist of 2 short paragraphs (different paragraphs 
depending on the age group) which are read out to the child, each paragraph followed by five 
questions pertinent to the content of the paragraph (see example paragraph in Table 3.4). A 
correct item scores 1 and incorrect or unanswered item scores O. 
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Table 3.4: Example paragraph from Listening to Paragraphs subtest from the CELF-3 
Trial A (ages 6 to 9.11 years): 
Lisa was excited because her sixth birthday had 
finally come. After her family sang 'Happy Birthday', 
Lisa blew out the candles on her cake. Then, Lisa's 
mother told her to look in the garage for her present. 
As Lisa opened the garage door, she heard a 'meow' 
and felt something furry rub against her leg. Lisa was 
happy that she got her birthday wish. 
CELF - 3 Expressive language subtests 
Questions: 
Why was Lisa excited? 
How old was Lisa on her birthday? 
What was Lisa's birthday present? 
What did Lisa do after her family sang 
'Happy Birthday? 
What do you think Lisa will do now? 
Recalling Sentences (RS) is a core subtest on the Expressive language scale of the CELF-3 and 
is used to assess immediate recall and reproduction of sentence surface structure as a function 
of syntactic complexity. There stimuli consist of 26 sentences that are read out to the child and 
which become successively longer and more complex. The scoring for each sentence ranges 
from 0- 3 depending on the number of errors, omissions, substitutions that the child makes. 
Word associations (WA) is a supplementary subtest on the Expressive language scale of the 
CELF-3 used to asses semantic organisation and word association strategies to generate and 
name members of a semantic class rapidly and efficiently. During the test the child is asked to 
name as many items as possible within a given category and in one minute. There are 3 test trials 
corresponding to 3 different categories, namely: Animals, Foods that people eat and Jobs and 
Occupations that people do. An appropriate response scores 1 while and incorrect or repeated 
response scores O. The scores are added up over the 3 trials. 
The Children's Communication Checklist - 2 (CCC-2) 
The CCC-2 (D. V. M. Bishop, 2003) is a parental report questionnaire used i) to screen for 
children who are likely to have a language impairment, ii) to identify pragmatic impairments in 
children with communication problems and iii) to help identify children who may need further 
assessment for an autistic spectrum disorder. The function of the test is to obtain an evaluation of 
communicative skills that are not easy to evaluate in a context of a traditional structured 
assessment, as this context is not sensitive to the pragmatic communicative problems in children. 
It is designed to be completed by an adult who has regular contact with the child, typically the 
parent. 
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The CCC-2 consists of 70 multiple choice items and is divided into 10 scales (Table 3.5), each 
with 7 items. For each scale, 5 items describe communication difficulties and two describe 
communication strengths. On each item, the ratings of frequency of occurrence of a given 
behaviour are made on a 4 point scale ranging from 0 (less than once a week lor never): 1 (at 
least once a week, but not every day); 2 (once or twice a day) and 3 (several times Imore than 
twice a day lor always). The raw scores on the CCC-2 are standardized on a normative 
population and scaled with a mean of 10 and SO of 3. 
Scale 
a) Speech 
b) Syntax 
c) Semantics 
d) Coherence 
e) Inappropriate Initiation 
D Stereotyped language 
g) Use of context 
Table 3.5: CCC-2 scales 
Item example 
Pronounces words in a babyish way, such as "chibley" for 
"chimney" or "bokkle" for "bottle". 
Leaves out "is" and so says "Daddy going to work" rather than 
"Daddy's going to work" or "Daddy is going to work". Or might 
say "the boy big" rather than "The boy is big". 
Forgets words s/he knows, e.g., instead of "rhinoceros" may say 
"you know, the animal with the horn on its nose". 
Can be hard to tell is s/he is talking about something real or 
make-believe. 
Talks repetitively about things that no one is interested in 
Repeats back what others have just said. For instance if you ask 
"what did you eat?" might say, "what did I eat?" 
Misses the point of jokes and puns (though may be amused by 
nonverbal humour such as slapstick). 
h) Non-verbal communication Stands too close to other people when talking to them. 
i) Social relations 
j) Interests 
Hurts or upsets other children without meaning to. 
Talks about lists of things s/he has memorised e.g., the names of 
the capitals of the world or the names of varieties of dinosaurs. 
The first four scales (i.e., A - D) assess aspects of language structure. These scales cover the 
language domains that are often impaired in children with specific language impairments (SLI). 
The scales E - H cover pragmatic aspects of communication that are not easily assessed by 
conventional language assessments. The remaining scales, I and J, assess social behaviours 
that are usually impaired in cases of ASD. Although low scores on these two scales, as well as 
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low scores on the scales assessing the pragmatic aspects of communication, may suggest further 
clinical evaluation, they cannot be used to diagnose autism. 
Two composite scores can be derived from the CCC-2. The General Communication Composite 
(GCC) based on the first eight scales can be used to identify children likely to have clinically 
significant communication problems (i.e., if their GCC score is below 55). It is also possible to 
derive a Social Interaction Deviance Composite (SID C), which reflects the mismatch between the 
sums of scales E, H, I and J, and the sums of scales A, B, C and O. The SIOC composite can 
therefore help identify the children in whom pragmatic language skills and social interaction skills 
are disproportionately impaired relative to their structural language. However, the SIOC provides 
qualitative information about the pattern of impairment and would normally only be interpreted in 
combination with the GCC and, more specifically, if the child obtains a score on the GCC below 
55. For example, a negative score on the SIOC in combination with the GCC score below 55 is 
common in children with ASO. A positive score on the SIOC (i.e., above 9), combined with the 
GCC score below 55, is common with children with specific language impairment (SLI). However, 
a low SIOC score of ~ -15, even if the GCC is within normal limits, may have clinical significance. 
Such extreme scores are rare in a normative population and are frequently seen in Asperger 
Syndrome (AS). 
All of the items on the CCC-2 were considered appropriate for use with children with VI except 
item 14 (i.e., 'does not look at the person S/he is talking to'). In over 50% of the cases, the parents 
of children with VI omitted this item, which was subsequently removed from analyses for both VI 
and Sighted groups. 
The Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ) 
The SCQ (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) is a parental report questionnaire that screens for the 
socia-communicative difficulties associated with ASO in children who are 4 years of age or older. 
It consists of 40 items with a yes/no response format. There are two forms of the SCQ: the 
Lifetime Autoscore which is used to obtain a child's entire developmental history and assist a 
diagnostic workup; and the Current Autoscore, which is used to assess a child's behaviour over 
the most recent 3 month period with a purpose to understand everyday living experiences of a 
child and evaluate treatment and educational plans. For the current thesis the Lifetime Autoscore 
has been used for its screening function. In this context, the SCQ Total Score is interpreted with 
reference to the cut-off score of 15 or greater, which is indicative of a possible autism and 
requires further clinical evaluation. Unlike the CCC-2, elevated scores on the SCQ are indicative 
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of higher prevalence of behavioural difficulties. The SCQ can be broken down into three sub-
scores that match three behavioural domains on the Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R) 
that form the basis for diagnosis of autism (Rutter et aI., 2003): Reciprocal Social Interaction 
Domain, Communication Domain and the Restricted, Repetitive and Stereotyped Patterns of 
Behaviour Domain. Although formal scoring of the subscales is not supported in the SCQ manual, 
the subscales can be investigated for research purposes as has been done here. 
Procedure 
The overall procedure took on average an hour and a quarter. The majority of children were 
assessed in a single session at home. In minority of cases, due to practical reasons, an additional 
assessment was carried out at school. Typically, the children took part in the language tasks 
while their parents completed the questionnaires. All of the questionnaires were completed by the 
parents of the children except in the case of two children with VI where the questionnaires were 
completed by a teacher who knew the children well. These two children came from the families 
where English is not the main language spoken at home, although both children are bilingual and 
attend an English school. All the language tasks were presented in the same order for all the 
children, with the WISC-III subtests being presented first, followed by the CELF-3 subtests, and in 
the order specified in the test manuals. 
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RESULTS 
Structured language assessment 
CELF-3 
First, it was of interest to examine whether the CELF-3 would discriminate between the two 
groups in terms of their language ability (H 1). The means and standard deviations (SDs) of the 
two groups on the CELF-3 composites and individual subtests, as well as the WISC-III 
performance, are summarised in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Means and SOs on WISC-1I1 and CELF-3 for the VI and Sighted groups 
Measure 
Mean (SO) 
WISC -III 
VerballQ / VIQ 
Information 
Similarities 
Vocabulary 
Comprehension 
Digit Span 
CELF·3 
Receptive Language Composite 
Word Classes 
Listening to Paragraphs 
Expressive Language Composite 
Recalling Sentences 
Word Associations 
Total Language Composite 
VI 
105.9 (10.7) 
12.2(3.1) 
11.6 (2.7) 
11 (3.6) 
8.9 (1.9) 
11.1 (2.7) 
104.5 (10.3) 
11.4 (2.4) 
9.9 (1.5) 
113.8(15.6) 
12.6 (2.7) 
11.9 (3.5) 
109.6 (12.9) 
Sighted 
106.3(11.1) 
11.8 (2.7) 
12.8 (3.0) 
10.7 (3.3) 
9.7(2.1) 
10.3 (2.5) 
96.7 (9.1) 
10.04 (2.4) 
8.8 (2.6) 
102.5 (14.4) 
9.8(3.1) 
10.7 (2.6) 
99.3 (11.3) 
p value 
.917 
.674 
.214 
.810 
.218 
.347 
.016 
.089 
.097 
.024 
.005 
.217 
.011 
As predicted (H 1), the two groups were found to differ significantly in terms of their language 
competence as assessed by the CELF-3 (Total Language). More specifically, independent-
samples t tests revealed that, despite being comparable in verbal ability (as measured by the 
WISC-III VIQ - Table 3.1, as well as the individual WISC-III subtests10), the children with VI 
10 Information (t (39) = .423, P = .674, d = .14), Similarities (t (39) = -1.262, P = .214, d = .40), Vocabulary (t (39) = .243, P 
= .810, d = .09), Comprehension (t (39) = -1.252, P = .218, d = .40), and Digit Span (t (39) = .952, P = .347, d = .31). 
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achieved significantly higher scaled composite scores than the Sighted group on the CELF-3 
overall (Total Language: t (39) = 2. 674, p = .011). This language strength did not seem to be 
confined to a specific language sub-domain (01) , as the VI group achieved higher performance in 
terms of both their receptive and expressive language (Receptive: t (39) = 2. 528, P = .016, d = .80; 
Expressive: t (39) = 2. 352, p = .024, d = .75). Figure 3.1 graphically illustrates this apparent 
language strength of the VI group across the three CELF- 3 composites. 
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Figure 3.1: Mean scaled scores on the verbal WISC-II/ and CELF-3 composites 
(error bars represent the SOs, ** p ~ .01 and *p ~ .05) 
However, the difference in language competence (as measured by the CELF-3) between the two 
groups did seem to vary as a function of a specific language skill (02), as the only CELF-3 
subtest discriminating the children with VI as significantly better than the Sighted was Recalling 
Sentences (t (39) = 2.956; P = .005). With regards to the other three CELF-3 subtests, there were 
trends towards a significant difference on Word Classes (t (39) = 1.742; P = .089) and Listening to 
Paragraphs (t (38.9) = 1.702; P = .097). The effect sizes for these trends were only medium (d = .56 
and d = .48 respectively). The group difference on Word Association was not significant (t (39) = 
1.256; p= .217, d = .40). Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 graphically illustrate the performance of the 
children in the two groups on the individual subscales on both WISC-III and CELF-3. 
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It may be worth highlighting that the performance of the Sighted group on the CELF-3 Total 
Language was significantly discrepant from their VIQ (t (25) = 4. 231 ; p :5 .001), whereas the 
scores of the VI group seemed comparable across the two composites (t (1 4) = -1. 262; p = .228, d 
= .33). The differing correlational pattern between individual WISC-III and CELF-3 subtests in 
both groups (Appendix A 1) potentially supports this picture of differing language profiles 
manifested by the two groups (in line with H1) . However, the overall performance on the two tests 
(CELF-31T0tal Language and WISC- 111/ VIQ) was significantly correlated in both children with VI 
(r = .559; P = .03, n = 15) and sighted children (r = .715; p :5 .001 , n = 26) signifying that the skills 
required for the two tests may not necessarily be independent (Q3) . 
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Parental reports 
CCC-2 
With regards to the range of every day language and communicative behaviours based on 
parental reports on CCC-2, the profile of the VI group was examined in comparison to that of the 
sighted group. The means and SDs of the two groups on the individual CCC-2 scales are 
summarized in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Means and SOs on the CCC-2 forthe VI and Sighted groups 
Measure VI Sighted p value 
Mean (SO) Missing N = 1 Missing N = 1 
CCC-2 
Speech 9.9 (3.5) 10.3 (2.6) .691 
Syntax 9.6 (3.6) 10.9 (1.9) .228 
Semantics 8.6 (3.1) 11.1 (2.7) .01 
Coherence 8.7 (3.3) 11 (2.5) .021 
Inappropriate Initiation 7.5(3.1) 11 (2.6) .001 
Stereotyped language 6.6 (3.6) 10.3 (3.3) .003 
Use of Context 6.5 (2.4) 11.2 (2.9) .001 
Non verbal 4.3 (2.6) 10.9 (2.7) .001 
Social 5.4 (2.8) 10.4 (2.9) .001 
Interests 6.5 (2.5) 9.5 (2.9) .003 
General Communication Composite 61.8 (18.8) 86.8 (14) .001 
(GCe) 
Social Interaction Deviance -13.14 (7.04) -1.5 (7.7) N/A 
Composite (SIDe) 
Profile Analysis was carried out to compare the profiles of the VI and Sighted groups across the 
CCC-2 scales (H2). Profile Analysis is a multivariate technique which examines three 
components of the profiles: 1) Flatness of the profiles, or whether performance, when collapsed 
across between-participant groupings, differs across measures (ct. 'main effect of Measure' in 
ANOVA), 2) Levels, or whether there is a between-group difference across measures (ct. 'main 
effect of Group' in ANOVA) and 3) Parallelism, or whether the profiles of different groups are 
parallel (ct. 'Interaction' in ANOVA). 
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The Profile Analysis comparing the profiles of the two groups revealed a significant test of 
Flatness, indicating that when averaged across the groups the children's performance differed 
across different CCC-2 subtests (Pill ai's Trace criterion: F (9, 29) = 5.323; P :5 .001). Furthermore, 
the test of Levels revealed a significant difference between groups when their scores were 
averaged across different CCC-2 scales (F (1 , 37) = 26.6; P :5 .001). However, these tests are 
qualified by a significant test of Parallelism, indicating distinguishable profiles between the two 
groups across different CCC-2 scales (Pill ai 's Trace criterion : F (9, 29) = 7.266; P :5 .001). In 
summary, and in line with H2, the Profile Analysis results indicate that the two groups were 
significantly different in terms of their language and communication profiles as measured by the 
CCC-2 scales. However, this between-group difference varied as a function of a different CCC-2 
scale on which specific communicative behaviours of the children were rated (Q4). 
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scales (** p:5 .01; * p:5 .05) 
Figure 3.4 graphically illustrates divergent CCC-2 profiles in the VI and Sighted groups. Here, in 
line with the significant deviation from profile parallelism, it is graphically evident that the pattern 
of parental rating for Sighted children 's behaviours across the CCC-2 scales is relatively 
consistent across different scales, averaging at around the mean scaled score of 10 (top 
reference line) which is in line with the CCC-2 developmental norms (D. V. M. Bishop, 2003) . In 
contrast, the profile of the VI group appears more uneven across the different scales. Despite the 
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irregularity of their profile however, the mean scores of the VI group across the CCC-2 scales are 
largely within the normal range limits (Le., scaled score ;::= 6) except for the Non-verbal and Social 
scales, where the mean scores of the VI group fall below normal limits (Le., scaled score < 6). 
In order to further explain the results of the Profile Analysis, post-hoc independent-samples t tests 
were conducted in order to examine the between-group difference on individual CCC-2 scales 
(Q4). With regards to the structural language aspects of the CCC-2, the t tests revealed that the 
children with VI were comparable to children who are Sighted with respect to their Speech (t (37) = 
- 0.401; p =.691, d = .13) and Syntax ability (equal variances not assumed - t (16.99) = -1.250; P 
=.228, d = .48). However, they were significantly poorer than their Sighted peers on Semantic (t 
(37) = - 2.717; P = .01) and Coherence ability (t (37) = - 2.404; p = .021, d = .80). With respect to the 
pragmatic language aspects of the CCC-2, the t tests showed significantly poorer performance of 
the VI group on all four scales tapping pragmatic language skills when compared to the Sighted 
group (Inappropriate Initiation: t (37) = - 3.838; p ~ .001; Stereotyped language: t (37) = - 3.18; p ~ 
.003; Use of Context: t (37) = - 5.105; P ~ .001; and Non-verbal: t (37) = - 7.49; P ~ .001). Similarly, 
with respect to the two CCC-2 scales tapping social interaction, the VI group performed 
significantly poorer than the Sighted group on both scales (Social: t (37) = - 5.17; P ~ .001; and 
Interests: t (37) = -3.15; P = .003). In addition, the children in the Sighted group obtained 
significantly higher General Communication Composite (GCC) scores on average, signifying their 
higher communicative competence, than the children in the VI group (t (37) = - 5.105; P ~ .001). 
Overall, these findings are in stark contrast to the VI group's superior language ability seen earlier 
with the CELF-3. 
In the VI group, there appeared to be a notable disparity between children's scores on the scales 
assessing language structure, and their scores assessing pragmatic language skills. With a view 
to examine whether this apparent disparity in the VI group is statistically significant (H3), the 
scaled scores on the scales assessing structural and pragmatic language skills were summed in 
order to derive a Structural and Pragmatic Index for the VI and Sighted groups. A 2x2 mixed 
ANOVA was carried out to examine the difference between Structure and Pragmatics in each 
group. The results were as expected following from the Profile Analysis, with significant main 
effect of Language Index (F (1, 37) = 32.471, p ~ .001) and Group (F (1, 37) = 789.94, P ~ .001), 
qualified by a significant Language Index x Group Interaction (F (1, 37) = 34.261, P ~ .001). The 
result of interest concerned the within-group contrasts of Language Index. As the relatively flat 
profile suggested, there was no difference in structural and pragmatic language skills of the 
Sighted group (t (24) = -.125; P = .901, d = .023). However, in line with the experimental prediction 
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(H3), the structural language skills of the VI group were significantly better than their pragmatic 
language (t (13) = 7.716; P ~ .001). 
Qualitative examination of the CCC-2 profiles 
As mentioned earlier, the VI and Sighted groups were found to be significantly different on the 
two scales assessing social interaction skills (Social and Interests). These two scales are used to 
calculate the Social Interaction Deviance Composite (SIDC), which can be considered in a 
screening context when identifying children with a potential socio-communicative impairment. A 
between-group comparison on the SIDC was not considered useful as this composite provides 
qualitative information about the pattern of impairment on an individual child's level and cannot be 
interpreted without the GCC. Instead the SIDC scores of each child have been examined 
qualitatively in relation to their GCC's in an attempt to subgroup the children from the two groups 
and identify the ones with potentially deviant socio-communicative profiles (H4). 
Accordingly, Figure 3.5 shows the individual children's socio-communicative profiles, based on 
the relationship between their individual GCC and SIDC scores. Three reference lines plotted on 
the scatter-graph indicate the clinical cut-offs used to subgroup children with specific 
communication impairments corresponding to the broader autism phenotype. The green section 
of the scatter-plot marks the distribution of individual GCC/SIDC profiles that are considered to be 
typical (Le., GCC > 55 and SIDC ~ 15). The blue section of the scatter-plot marks a region of 
profiles where both the GCC (general communication) and the SIDC (social interaction skills) are 
considered to be below normal range (Le., GCC < 55 and SIDC < 0), and such profiles are typical 
of a broader autism spectrum. Finally, the red section of the scatter-plot highlights the profiles of 
those children whose GCCs are within normal range (GCC > 50), but whose SIDC is considered 
to be deviant (SIDC < -15), and such profiles are frequently seen in Asperger Syndrome (AS). 
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Figure 3.5: Individual children's socia-communicative profiles 
(Note: participant ID numbers are given for the children with VI only) 
Figure 3.5 illustrates that the socia-communicative profiles of all of the children in the sighted 
group were within a typical range. It is also important to highlight that the profiles of five children 
in the VI group were distributed within this section. However, it is crucial to emphasise further that 
four children with VI showed GCC/SIDC profiles that are typical of ASD and five that are 
associated with Asperger Syndrome. Overall , in support of H4, a substantial number (64 %) of the 
children with VI in this study (9/14, with the data of one child - Participant 10: 10 - missing) 
showed socio-communicative characteristics that are consistent with broader autism phenotype 
and which may warrant further clinical evaluation. 
SCQ 
To test H4 further, parental ratings of the children's socia-communicative behaviours on the SCQ 
were also examined. Table 3.8 summarizes the means and SDs for the prevalence of 'autistic-
like' behaviours overall (SCQ total raw score) and across the three separate SCQ domains 
corresponding to the DSM-III criteria for autism diagnosis (Reciprocal Social Interaction Domain, 
Communication and Restricted, Repetitive and Stereotyped Patterns of Behaviour) . 
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Table 3.8: Means and SOs on the SeQ for the VI and Sighted groups 
Measure VI Sighted p value 
Mean (SO) missing N = 1 
SeQ Lifetime Autoscore 
Total raw score 14.3 (3.9) 4.4 (3.9) .001 
Reciprocal Social Interaction Domain 4.1 (2.3) 0.9 (0.9) .001 
Communication Domain 5.3 (2.0) 2.1 (2.0) .001 
Restricted, Repetitive and 4.5 (2.0) 1.2 (2.0) .001 
Stereotyped Behaviours Domain 
In further support of H4, independent-samples t tests revealed a highly significant difference 
between the two groups on the SCQ total raw score, indicating higher prevalence of 'autism-like' 
socio communicative behaviours in the VI group (t (38) = 7.727; P =:; .001). This difference between 
the two groups is also graphically illustrated in Figure 3.6. Further t tests revealed highly elevated 
scores in the VI group, relative to the sighted group, on all three individual SCQ domains that 
comprise the total SCQ score and form the basis for diagnosis of autism on ADI-R (Reciprocal 
Social Interaction: equal variances not assumed - t (16.9) = 5.306; P =:; .001; Communication 
Domain: t (38) = 4.835; P =:; .001; and Restricted, Repetitive and Stereotyped Patterns of Behaviour 
Domain: t (38) = 4.941; P =:; .001) (see also Figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.6 highlights the five children in the VI group (34% overall) whose scores may be of 
potential clinical concern (SCQ total raw score ~ 15). It is worth noting that four of these children 
(i.e., Participant 10 numbers: 7, 18,25 and 26) were also within a domain for clinical concern of a 
potential communicative disorder on the CCC-2 (Figure 3.5). Additionally, a number of other 
children in the VI group (i.e., PartiCipant ID numbers: 4, 17, 19 and 20) achieved overall SeQ 
scores that were just below the clinical cut-off of 15. Children obtaining such scores are frequently 
considered worthy of further clinical evaluation where there has been a raised concern of a 
potential autism spectrum disorder (Rutter et aI., 2003). Thus, it is also worth noting that the 
profiles of three of these children fell within the red section of the CCC-2, signifying a concern of a 
socio-communicative disorder that is consistent with a broader autism presentation. Interestingly, 
one sighted child (Participant ID: 38) obtained an SCQ total score of potential clinical significance. 
However, the same child's socio-communicative profile on the CCC-2 was in the normal range 
and her parent did not report any concerns relating to her everyday behaviour or general 
development. 
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Further data considerations 
Association of the autistic-like profiles and severity of VI in the VI group 
It is important to emphasise that clinically elevated scores on the CCC-2 and SCQ in the present 
study were seen in both the children with PVI and those with SVI. For a graphic illustration of this 
pattern of scores, the Figure 3.8 shows scores of individual children from the VI group on the 
CCC-2 and the SCQ, highlighting the degree of VI for each individual child. Individual 10 codes 
appearing within the Venn circles indicate scores of clinical concern on the two parental 
checklists. For example, participant 23, who is a child with severe VI (SVI), had a clinically 
elevated score on the SCQ but not on the CCC-2. 10 codes appearing outside the Venn circles 
indicate the profiles that fall within normal range. For instance, the profiles of participant 16, who 
is a child with profound VI (PVI), are in the normal range as this participant's scores fell outside 
the SCQ and CCC-2 domain for clinical concern. Chi square tests revealed that there was no 
significant association between the degree of VI in the early years (PVI and SVI) and the clinical 
cut-off for autism concern on the SCQ (x' (1) = 1.250; P = .3) and the CCC-2 (X' (1) = .837; P = .4) 
respectively. Therefore, the distinction between having and not having a degree of useful (i.e., 
form) vision in early childhood does not seem likely to explain the prevalence of autistic-like 
characteristics in this group of school-age children with congenital VI (Q5). 
SCQ 
~ 
16 PVI 
23 SVI 
07 PVI 18 SVI 
25 SVI 
26 SVI 
10 PVI 
(data missing for CCC-2) 
CCC·2 
/ 
04 PVI 
09 PVI 
19 PVI 
17 SVI 
20 SVI 
02 SVI 
31 SVI 
32 SVI 
Figure 3.8: Venn diagram illustrating the individual children with PVI and SVI with CCC-2 and/or 
SCQ profiles of potential clinical significance 
(Note: the participants outside the Venn circles are those who did not reach clinical cut-off criteria) 
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Further consideration of the autistic-like profiles in the VI group 
Table 3.9: Language and social communication scores of individual children with VI 
Child W/SC-II/ CELF-3 SCQraw CCC-2 profile 
ID VerballQ Total Language (atypical ~ 15) 
02 109 102 9 Typical 
04 110 114 14 AS 
07 100 91 23 (atypical) ASD 
09 101 95 12 ASD 
10 99 108 9 Data missing 
16 99 106 12 Typical 
17 113 95 14 AS 
18 128 126 19 (atypical) AS 
19 108 126 13 ASD 
20 119 128 13 AS 
23 100 97 16 (atypical) Typical 
25 113 121 16 (atypical) ASD 
26 95 120 20 (atypical) AS 
31 84 98 12 Typical 
32 111 117 12 Typical 
No significant correlations were found between the overall performance on the WISC-III and 
CELF-3, and socio-communicative behaviour rating on the SCQ and the CCC-2 (p values> .05, 
see Appendix A2). Thus, in it appears that the individual differences in verbal intelligence and 
language competence cannot explain the prevalence of autism-like socio-communicative profiles 
in the present sample of children with VI (Q5) . Data examination at individual children's level 
(Table 3.9) did not throw any further light on this and it is difficult to get a clear grasp as to why 
some children showed atypical profiles while others did not. Moreover, it was not possible to 
ascertain what factors may have contributed to the better socio-communicative outcomes of 
those children with the lowest SCQ scores and normal range CCC-2 profiles (i.e., the participants 
shaded in grey in Table 3.9). None of these children's personal characteristics (e.g ., age, gender, 
visual level or diagnosis), nor their VIQ and language characteristics, seemed to distinguish them 
from the rest of the VI group (see both Table 3.1 and Table 3.11). Interestingly however, even 
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though these few children showed socio-communicative profiles that appeared within the normal 
range limits, it is questionable to what extent they can be considered 'comparable' to sighted 
children. For instance, even the two children with VI with some of the lowest (i.e., indicative of 
better outcome) SCQ scores in the VI group (Participant IDs: 02 and 10) were still in line with the 
10 % of children who showed the highest prevalence of undesirable SCQ behaviours within the 
sighted group (Figure 3.6). Similarly, the four children with VI, whose CCC-2 profiles were 
considered to be in the typical domain, achieved scaled scores that were below the sighted group 
mean on Social, Non-Verbal and Context scales, and all but one on the Interests scale of the 
CCC-2. This has been given further attention in the discussion of this chapter. 
Overlap between the CCC-2 and SCQ ratings 
In line with H5, the pattern of specific socio-communicative weaknesses in the VI group appeared 
to be consistent across the CCC-2 and the SCQ, given the distribution of negative correlations 
between the two measures (Table 3.10). This pattern was similarly consistent also in the sighted 
group, suggesting that the CCC-2 and the SCQ are likely to tap similar underlying abilities. Most 
notably, the SCQ total scores correlated highly in both participant groups with the Social scale 
(VI: r = -.653, P = .01, n = 14; Sighted: r = -.580, P = .002, n = 25) and the Non-Verbal scale on 
the CCC-2 (VI: r= -.631, p = .015, n = 14; Sighted: r= -.469, p = .018, n = 25). Interestingly, both 
the scores of children with VI and sighted children on the restricted and stereotyped behaviour 
domain of the SCQ were significantly correlated with the CCC-2 scales assessing stereotyped 
language (VI: r = -.703, P = .005, n = 14; Sighted: r = -.544, P = .005, n = 25) and restricted 
interests (VI: r = -.604, P = .022, n = 14; Sighted: r = -.396, p = .05, n = 25). Therefore, based on 
the correlations between the two measures, it is clear that they are both sensitive to the same 
underlying socio-communicative strengths and weaknesses. 
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Table 3.10: Pearson coefficients for correlations between SCQ and CCC-2 
VI group - SCQ (raw score) Sighted group - SCQ (raw score) 
(") ;u (") ;u 
-I 0 OJ$aCD;U -I 0 OJ(/)CD;U 0 ::J 3 CDCD~CD 0 ::J 3 CDCD~CD 
-
CD(/) 3 - CD(/) 3 Q) Q3 ~ c: ~ ro ~. -g ~ Q3 g c: ~ ro ~.-g (/) ::J <0 __ (/) ::J <0 __ n _. 0 ' -< ~ a: n _. 0'';: ~ a: n g:~ (';- n g:Q) (';-0 ~ c:~ < 0 Q) c: "'0 < ro ::J (jJ ~sn ro ::J 
-
(jJ CD Q) CD 
o· o· Q. ::J -
::J Q. ::J Q. 
CCC-2 
Speech -.589 -.331 -.084 -.610 -.021 .173 .058 -.132 
Syntax -.260 -.091 -.024 -.302 -.552** -.371 -.275 -.409 
Semantics -.455 -.179 -.282 -.429 -.320 -.079 -.071 -.432 
Coherence -.335 .022 .017 -.653** -.200 .088 -. 188 -.139 
Initiation -.271 .055 .104 -.667** -.454 -.086 -.408 -.292 
Stereotype -.278 .247 -.222 -.703** -.461 -.192 -.158 -.544** 
Context -.328 -.111 -.117 -.405 -.297 .055 -.297 -.170 
Non-verbal -.631 -.413 -.051 -.585 -.469 -.051 -.216 -.542** 
Social -.653** -.490 -.258 -.369 -.580** -.490** -.447 -.240 
Interests -.436 -.094 -.158 -.604 -.472 -.234 -.301 -.396 
GCC -.517 -.117 -.111 -.731** -.519** -.075 -.290 -.508** 
** - significant at p S .01 
DISCUSSION 
Three main findings emerged from the research presented thus far. Firstly, despite being 
comparable on age and verbal intelligence, children with VI performed significantly better than 
developmentally matched sighted children on a standardised test of language function. Secondly, 
and in contrast to the first finding, the children with VI showed a significantly poorer range of skills 
than their sighted peers in terms of their language functioning in an everyday context (based on 
parental reports), with a particular weakness in use of language for pragmatic and social purpose. 
Thirdly, judging by the parental reports of children's everyday socio-communicative behaviours, a 
large proportion of children with VI showed a level of behavioural difficulties that is consistent with 
a broader autism phenotype in sighted children and may be of a potential clinical concern. 
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As discussed previously in the introduction of this chapter and also in Chapter 1, language has 
been generally seen as a strong point of the development of children with VI. However, what is 
especially remarkable about the present findings, unlike those of previous research, is that they 
differentiated children with VI as better than their sighted peers. These findings carry particular 
significance in light of the early language irregularities and delays in language development of 
children with VI reported by previous research (Andersen et aI., 1984; Dunlea, 1989; McConachie 
& Moore, 1994; Reynell, 1978), and bear important implications for language-based interventions. 
Crucially however, how can we explain the language strength that children with VI have 
demonstrated in this study? 
In line with Perez-Pereira and Conti-Ramsden (1999), the language domain may be more salient 
to children with VI than children who are sighted and is therefore likely to serve a different 
function in the two groups. Importantly, the CELF-3 was shown in this study to be a successful 
tool in separating this language function from general intelligence, allowing us to illuminate the 
strength of children with VI that may be specific to their dominant domain. Being a test of 
language ability, a child's performance on the CELF-3 is likely to be related to their verbal IQ as 
assessed by the WISC-III (Semel, Wiig, & Secord, 2000b), a pattern which is also supported by 
the significant correlations between the two tests in the present research. However, unlike the 
majority of verbal WISC-III subtests, which essentially measure reasoning capacity through verbal 
means, the CELF-3 is less comprehension based, largely tapping language elements such as 
content and structure, which can be 'scrutinized independently and out of context' (Semel et aI., 
2000b, p.2). This potential of the CELF-3 to isolate language-specific strengths and difficulties in 
children has also been demonstrated in research with other clinical groups of children, such as 
those with specific language impairments (SLI) and those with autism (Lloyd, Paintin, & Botting, 
2006; Nash, 2008). 
However, we must remind ourselves that the CELF-3 assessment in the current study was based 
only on four out of required six subtests (two of which were supplementary) due to the visual 
content of most of the CELF-3 stimuli. For that reason the language profiles provided by the 
CELF-3 in this study are incomplete, so the composite language scores obtained in the present 
research need to be treated with some caution. For example, this incomplete CELF-3 
assessment may explain why there was a significant discrepancy between the CELF-3 Total 
Language and the VIQs in the Sighted group, who did not performed on the CELF-3 as it would 
be expected based on their verbal IQ. However, given that the CELF-3 assessment in this study 
was not presented in its required format, it is unlikely that the difference between the two groups 
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of children was solely the effect of the sighted group.11 In fact, the mean and standard deviation 
of the sighted group was still in line with the CELF-3 normative data which has a mean of 100 and 
standard deviation of 15. On the other hand, the CELF-3 Total Language scores in the VI group 
were higher than their VIQ score, even though this within-group difference was not statistically 
significant. Hence, it is possible that the CELF-3 subtests that were used here were especially 
favourable to children with VI, an advantage which was particularly obvious on the Recalling 
Sentences subtests. 
Even though the CELF-3 subtests generally all have a strong memory component (Semel et aI., 
2000b), the Recalling Sentences subtest is particularly verbal short-term memory (STM) based. It 
is plausible to suggest that, given adequate intelligence, verbal STM may playa particularly 
important role for children with VI. The VI group's superior performance on Recalling Sentences 
accentuates their STM advantage, which traditionally has been demonstrated using Digit Span 
subtest from the WISC (Hull & Mason, 1995; Smits & Mommers, 1976; Tillman & Bashaw, 1968; 
Tillman & Osborne, 1969). The Digit Span superiority of children with VI has not been replicated 
in the present research, although direction of the means suggested this pattern. It is likely that 
Recalling Sentences places slightly different demands on the child than does the Digit Span, in 
that the words to be recalled need to be recognised within a language context (i.e., syntax and 
semantics). For this reason, Recalling Sentences may better capture a language-specific STM 
advantage than would a traditional Digit Span test. 
Importantly, STM advantage may not only be obvious at the level of STM tests, but may also feed 
into all the other skills required for successful language function. 12 Hence, for a child with ample 
vocabulary, grammar and semantics, good verbal STM may especially boost an overall language 
outcome. This may explain why the overall CELF-3 performance (i.e., composite scores) of the VI 
group was more successful than for the sighted children, even though at the level of an individual 
subtest, only Recalling Sentences had the power to differentiate the two groups (i.e., Word 
11 For instance, within the sighted group the lowest scores were obtained on the Listening to Paragraphs subtest 
from the Receptive Language domain. However this is a supplementary subtest, which was used here as a 
replacement for the required subtest that involves visual stimuli. 
12 In relation to this, it is important to note that the Recalling Sentences subtest has been demonstrated in previous 
research as a highly sensitive measure for discriminating between children with and without language impairment, 
including those with SLI (Botting & Conti-Ramsden, 2003; Conti-Ramsden, Botting, & Faragher, 2001). 
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Classes and Listening to Paragraphs were trends}. Interestingly, STM strength may also provide 
an explanation for certain characteristics of the language of children with VI that are considered to 
be a disadvantage, such as modelled and imitative speech. Some researchers have argued that 
imitative speech, to an extent, may serve a purposeful, self-scaffolding function for children with 
VI (e.g., Perez-Pereira, 1994), although this has been disputed by others (Norgate et aI., 1998). 
Nevertheless, imitative speech is likely to be driven by STM (i.e., rehearsal). While this implicit 
rehearsal-like strategy may be beneficial in a STM-based context like Recalling Sentences for 
children with VI, the demands of such a task may be more challenging for sighted children. 
Sighted children may get distracted by the semantic context of the task and they may attempt to 
chunk meaningfully the semantic content of the sentence as a remembering strategy. Thus, 
future studies may need to consider the types of errors that sighted children make within such 
tasks, in order to unpack the processes that may underlie their poorer performance, in 
comparison to children with VI. 
Furthermore, it is likely that the observed language competence in children with VI is dependent 
on the context within which it is assessed. For instance, while the children with VI performed 
better than sighted children on the CELF-3, their parental ratings of specific structural language 
skills revealed a potentially contrasting picture. More specifically, the VI group's Semantics and 
Coherence, as assessed by the CCC-2, although largely within normal range limits, were 
significantly lower than those of sighted children. It is possible that the children with VI benefited 
from the context of a traditional one-to-one assessment in which both the WISC-III and the CELF-
3 are carried out. Such a context is structured and therefore rigid and scripted. This context, in 
addition to the provision of clear instructions by the assessor, may provide a useful scaffolding 
tool for achieving successful performance in a child with VI and may better capture the strength 
that is not necessarily apparent in an everyday conversation with such a child. On the other hand, 
an everyday context (within which language is generally used) is less rigid, largely spontaneous, 
and inherently social. For this reason, parental reports may be more likely to reveal a VI related 
disadvantage in Coherence and Semantics than would be evident in the context of a structured 
assessment. However, more rudimentary language elements, such as Speech and Syntax, may 
be less susceptible to contextual influences than are Semantics and Coherence, explaining why 
the two groups did not differ on these two CCC-2 components. 
A particularly striking language weakness of children with VI that was brought into spotlight by the 
parental reports in the present study was the children's use of language for social and 
communicative purposes. More specifically, despite scores that generally appear to be within the 
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normal range limits, the children with VI were found to be significantly poorer that their sighted 
peers at pragmatic language skills as measured by the CCC-2 (Inappropriate Initiation, 
Stereotyped Language, Use of Context and Non-Verbal Communication). Concerns about poor 
pragmatic skills in children with congenital VI have been raised previously in research studies 
looking primarily at young preschool children (Dunlea, 1989; Fraiberg, 1977; Preisler, 1991; 
Urwin, 1978), although research attempts to address this issue systematically have been 
methodologically limited (e.g., James & Stojanovik, 2007). The current research therefore 
provides unique evidence that pragmatic language concerns in children with VI are present at 
school age and in those children who are cognitively able, highlighting the non-verbal aspects of 
pragmatics as a particular challenge. 
It could be argued that the parental ratings on the CCC-2 were negatively biased towards the 
children with VI, as this questionnaire has not been developed with such children in mind and is 
therefore less sensitive to their strengths. However, this is possibly a circular argument, because 
pragmatic language skills are likely to be particularly vision-driven. For instance, the non-verbal 
aspects of pragmatics, such as use of facial expressions and gestures, may be the most potent 
communicative tools in maintaining a conversational partner's focus of attention. Similarly, the 
ability to initiate conversations appropriately, understand irony and sarcasm, and adjust 
conversational topics based on others' levels of interest may be easier to achieve through 
monitoring of the conversational partner's facial expressions and bodily gestures. Hence, 
considering the use of visual behaviours for pragmatic purpose, it is not surprising that these 
skills in children with VI are not as good as those of their sighted peers. Interestingly, the visual 
nature of pragmatics may be the reason for why pragmatic language my not benefit from 
scaffolding in the same way as structural language does (as discussed previously). More 
specifically, pragmatic language is possibly more dependent on successful development of joint 
attention in early childhood than are structural language skills, which seem to develop without 
much difficulty in children with VI. On the other hand, early joint attention is a recognised area of 
developmental vulnerability in such children, and poor communicative pragmatics of verbally able 
children with VI at school age may be a consequence of this vulnerability. This is certainly in line 
with the developmental patterns observed in autism, as even high-functioning children with 
autism who show better language outcomes show poor use of language for pragmatic and social 
purpose (Dennis et aI., 2001; Klin, 2000). 
Following from this, it may not be surprising that the VI group obtained notably impoverished 
ratings on the CCC-2 scales targeting autism-related social difficulties (Social Relations and 
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Interests). Furthermore, the overall CCC-2 profiles of children with VI were significantly uneven in 
comparison to the typically flat profiles of the sighted group, and revealed a disproportional 
weakness of social and pragmatic skills relative to the presentation of structural language skills. 
This pattern is largely reminiscent of the presentation of autism in sighted children and is 
accentuated by the fact that a substantial proportion of the children with VI reached or exceeded 
the clinical cut-off for autism concern on both the CCC-2 and the SCQ. 
These findings support the seminal research by Hobson and colleagues who were amongst the 
first to raise a concern about the alarming prevalence of autism-like features in children with 
congenital VI (R. Brown et aI., 1997; Hobson et aI., 1999). In this previous research, the autism-
like clinical picture was found across a cognitively heterogeneous population of children with 
congenital and total sight loss, although it was significantly more prominent in those children who 
had learning difficulties. Crucially, the present research provides an important additional insight in 
that autism-like socio-communicative impairments have been observed in an intellectually 
homogeneous group of children VI with advanced language skills, some of whom have above 
average verballQs (e.g., Participant ID: 18, VIQ = 128; Participant ID: 25, VIQ = 113). In relation 
to this, it can be argued that the behavioural characteristics observed in the present VI sample 
overall bear strong resemblance to the presentation of Asperger Syndrome, which is a form of 
high-functioning autism that is marked by a good language outcome (Wing, 1981). Interestingly, 
sighted children with an Asperger diagnosis may provide a useful comparison group in further 
research, to help illuminate some of the subtleties that underlie autistic-like presentation in 
verbally proficient children with congenital VI. 
Furthermore, while the previous research investigated autistic-like characteristics exclusively in 
children with total sight loss (i.e., PVI) (R. Brown et aI., 1997; Hobson & Bishop, 2003; James & 
Stojanovik, 2007), the present research provides unique evidence that such characteristics are 
also prevalent amongst the children with some limited levels of functional although severely 
degraded vision in their early years (SVI). It is worth noting that some previous studies with 
infants and young children with congenital VI demonstrated poorer developmental outcomes in a 
range of areas in children with PVI compared to those with SVI. However, these studies were of 
an epidemiological nature and included a more representative sample of children with VI, 
including children with low IQ, the prevalence of which is higher in the PVI group (Cass et aI., 
1994; Dale & Sonksen, 2002). The present results suggest that it is unlikely that the distinction 
between children with total sight loss and those with some limited form perception in early 
childhood can explain the autistic-like features in the current sample of verbally-able children in 
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their primary school years. With this in mind, the reader should be reminded that all of the 
children with VI in this study had a very significant vision loss and the severely degraded form 
vision in the children in SVI is still likely to interfere with the processes that are particularly at risk 
from reduced vision. 
In relation to this, it is important to reiterate the previous point about the developmental 
significance of early joint attention. Vision loss may impose seriously limited opportunity to 
engage in that very special form of relatedness, affective sharing and perspective taking that the 
context of joint attention provides to the child and their interactional partner, creating a 
developmental vulnerability with possible long-term consequences for a child with VI (Hobson, 
1990, 1993, 2002). Hence, the presentation of a broader autism phenotype in later childhood in 
children with VI is potentially a consequence of this early vulnerability rather than presentation of 
core autism per se. Similarly, this vulnerability may account also for why even those children with 
VI whose socio-communicative profiles were within normal range limits did not reach the levels of 
social and communicative competence that is typical of the majority of sighted children. However, 
it still remains unclear why some children with VI, despite their good language and verbal 
intelligence, present with autistic-like behaviours more strongly than others, and to the extent that 
may warrant further clinical evaluation. Similarly, individual characteristics of those children 
whose socio-communicative profiles scores are in the normal range do not provide any clues with 
respect to the potential factors that may contribute to their seemingly better socio-communicative 
outcomes. The reasons for this possibly extend beyond linguistic competence and, the research 
presented in the following chapters of this thesis may help to clarify some of these issues. 
Finally, we must remind ourselves that the measures of socio-communicative competence used 
in this study were based on parental reports. The subjective nature of parental reports may not 
only underestimate children's behavioural difficulties that may require professional attention; it 
may also exaggerate the severity of a child's behaviours that parents may find particularly difficult 
to deal with. This may provide an explanation for why some children with VI in this study 
presented with more prominent socio-communicative difficulties than others. Thus, utilizing more 
structured measures and direct clinical assessments may be a useful addition to the parental 
questionnaires in future research. Nevertheless, the existing clinical measures that target autism-
related socio-communicative problems may not be as revealing on their own, as they are not 
developed with children with VI in mind, and are likely to be difficult to adapt to their needs (i.e., 
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they are largely dependent on the utility of visual stimuli)13. This further emphasises the lack of 
measures that are suitable for use with children with VI and which are sensitive to their 
developmental strengths. With this in mind, parents are a valuable source of knowledge about 
their children and are likely to provide a window into their children's characteristics that may not 
be easy to evaluate otherwise. Therefore, in the context of the present research, we can conclude 
that parental reports provided a valuable insight into the everyday socio-communicative 
competencies and difficulties of their children with congenital VI. From these reports we have 
learned that there is a wide spectrum of socio-communicative difficulties in cognitively able 
children with congenital VI of varying severity. However, while these difficulties (particularly in 
some children with VI) may resemble socio-communicative difficulties in sighted children with 
autism, we cannot generalise from these findings that there is a distinction between visually 
impaired children with and without autistic features. More accurately, these findings can be seen 
as providing useful baseline norms for cognitively able children with VI, from which future 
diagnostic criteria for autism (or autism-like socio-communicative disorder) in such children may 
potentially be developed. 
13 For instance, the Autism Diagnostic Observational Schedule (ADOS) (Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 1999). 
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Chapter 4 
Understanding Mental States as Causes of Emotions in Children 
with Congenital VI 
SUMMARY 
The aim of the research presented in this chapter was to investigate social cognition in the same 
children with congenital VI who took part in the research presented in Chapter 3. Here, the 
children's theory of mind capacity was examined in a way that differs from the standard false-
belief task, with an emphasis on the children's spontaneous use of mental states terms when 
explaining the emotions of story characters. Considering the VI group's socio-pragmatic 
difficulties that were highlighted in the preceding chapter, it was of interest to examine whether 
such difficulties would also transpire in their mentalistic language use. The children with VI were 
compared to age and VIQ matched sighted children on the extent to which they spontaneously 
referred to mental states rather than to situational factors as the causes of emotions. The results 
showed that the two groups did not differ in the frequency with which they used mental state 
language to explain basic emotions, and that their use of mental state terms (both for beliefs and 
desires) was as frequent as was their use of situational terms in their explanation of both typical 
and atypical emotional scenarios. These results are discussed in relation to i) methodological 
limitations of the task used in the current study, and ii) in comparison to the previous research 
evidence that highlighted social cognition as an area of vulnerability for children with VI. 
INTRODUCTION 
Numerous studies are in agreement that children with congenital VI are delayed in developing 
theory of mind understanding compared to sighted children of the same developmental level 
(McAlpine & Moore, 1995; Minter et aI., 1998; Peterson et aI., 2000; Pring et aI., 1998; Roch-
Levecq, 2006). As discussed in the previous chapters, theory of mind delay in children with VI is 
consistent with contemporary theories of social cognition that emphasise the importance of visual 
precursors to theory of mind. To reiterate, in typically developing sighted children, learning about 
subjective mental states is thought to be facilitated by the experiences of visually-driven shared 
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attention (Baron-Cohen, 1995b), visual imitation (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 1993), and affectively 
charged triadic interactions (Hobson, 1993), which take place in early childhood and precede the 
development of theory of mind. On the other hand, children who are visually impaired are denied 
the chance to benefit from the rich cues provided within this visually-driven social context of 
imitation and affective sharing of attention (e.g. eye-gaze directing, gestures and facial 
expressions), leading to an impoverished framework for learning about the mental states of 
others, thus resulting in a delayed theory of mind (Hobson, 2002). 
Methodologically, the majority of the aforementioned studies, which demonstrated a theory of 
mind delay in children with congenital VI, used variations of the false-belief task as a measure of 
theory of mind understanding. There is general consensus among researchers that in typical 
development, mastery of false-belief tasks is acquired around the age of four years (Ruffman, 
2004; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, children with 
congenital VI have repeatedly been found to have difficulties with false-belief tasks at 
chronological and verbal mental ages older than four years (Green et aL, 2004; McAlpine & 
Moore, 1995; Minter et aL, 1998; Peterson et aL, 2000; Roch-Levecq, 2006). 
In most theory of mind studies that employ a false-belief paradigm children are asked explicitly to 
predict a story character's mental or emotional state. However, it has been suggested that theory 
of mind development should be studied in relation to real world consequences (Astington, 2001; 
Rieffe & Meerum Terwogt, 2000). For instance, even when children demonstrate that they can 
make an adequate false-belief prediction it is still uncertain whether they can use this ability 
spontaneously and whether they can formulate an explanation for the cognitive or emotional 
states they observe in other people. Related to this, it has been argued that the use of the 
language representing mental states (i.e., thoughts, desires and emotions) is fundamental to 
social cognition and may be an important indicator of a child's theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 
2000; de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006; Symons, 2004). In fact, it has been suggested that children's 
discourse about inner mental states in real life precedes their mastery of false-belief tasks 
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). To the contrary, children with autism, for whom the theory of mind 
deficit is seen as a defining characteristic (Baron-Cohen, 1995b; Happe, 1995), have been found 
to produce fewer words representing mental states when describing pictures involving action and 
deception and in their spontaneous conversational discourse compared to their typically 
developing peers (Baron-Cohen et aL, 1985; Dennis et aL, 2001; Tager- Flusberg, 1992). 
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However, little is known about the extent to which children with congenital VI spontaneously refer 
to mental states (particularly those of other people) in their everyday language use. The only 
investigation to date that has addressed this specific aspect of social cognition in children with 
congenital VI is the study by Pring et aL (1998), that used the 'Strange Stories' task (designed by 
Happe, 1994) for this purpose. In this study, sixteen children with congenital VI and no other 
impairments, with IQs reported to be in the average range, were compared to a group of 
chronological age matched sighted controls on the frequency of mental state justifications when 
explaining the story characters' behaviours. There were twenty four stories tapping sophisticated 
theory of mind and involving a range of advanced mental state elements such as sarcasm, 
misunderstanding, persuasion, pretence and deceit. In their study, Pring et aL found that the 
children with congenital VI produced significantly fewer mental state justifications for the story 
protagonists' behaviours than did the sighted children overall, concluding that that there is a 
difference between children with VI and sighted children in understanding the uses of language 
that requires insight into the beliefs and desires of others. The study further highlighted that this 
subtle difference in the way social understanding manifests in children who are visually impaired, 
compared to children who are sighted, is seen at an age (i.e., 9 - 12) by which it had previously 
been assumed that earlier developmental problems would have been overcome (Hobson, 1993). 
Finally, the authors reported a significant relationship between the children's general intellectual 
levels and the frequency of their mental state justifications. This supported the previous research, 
which suggested that children with VI who are intellectually more able may also be more able to 
compensate for difficulties in social cognition than children with lower intellectual levels (R. Brown 
et aL, 1997; Green et aL, 2004). For this reason, however, as the children in this study were not 
matched on cognitive ability, it remains unclear whether the difference between the VI and the 
sighted children was confined to the lower ability group. 
Following Pring et aL (1998), the purpose of the current research was to investigate social 
cognition in children with congenital VI by focussing on children's spontaneous use of 
conversational means as indicators of their understanding of mental states. Unlike Pring et aL's 
study, the aim of the current investigation was to compare children with VI to sighted controls 
matched on verbal ability (VIQ) as well as on chronological age. Furthermore, whilst Pring et aL 
noted the children's mental state language use in terms of justifications for the story characters' 
behaviours, in the current research the focus was on the children's insight into the story 
characters' mental states as causes of their emotions. 
99 
The design for the current investigation was built upon the series of experiments carried out by 
Rieffe and colleagues with children who are typically developing (Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & 
Cowan, 2005), children with autism (Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Stockmann, 2000) and children 
with hearing impairment (Rieffe & Meerum Terwogt, 2000). More specifically, Rieffe et aL 
designed a task which involves presenting six stories, initially requiring children to predict 
emotional states of the story characters and subsequently to provide subjective explanations for 
the factors that caused them. The authors argued that understanding the causes of emotions is 
more sophisticated than just recognizing and reacting to them as it places the emotional 
experience in a socio-cultural context. In this context, emotions can also be a consequence of a 
person's interpretation of a situation and not just a mechanical product of the situation itself, the 
understanding of which requires theory of mind (Rieffe et aL, 2005, p. 260). 
Despite difficulties with theory of mind, it has been reported that children with congenital VI have 
an understanding of cause-effect relationships that evoke basic emotions (i.e., happiness, 
sadness, fear and anger). More specifically, it has been found that children with VI are as able as 
sighted children to identify such emotions as they occur typically in specific situations, from their 
own perspective (e.g., How do you feel when you receive a new gift?) (Roch-Levecq, 2006) and 
from the perspective of others (e.g., Susan is given a new bicycle for her birthday? What will 
Susan feel?) (Dyck et aL, 2004). Moreover, Dyck et aL (2004) reported that, when asked explicitly 
to explain the meaning of emotions (e.g., What does the word 'angry' mean?), the semantic 
knowledge of children with VI even exceeded the knowledge of the sighted controls. However, 
both studies found that, in the task which required children to represent mental states more 
implicitly, children with VI were not as proficient. For example, the false-belief task performance of 
children in Roch-Levecq's study was significantly poorer than the performance of sighted controls 
(Roch-Levecq, 2006). Similarly, whilst able to explain the meaning of basic emotions, the children 
with VI studied by Dyck et aL (2004) were less able than their sighted peers at recognising vocal 
intonations specific to different categories of emotion. It is worth noting that a similar difficulty with 
recognising vocally expressed emotions in children with congenital VI has been reported by 
others (Minter et aL, 1991). Thus, in tandem with these studies, it is expected that the children 
with VI in the current study will be able to predict the four basic emotions (i.e., happiness, 
sadness, fear and anger) without much difficulty. However, it is their explanations of the causes of 
emotions that may differentiate the children with VI from sighted children, as this process is more 
likely to call upon a child's theory of mind (Rieffe et aL, 2005). 
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The paradigm designed by Rieffe and colleagues, which was adopted for the current study, also 
included another important element. They suggested that, within a socio-cultural context, within 
which emotional states occur, it is important to consider how typical certain emotions are. For 
example, a typical emotional reaction to receiving a present would be happiness and excitement, 
whereas an atypical reaction would be anger or sadness. By the age of five children understand 
the causal link between these typical emotions and subjective desires in that they are able to 
accurately predict a happy emotion when the protagonist receives what s/he desires and an 
unhappy emotion when the protagonist is frustrated in fulfilling his/her desire (Wellman, 1990). It 
has been argued that, when explaining emotions, typical emotional scenarios may not necessarily 
require a mental state inference and can easily be explained in terms of situational factors, which 
tend to be self-evident and usually represent a shared view of the world (Gnepp, 1983; Rieffe et 
aI., 2005). For example, children can easily attribute a story protagonist's happiness at receiving 
a present to the possibility that it is the protagonist's birthday. However, such situational 
explanations may not be sufficient in the case of an unexpected emotional reaction, such as 
anger at receiving a present. In order to provide a justification for the strangeness (i.e., atypicality) 
of this situation, insight into the protagonist's mental state may be required (e.g., 'he is angry 
because he thinks it will be something he doesn't like'). Therefore, if children have a theory of 
mind, atypical emotional scenarios should most strongly encourage them to make references to 
story protagonist's mental states (Gnepp, 1983; Rieffe et aI., 2005). 
Rieffe et al. (2000) found that the atypical emotion scenarios did in fact induce more mental state 
language in both typically developing children and children on the autism spectrum. However, 
whilst typical emotions differentiated children with autism from typically developing children, the 
atypical emotion did not. More specifically, when explaining typical emotion scenarios the autistic 
group referred to fewer desire and belief terms as causes of story protagonist's emotions than 
even a younger control group. However, when explaining atypical emotions, the autism group 
referred to mental states as frequently as did the typical controls of the same age. Based on the 
children's performance on this task, the authors argued that children with autism may have an 
insight into the mental states of others. However, they do not use this capacity in every-day 
circumstances and in the same way as do typically developing children. This is consistent with 
other findings that some high functioning individuals with autism who pass false-belief tasks still 
show poorer levels of social adaptation in everyday context (Klin, 2000). 
In the current study it was of interest to examine whether children with congenital VI would 
perform like the children with autism studied by Rieffe et al. (2000). Given the theory of mind 
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delay and the reduced propensity for mental state language reported previously in children with 
VI (Green et aI., 2004; Pring et aI., 1998), it would not be unexpected to find a difference between 
the children with VI and their sighted counterparts in the frequency with which they use mental 
state attributions rather than situational attributions in their explanations of emotions. Moreover, in 
keeping with Rieffe et al. (2000), while atypical emotions are more likely to induce mental state 
inferences in both groups, the typical emotion scenarios may be more likely to differentiate 
children with VI from children who are sighted. 
Finally, it was of interest to investigate whether the two groups would differ in the extent to which 
they referred to different categories of mental states. Previous research has established that in 
the course of theory of mind development there is a clear developmental progression in the 
understanding of various mental state concepts (Wellman & Liu, 2004). More, specifically it has 
been found that children's understanding of desires precedes their understanding of beliefs and 
furthermore, that the causal relationship between desire and emotion is understood before the 
causal relationship between belief and emotion (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Harris, 1989; Wellman 
& Liu, 2004). One explanation for this is that separate modules, dedicated to each distinctive 
mental state concept, become available at different points in development (Fodor, 1992; B. J. 
Scholl & Leslie, 1999). Another explanation is that, in order to understand belief, children need to 
develop a concept of mental representation, which might not be necessary for understanding 
desire (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). The theories of developmental lag between the understanding 
of desire and belief do not fall withing the scope of this thesis and will not be discussed in further 
detail here (see Flavell, 1999; Harris, 1996 for the reviews of literature). Importantly, there seems 
to be general agreement amongst researchers that there is a clear developmental sequence by 
which the understanding of different mental state concepts occurs. Thus, a similar pattern of 
understanding of desire before understanding of belief should also be observable in children with 
congenital VI. However, following the theory of mind delay hypothesis for children who are 
visually impaired, it is of interest to examine this pattern in comparison to children who are 
sighted. Finally, as children in general are more likely to make mental state inferences overall at 
an older age (Harris, 1989), an overall developmental trend in the frequency of references to 
mental states should also be observable in the two groups of children. 
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Research questions and hypotheses 
In summary, in order to assess the frequency of mental state language use as an indicator of 
theory of mind in children with congenital VI, the current research used the paradigm designed by 
Rieffe et al. (Rieffe & Meerum Terwogt, 2000; Rieffe et aI., 2005; Rieffe et aI., 2000) with an aim 
to address the following questions: 
Question 1 (Q1): Do children with congenital VI differ from sighted children of the same age and 
verbal ability in the extent to which they refer to mental states rather than situational factors in 
their explanations of emotions of story characters? 
Question 2 (Q2): Does the extent to which the two groups may differ in their spontaneous use of 
mental state terms depend on whether the emotional scenarios are typical or atypical? 
Question 3 (Q3): Does the extent to which the two groups may differ in their use of mental state 
terms depend on the specific type of mental state (i.e., desire terms relative to belief terms)? 
Question 4 (Q4): Can severity of VI, chronological age and verbal IQ explain the variation in the 
extent to which children with VI refer to mental states? 
METHOD 
Participants 
The participants were the same children described in Chapter 3. There were 15 children with 
congenital VI of differing degrees (i.e., severe and profound) and 26 children with normally 
developed vision, matched on verballQ, chronological age and gender. Average VIQ across the 
two groups was 106.2 (SO = 10.8) and the mean chronological age was 8 years and 3 months 
(SO = 1.7, range = 6 years and 3 months - 12 years 11 months) (see also Table 3.2). In both 
groups there were marginally more girls than boys (VI group gender ratio: 9/6; Sighted group 
gender ratio: 14/12). 
Design 
The study used a mixed 2 (Group) x 2 (Emotion typicality) factorial design. The first Independent 
Variable (IV) Group was between-subjects with two levels: VI and Sighted. The second IV, 
Emotion typicality, was within-subjects, and the two conditions were Typical and Atypical. There 
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were two Dependent Variables (DVs). The first was frequency of mental state explanations, 
relative to situational explanations, when explaining the emotions of story protagonists. The 
second DV focused upon mental state explanations only and was measured in terms of the 
frequency of desire explanations, relative to belief explanations, when explaining the emotions of 
story protagonists. 
Materials 
The Emotion task was adopted from Rieffe and colleagues (Rieffe & Meerum Terwogt, 2000; 
Rieffe et aI., 2005; Rieffe et aI., 2000). It consisted of six short stories that described emotion 
eliciting situations (Table 4.1 and Appendix B1). The stories were designed to elicit typical 
emotions, with two stories provoking a positive emotion (e.g., happy, excited, surprised), two 
stories provoking sadness or anger and two stories provoking fear (Table 4.1, Typical Emotion 
column). 
All but one story (Story 5) were the same as those used previously by Reiffe et al. In the original 
stimuli Story 5 depicts a girl who sees a person in a dark living room who she cannot identify. The 
visual aspect of the story was modified as it was felt that this would be more suitable for the 
experiences of the children with VI (i.e., a girl hears a person walking, in what she thinks is an 
empty house). 
Anger and sadness are placed in one emotion cluster. Rieffe et al. argued that they are both seen 
as plausible reactions to one and the same scenario because a situation can arouse either 
depending on whether the person concentrates on the cause of the negative outcome or on the 
negative outcome itself. 
Table 4.1: Content of the six stories with typical and atypical emotions 
Story Story content 
1 Boy receives a present from his mother 
2 Girl goes outside to play hide-and-seek with other children 
3 Girl cannot go to the Zoo, but has to stay at home 
4 Boy has a dog that is ill 
5 Girl hears a person walking, in what she thinks is an empty 
house 
6 Girl lies in bed and hears a strange noise 
Typical 
Happy 
Happy 
Angry / 
Sad 
Sad 
Afraid 
Afraid 
Atypical 
Angry 
Afraid 
Happy 
Afraid 
Happy 
Angry 
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Procedure 
The task administration for each child lasted approximately 10 minutes and was tape-recorded for 
subsequent transcription. All of the children in the study completed all six stories. The order of 
presentation of the six stories was randomized. The experimenter read the stories to the children 
in a neutral tone of voice. 
The task had two elements: Emotion prediction and Emotion explanation. First, after hearing each 
story, the children were asked how the protagonist in the story would feel (Emotion prediction). If 
a child failed to identify an emotion the experimenter prompted the child, for example "Do you 
think Linda feels happy, sad, angry or afraid?" The order of the suggested emotions was 
randomized to avoid biased responses. Second, if the child predicted the typical emotion (Table 
4.1, Typical Emotion column), they were asked to explain it (Emotion explanation - TypicaD. For 
instance "Why does Linda feel sad?" After the child had explained the typical emotion, the 
experimenter informed the child that the protagonist felt differently and named an atypical 
emotion. For example, "Yes, that's what I thought as well. But Linda doesn't feel sad, she feels 
happy now that she is not going to the Zoo. Why is Linda happy?" The atypical emotions were 
fixed for each story (Table 4.1, Atypical Emotion column). The children were then asked to 
provide an explanation for the atypical emotion (Emotion explanation - Atypical). 
If in the emotion prediction stage the child predicted an unexpected (i.e., atypical) emotion, the 
child was again asked to explain this emotion. After this explanation was given, the experimenter 
continued the task in the normal way by providing the emotion that was opposite to the one given 
by the child. The child was again asked to provide an explanation for the emotion given by the 
experimenter. However, any explanations given for emotions on stories where an atypical 
emotion had been predicted were not included in the analyses involving emotion explanations 
(see below). The purpose of continuing with emotion explanations on stories where the child had 
predicted an atypical emotion was to facilitate the general procedure and in order for the children 
not to become discouraged. 
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Scoring14 
Emotion Prediction 
On each story each child could predict either a typical or atypical emotion. All of the children in 
the study were able to make an emotion prediction for each story, except one child with VI who 
failed to predict an emotion for Story 4 even after a prompt. The frequency of predictions in each 
category (typical and atypical) was calculated for each individual story and each vision group (the 
single instance where a child with VI failed to predict an emotion for Story 4 was treated as 
missing). In the VI group (N = 15), one child made atypical emotion predictions on two stories 
while five children made atypical emotion predictions on one story. In the Sighted group (N = 26), 
two children made atypical emotion predictions on two stories while five children made atypical 
emotion predictions on one story. The two groups did not differ significantly in terms of the mean 
number of atypical responses (t (18) = .859; P = .396). 
Emotion explanation 
As mentioned above, emotion explanations were only included for further analysis from those 
stories in which typical emotions had been predicted (valid stories). Explanations from stories on 
which an atypical emotion was predicted (along with the single instance in which no emotion was 
predicted) were not examined further. Therefore, for six children in the VI group and seven 
children in the sighted group, the subsequent examination of mental state references had to be 
carried out for fewer than six stories. The minimum number of stories on which the frequency of 
children's mental state references could be calculated was four. Table 4.2 below shows the 
proportion of children in each group based on the number of stories included in the subsequent 
analyses. 
Table 4.2: Proportion (%) of children in each participant group based on the number of valid 
stories 
Number of stories 
6 5 4 
VI 60% 27% 13% 
N = 15 (N = 9) (N = 4) (N = 2) 
Sighted 73% 19% 8% 
N = 26 (N = 19) (N = 5) (N = 2) 
14 Two examples of scoring procedure, including the data of one child from each group is given in Appendix 82. 
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For all valid stories, the emotion explanations were categorised as either 1) Mental State or 2) 
Situational as described below. If no explanation was offered, the response was classified as 
'Don't know'. Classification of explanations was performed separately for the typical and atypical 
emotions on each valid story. 
1) Mental State explanations were further classified as Beliefs or Desires. Belief explanations 
were those in which children referred to a broader range of protagonist's cognitive states about 
the situation (e.g., know, think, imagine, wonder, guilty, guess). For example, Maggie is scared to 
hear someone moving in the living room 'because she doesn't know who it is' or 'because she 
thinks it's a monster'. Desires were those explanations in which children referred to the 
protagonist's states of desires and preferences (e.g., want, wish, like, look forward to, prefer, 
keen on). For instance, Linda is happy that she is not going to the Zoo because 'she didn't want 
to go in the first place' or 'because she doesn't like animals'. Importantly, these two mental state 
categories (Beliefs and Desires) were not exclusive. If a child used both to explain a protagonist's 
emotion (e.g., 'She wanted to go to the Zoo and she doesn't know why she can't go') then the 
responses were assigned to both categories. 
2) The responses were categorised as Situational when children elaborated on the situation or 
referred to another situation without reference to the protagonist's mental state. For example, 
Linda is happy that she is not going to the Zoo 'because it's raining'. 
When the children failed to provide an explanation for an emotion the response was classified as 
'Don't Know'. Across the Typical and Atypical emotion explanations the mean percentage of Don't 
Know responses in the VI group was 8% compared to 3% in the sighted group. However this 
difference between the two groups was not statistically significant (equal variances not assumed -
t (17.04) = 1.291; P = .214). It is worth noting that in both groups the proportion of Don't Know 
responses appeared higher when children were asked to provide explanations for atypical 
emotions. Consequently, related-samples t tests (collapsed across the two groups) revealed that 
the difference in the proportion of Don't Know responses between Typical and Atypical emotion 
explanations was statistically significant (t (40) = - 2.918; p = .006). The Don't Know responses 
were excluded from the subsequent analyses. 
Inter-rater reliability was calculated for each explanation category (sum of explanations for typical 
and atypical emotions), using the Pearson correlation coefficients (r). An independent judge who 
was unaware of the children's individual characteristics or the hypotheses of the study coded 
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approximately 50% of randomly selected transcripts from each vision group. The reliability ratings 
overall were high (Beliefs: r = .943; Desires: r = .880; Situations: r = .985; Don't Know: r = .978). 
RESULTS 
Typical emotion predictions 
Predictions of the typical emotions were frequent in both groups. For most stories, typical emotion 
predictions were over 90% (Table 4.3). However, Story 5, which was initially modified to be 
suitable for experiences of children with VI, produced more atypical emotion predictions than any 
other story. Story 5 evoked 27% atypical emotion predictions in the VI group and 15% of atypical 
emotion predictions in the sighted group. However, Chi square tests revealed that there was no 
significant association between Group (VI and sighted) and type of emotion prediction (Typical 
and Atypical) for any of the 6 stories (Story 1: N/A; Story 2: X2 (1) = .015; P = .903; Story 3: N/A; 
Story 4: X2 (1) = .004; P = .950; Story 5: X2 (1) = .771; P = .380; Story 6: X2 (1) = .163; P = .686). 
However, it is worth noting that initially, when asked to predict an emotion, 20% (3/15) of the 
children in the VI group needed a prompt by the experimenter to identify an emotion. More 
specifically, two children needed a prompt on two stories each (Child 1: Story 2 and 4, and Child 
2: Story 3 and 6) and one child required a prompt on one story (Story 6). By comparison only 4% 
(1/26) of the children in the sighted group needed a prompt to predict an emotion (Story 5). There 
was no obvious association between the story and the prompt requirement. Only prompted 
emotion predictions that were typical were included in the subsequent analyses. 
Table 4.3: Proportion (%) of typical emotion predictions in VI and Sighted groups across the six 
stories 
VI 
Sighted 
Happiness 
Story 1 Story 2 
100% 
100% 
93% 
92% 
Anger/Sadness 
Story 3 Story 4 
100% 
100% 
87% 
92% 
Fear 
Story 5 Story 6 
73% 
85% 
93% 
96% 
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Typical and atypical emotion explanations 
First, it was of interest to examine whether the two groups differed in the extent to which they 
referred to mental states, rather than situations (Q1), as causes of the story protagonists' 
emotions, and if this was dependent on whether the emotion was typical or atypical (Q2). Thus, 
for each participant, the proportion of mental state emotion explanations was calculated as a 
proportion of all emotion explanations across all valid stories (i.e., number of Mental State 
explanations / number of all explanations [Mental states + Situations]). Each explanation was 
classified as either a mental state or situational. For mental states it was irrelevant which sub-type 
of mental state (i.e., Belief or Desires, or both) was given. This was repeated for typical and 
atypical emotion explanations. Table 4.4 shows the mean proportion of Mental State 
explanations, in the two groups of children across the typical and atypical emotion conditions. 
Notably, data variability was considerably large in both groups of children. 15 
Table 4.4: Mean proportions of mental state references in the two groups for typical and atypical 
emotion conditions 
Typical Atypical 
VI n = 15 
Mean (SD) .49 (.33) .48 (.32) 
Sighted n = 26 
Mean (SD) .45 (.22) .44 (.22) 
Looking at the proportions in Table 4.4, it is clear that mental state references were made 
approximately half the time for both typical and atypical emotions (i.e., the other 50% of the 
explanations were Situational, see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Furthermore, it can be seen that the 
proportions of mental state references were similar across the two groups of children, and the 
proportions of mental state references were comparable for both typical and atypical emotions. 
Not surprisingly, a mixed 2 (Group) x 2 (Emotion typicality) ANOVA revealed no significant effects 
of Group (F (1, 39) = .284; P = .597), Emotion typicality (F (1, 39) = .001; p = .841) or interaction (F (1, 
39) = .041; P = .979). These results suggest that the children in the VI and the sighted groups were 
15 It is worth noting that Log transformation of the data was carried out, but did not improve the data distribution. 
Importantly, the subsequent analyses on transformed data as well as on raw scores did not yield different results 
from those presented here (i.e., proportion scores). 
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comparable in terms of the frequency with which they used mental state attributions to explain 
emotional states of the story characters (Q1), and the frequency with which the mental state 
references were made in both groups was the same for typical and atypical emotions (Q2). 
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Figure 4.1: Proportion of mental state and 
situational explanations for typical emotions 
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Figure 4.2: Proportion of mental state and 
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emotions 
A further analysis of interest was to examine whether there was a difference between the two 
groups in the type of mental states explanations offered, namely Desires and Beliefs (Q3). Table 
4.5 below shows the mean proportion of Desire explanations in the two vision groups, calculated 
as proportions of all the mental state references (Le., number of Desire explanations / [number of 
Desire and Belief explanations]), for typical and atypical emotions. Naturally, children who did not 
refer to mental states in their emotion explanations on either typicality condition were excluded 
from these calculations. This was the case for 3 children in the VI group (Le., one child on both 
typical and atypical emotion; one child on typical; and one child on atypical emotion condition) 
and 2 children in the sighted group (one child per typicality condition). 
Table 4.5: Mean proportion of references to Desires in the two participant groups for typical and 
atypical emotions 
Typical Atypical 
VI (n = 12) 
Mean (SO) .39 (.31) .62 (.30) 
Sighted (n = 24) 
Mean (SO) .61 (.35) .64 (.34) 
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Table 4.5 shows that, overall, children in the sighted group referred more frequently to Desires 
than Beliefs, as the mean proportions of Desire attributions, for both typical and atypical emotion 
explanations, were over 60%. However, in the VI group, Desires seemed to be referred to more 
frequently than Beliefs only for atypical emotion explanations; in the typical emotion condition the 
references to Desires made up fewer than 40% of all the references to mental states. Figures 4.3 
and 4.4 graphically illustrate this pattem. 
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Figure 4.3: Proportion of Belief and Desire 
explanations for typical emotions 
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Figure 4.4: Proportion of Belief and Desire 
explanations for atypical emotions 
A mixed 2 (Group) x 2 (Typicality) ANOVA, however, did not show a significant effect of Group (F 
(1 . 34) = 1.612; P = .213) and the effect of Typicality of emotion just failed to reach significance (F (1 . 
34) = 3.937; P = .055). Furthermore, the interaction of Group x Typicality was not significant (F (1 . 
34) = 2.213; P = .146). Given these findings, any further analysis and interpretations regarding Q3 
would have been speculative. 
Accounting for chronological age, intellectual level and VI level 
The data were potentially too variable to carry out correlational analyses that would address 04. 
Not surprisingly, using either raw or proportion scores, no significant correlations were detected in 
either participant group between the frequency of explanations in the Mental States category 
(overall and individual Belief and Desire categories) and the children's chronological ages and 
VIQs (Le., based on the non-parametric Spearman's test; p values> .05). Additionally, Mann-
Whitney tests did not significantly differentiate the PVI and SVI groups on the frequency of mental 
state explanations (overall, or for individual categories), using either proportion or raw scores, 
suggesting that the distinction between the PVI and SVI levels in the early years in children with 
VI could not account for the current task performance (p values> .05). 
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I 
Qualitative considerations 
The lack of power in the current experiment to detect results of statistical significance may have 
obscured the true richness of the children's language produced in a conversational context. For 
that reason it was felt that examinations at a level of individual children may throw further light on 
their use of mentalistic discourse to explain causes of emotions. 
Judging by the qualitative data (examples of which can be seen in Appendix B.2), even the 
youngest children in the study, and in both participant groups, were able to express themselves 
very well using a range of mentalistic language terms across the typical and atypical conditions. 
However, closer inspection of such data may reveal some underlying subtleties in individual 
childrens' discourse, which could not otherwise be detected by a systematic coding method or a 
statistical test. The testing session with an 8 year old girl with SVI was chosen to illustrate such 
subtleties and the transcript from this session is presented in Table 4.6. 
This child's data was chosen partly as she produced possibly the richest repertoire of mentalistic 
language in the whole sample. Her explanations were somewhat challenging to score using the 
coding method suggested by Rieffe et al. as she tended to predict a range of potential emotional 
outcomes for the story characters (e.g., Story 2, Table 4.6), unlike the majority of children who 
generally provided only one prediction. This made it clear that the task itself, including the coding 
system, was still relatively rigid, and did not necessarily account for the natural fluency of a child's 
language. Nevertheless, considering that this child's verballQ was above the average range (VIQ 
= 118) her verbal expression in the context of the present task may not be surprising. 
Interestingly, the majority of her explanations were justified using mentalistic discourse, rather 
than drawing on situational causes, which revealed a rich insight into the inner mental states held 
by this child. For instance, where many of her VI and sighted peers produced explanations that 
were relatively simple and had meaningful representations in real life (e.g., Walter is afraid that 
his dog is not very well because 'he might not know anyone around the area to play with'; 'he 
doesn't want his dog to die' or 'he won't have much fun without his dog), her explanations 
seemed quite intricate for a child of her age (e.g., 'he feels sorry for his dog, he feels guilty, 
'cause he blames the dog', Story 1, Table 4.6). However, despite her extensive knowledge of 
mental states and her clear ability to attribute them to other people, her cause-consequence 
reasoning within the emotional scenarios sometimes appeared to lack pragmatic quality (e.g., 
Nadia feels angry when she hears the strange noise at night 'because she's too scared and too 
frightened of her mother to tell her about the strange noises because she's heard them before', 
Story 6, Table 4.6). This occurred throughout the testing session and she sometimes needed to 
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be re-directed to the topic (e.g., Story 1, Table 4.6). Additionally, it appeared as if she had learned 
the right thing to say in a given context, even though her own reasoning for that answer did not 
always seem pragmatically meaningful (e.g., Maggie is happy that someone is in the living room 
'because she knows someone's there even though it's her arch enemy', Story 5, Table 4.6). 
While it may be speculative to generalise from this pattern of findings, it may be interesting to 
point out that, in Chapter 3, this child was within the domain for Asperger syndrome on the CCC-2 
and just below the clinical cut-off for autism spectrum on the SCQ (participant 10: 20). 
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Table 4.6: Emotion task transcript for a child with VI 
Story 1 
Assessor: How did Max feel when he got the package? 
Child: Very excited and apprehensive 
Assessor: Why did Max feel like that? 
Child: 'Cause, when I got a parcel this moming and it was a t-shirt and a pair of track suit bottoms, and I didn't 
know, and I was so excited because I thought it was like a big toy or something. 
Assessor: That is interesting. But how about Max, why did he feel excited and apprehensive? 
Child: Because he got a present and he doesn't know what it is. 
Assessor: Actually Max feels angry when he gets the package. Why does he feel angry? 
Child: 'Cause his mum won't tell him whafs inside. 
Story 2 
Assessor: How does Anna feel when she goes out to play hide-and-seek with her friends? 
Child: Nervous, in case they don't want her and happy, 'cause she likes the game, and maybe a bit 
apprehensive in case they start fighting with her. 
Assessor: Thafs what I thought as well but, actually she feels afraid when she goes out to play hide-and-seek. 
Why does she feel afraid? 
Child: Because she may have her arch enemy among them. 
Story 3 
Assessor: How does Linda feel when she is told that she can't go to the Zoo anymore? 
Child: Upset and Angry 
Assessor: Why does she feel upset and angry? 
Child: Because they never told her on the day, because she really wanted, she was really looking forward to it. 
Assessor: Hmm, I see. But Linda is happy not to go to the Zoo. Why is Linda happy? 
Child: Because she doesn't want to lose them, her parents, doesn't want them to go away. 
Story 4 
Assessor: How does Walter feel now that his dog is not very well? 
Child: Upset and angry 
Assessor: Why does Walter feel that way? 
Child: Angry, because his dog is not very well and he'll blame the dog, upset because his dog is not very well 
and he'll feel sorry for him. 
Assessor: But Walter is actually afraid now that his dog is not very well . Why is Walter afraid? 
Child: He feels sorry for his dog, he feels guilty, 'cause he blames the dog. 
Story 5 
Assessor: How does Maggie feel when she hears that someone is moving in the living room? 
Child: Scared and determined. 
Assessor: Why does Maggie feel like that? 
Child: Scared because she doesn't like the fact that no one is there, and determined because she's heard them 
before, and she knows who they are, and she can defend her room. 
Assessor: Yes, I would have thought that as well, but Maggie is actually happy when she hears that someone is 
in the living room, why does she feel happy? 
Child: Because she knows someone's there, even though ifs her arch enemy. 
Story 6 
Assessor: How does Nadia feel when she hears the strange noise? 
Child: Scared 
Assessor: Why is she scared? 
Child: She doesn't know who it is ... but also she may feel a bit comforted, because she might think she knows 
who it is, whilst she doesn't. 
Assessor: Nadia actually feels angry when she hears the strange noise? Why would she be angry? 
Child: Because she's too scared and too frightened of her mother to tell her about the strange noises, because 
she's heard them before. 
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DISCUSSION 
The present findings suggest that children with congenital VI do not differ from their age and 
verbal ability matched sighted peers in the extent to which they refer to mental states in their 
explanations of emotions of story characters. This lack of difference is a finding that was 
consistent across typical and atypical emotional scenarios and the differing types of mental states 
(i.e., beliefs and desires) in the present design. Importantly, in the interpretation of these results, 
two main issues need to be considered. First, the result did not support the methodology by 
Rieffe et aI., who designed and validated the Emotion task used in the present study. Second, 
they contrast with the previous research evidence highlighting theory of mind development as an 
area of relative difficulty for children with congenital VI, in comparison to developmentally 
matched sighted children. 
First, we must consider the present results in comparison to those of Rieffe and colleagues and 
take into account the methodological limitations of the task. In their studies with sighted typically 
developing children and sighted children with autism (Rieffe et aI., 2005; Rieffe et aI., 2000), 
Rieffe et al. supported their hypothesis that atypical emotions would produce more mental state 
justifications than typical emotions. It is possible that their findings may have been a result of 
having a fixed order of 'typical first, atypical second' explanations, whereby probing children for 
an additional explanation on the same story may evoke more thinking in general. The authors 
themselves suggested that the first emotion explanation may have caused a 'priming effect', 
resulting in an increased incidence of mentalistic language in the atypical emotion condition, even 
in the autism group (Rieffe et aI., 2000). This cuing strategy that increased mentalising capacity of 
children who are known for their impoverished mental state insight is striking, particularly as the 
typical emotional scenario significantly distinguished the autism group as poorer than the control 
children. 
Following from this, it is possible that the sample-size related lack of power had contributed to the 
current results, given that the studies by Rieffe et al.'s included larger groups of children. 
However, considering the distribution of the means in the present experiment (whereby the 
proportions of the mentalistic explanations for typical and atypical emotions were virtually 
indistinguishable), low power does not seem to provide a sufficient explanation. Here it is 
important to consider again the fact that the Emotion task required the children to provide an 
explanation for the novel (atypical) emotion after their initial (typical) emotion prediction had been 
challenged by the assessor (e.g., 'yes, that's what I thought as well, but Linda doesn't feel sad, 
she is actually happy now that she is not going to the Zoo. Why is Linda happy?). Theoretically, it 
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makes sense that the atypical emotions should be more likely to provoke children to think about 
mental states, as the cause for the strangeness of an atypical emotional scenario (e.g., seeing 
someone angry at receiving a present) may not be self-evident (Gnepp, 1983; Rieffe et aI., 2005). 
However, methodologically, the task design may not necessarily facilitate this process, as the 
children's responses may be affected by their learning that their prediction in the first place is not 
'correct'. For instance, this may account for significantly more Don't Know responses for atypical 
emotion explanations in this study. Additionally, learning that their prediction may not be what the 
assessor expects, is likely to affect the children's prediction of typical emotions after the first 
story. Anecdotally, as a result of the assessor suggesting the emotions that were opposite to the 
ones provided by children, it was observed that a number of children developed a strategy of 
spontaneously predicting and explaining both typical and atypical emotions for a given story, 
before giving the chance for the assessor to suggest an alternative emotion. This would at least 
to an extent cancel out the priming effect that Rieffe et al. suggested of the atypical emotion 
scenarios, explaining the lack of difference of mental state use across typical and atypical 
emotion conditions in this research. 
The findings comparing children with VI and sighted children in their use of specific mental state 
terms were not clear-cut in the present study. Overall, it may be speculative to discuss these 
results in any detail as the group variances with regards to this data were too heterogeneous. 
However, in line with Rieffe et aI., it may be worth noting that the mentalistic language of typically 
developing sighted children appeared to contain more desire terms than belief terms overall, 
although Rieffe et al. found this effect to be particularly pronounced with younger children 16 
(owing to the small sample, it was not possible to capture the age trend in this research). On the 
other hand, mentalistic language of children with VI appeared to follow a somewhat different 
pattern as they seemed to use more belief terms to explain typical emotion scenarios and more 
desire terms to explain atypical emotion scenarios. Even though it was not possible to affirm such 
findings statistically, the fact that the VI group appeared to rely on belief terms more than on the 
desire terms in certain conditions is indicative of existing mentalistic insight in these children, as 
16 It may be worth noting at this point that, when analysed further, Reiffe et al.'s findings regarding the emotion 
typicality and the type of mental state were found to vary as a function of type of emotion (i.e., sadness, happiness, 
fear). However, the present sample (particularly the VI group) was deemed too small to investigate potential effects 
of this variable. Having said that, it is possible that different types of emotion may interact with task performance in 
the current study. However, larger groups of children with VI would be required to address this systematically. 
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belief terms are developmentally more sophisticated and acquired later than desire terms 
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). 
Following from this, the methodological limitations (including the lack of power) discussed thus far 
do not provide sufficient explanation for why the Emotion task failed to differentiate children with 
VI and children who are sighted in this study, despite its relative sensitivity with typically 
developing children and children with autism in previous research. For this reason, it is possible 
that the present null results reflect a real effect. More specifically, if performance on the Emotion 
task is a true index of mentalising capacity, then based on the present findings, such capacity in 
children with VI at school age indeed may be as proficient as that of sighted children of similar 
age and intelligence. In support of this, the qualitative data from individual children confirms that 
children who are visually impaired use a wide repertoire of mental state terms in their 
explanations of emotions. This, in turn, contrasts with previous research which demonstrated 
poor theory of mind outcomes, including mentalistic language use, in children with VI relative to 
sighted children (e.g., Green et aI., 2004; Pring et aI., 1998). 
However, this interpretation requires the consideration of a number of issues. For example, the 
previous studies, which demonstrated a delay in theory of mind development in children with 
congenital VI, have shown that such children often require a mental age of at least four years in 
order to pass a standard false-belief task (Green et aI., 2004; Minter et aI., 1998; Peterson et aI., 
2000). Furthermore, an association between intellectual level (i.e., verbal IQ) and theory of mind 
performance in children with VI had also been demonstrated previously, with better socio-
cognitive outcomes being observable in children with VI who were more able (Green et aI., 2004; 
Pring et aI., 1998). The children with VI in the present study, who were age-range 6 to 12 years, 
all had verbal mental ages that were in line with, or exceeding, their chronological ages. Even 
though the association between verballQ and the frequency of mentalistic discourse could not be 
established statistically, the children with VI in this research all had verbal IQs that were at least 
within the normal range limits, with a number of children with above average verbal intelligence 
levels. Therefore, it is likely that these children have already reached the verbal mental ages by 
which any potential theory of mind difficulties at an earlier age would have been resolved. 
In relation to this, however, a number of research studies have reported that theory of mind 
difficulties in samples of children with VI often persist at considerably older ages (e.g., 9-12 years) 
(McAlpine & Moore, 1995; Peterson et aI., 2000) and in cases of children with normallQ (Green 
et aI., 2004; Pring et aI., 1998; Roch-Levecq, 2006). Hence, it is possible that the variations of the 
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standard false-belief tasks used in such studies were generally more complex than the Emotion 
task used here, providing perhaps a more sensitive measure for distinguishing children with good 
and poor theory of mind. Similarly, it is clear that the 'Strange Stories' task, used by Pring et al. 
(1998), calls upon higher-order mental state understanding as it involves knowledge of more 
advanced mental state concepts, such as sarcasm, misunderstanding and figure of speech, 
compared to the basic emotions presented to children in the current study. This, in turn, may be 
more likely to capture the difficulties of those children who have poorer theory of mind ability. 
On the contrary, it can be argued that the Emotion task had specific advantage in comparison to 
the standard false-belief tasks and 'Strange Stories', as these may be too complex and difficult for 
children with congenital VI for reasons other than poor theory of mind. For example, it has been 
suggested that children with VI fail false-belief tasks because lack of visual input affects their 
information-processing and representation (Roch-Levecq, 2006). It is likely that the false-belief 
task may place an additional information-processing load on children with VI, who may have to 
rely on attention and memory to deal with the demands of the task. However, this use of 
information-processing resources may not be as efficient as for children who are sighted (Roch-
Levecq, 2006). Similar argument was given by Marschark, Geen, Hindmarsh and Walker (2000) 
with regards to children with hearing impairment (HI). They found that, contrary to the difficulties 
with understanding false-belief reported by others (Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1998), children with 
HI were able to produce a rich repertoire of mental state terms, which was comparable to the use 
of mental state language in hearing controls. They argued that the false-belief paradigm tests 
more than just theory of mind understanding and that this may be the reason why children with HI 
fail false-belief tasks, despite having a reasonable insight into the mental states. 
Following from this, the strength of the current paradigm may be in the similar information-
processing demands that it places on both VI and sighted children. Additionally, in comparison to 
the 'Strange Stories', the Emotion task may be more suitable for use with younger children. The 
children who completed the 'Strange Stories' in the study by Pring et al. (1998) were above nine 
years of age. Moreover, they were also matched to a group of sighted children on chronological 
age only. Considering the lack of intellectually matched sighted controls (as well as the 
relationship between the intellectual levels of the children with VI and the frequency of their 
mental state justifications), there is a possibility that the poorer 'Strange Stories' performance of 
the VI group studied by Pring et al. may have been confounded by variables extraneous to theory 
of mind. Hence, it can be argued that the Emotion task provided a simple, but adequate measure 
that was sensitive to the understanding of mental states in children with congenital VI and at 
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different chronological ages. Similarly, this measure is likely to have a greater ecological validity 
than the false-belief task or the 'Strange Stories'. This is because in real life, children may be 
frequently required to make judgements for why someone may be feeling happy or sad, than they 
are to be involved in scenarios such as those depicted in the other types of tasks. However, 
without a doubt, use of a range of measures of mental state reasoning of different complexity, 
along side the current task, would have provided a more comprehensive picture of socio-cognitive 
skills in the present sample of children with VI. 
At this point it may be worth pointing out that, despite the ability of the children with VI to predict 
typical emotions without much difficulty (as expected, in line with Roch-Levecq, 2006 and Oyck et 
aI., 2004), a somewhat larger percentage of these children needed a prompt by the experimenter 
to predict an emotion than did the sighted group, although this difference was not statistically 
significant (the prompt requirement was not an effect of any particular story). What may be 
particularly interesting about this pattern of finding is that the children in the VI group (N = 3) who 
required a prompt to predict an emotion were those children whose levels of vision were poorer 
(i.e., PVI). Statistically, the task did not differentiate children with PVI and SVI in the frequency 
with which they referred to mental states. Indeed, such small numbers of children within the two 
VI subgroups preclude us from drawing any firm conclusion with regards to the PVI/SVI 
distinction in this group of children. Additionally, eyeballing the qualitative outputs of the individual 
children did not reveal any obvious disadvantage for children with PVI in their use of mental state 
discourse. This may not be surprising, given that, despite some prompt requirements, the 
emotion prediction abilities of these children were near ceiling. However, even the minimal need 
for prompts by these children may reveal the subtle difficulties in the way that children who have 
no functional vision in their early years learn about emotions, compared to children with SVI 
whose limited form perception may enable them to discern some limited patterns of emotional 
expression on human faces very close by. Although speculative in this context, these issues are 
likely to be of relevance for future research with such children, particularly at younger ages. 
Thus far, it cannot be disputed that the Emotion task called upon the implicit knowledge of mental 
states in children with VI in this study, as their references to beliefs and desires of the story 
characters were produced spontaneously, frequently and in a meaningful way, even when 
situational explanations were available to them. Without a doubt, such ability must be indicative of 
an active theory of mind. Therefore, it may be presumptuous to attribute the lack of difference 
between the two groups in the present study solely to a methodological limitation of the current 
task to distinguish the children with VI as poorer than their sighted counterparts. It is not a trivial 
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achievement for children with congenital VI to recognise the emotions of others and to consider 
the subjective beliefs and desires that underlie them. For this, they have to assimilate, coherently 
and meaningfully, different mental state concepts and different perspectives from which they arise 
into their repertoire of experiences. Hence, the success in showing contextually appropriate 
mental state awareness by children with VI in this study is undoubtedly an important finding. 
However, we still cannot be certain whether this ability is indicative of the fully fledged, 
sophisticated theory of mind that is required to deal with the complex day-to-day demands of the 
social world. This is a particularly important question to ask, as the same children with VI who 
completed the Emotion task were found to show poorer social communication and pragmatic 
language use relative to the sighted children in the research presented in the previous chapter. 
This pattern is also somewhat illuminated through the qualitative consideration of an individual 
child in the current result section, as this child showed an unusual pattern of responses in 
pragmatic terms, despite her rich knowledge and use of mental state language that distinguished 
her even from the majority of sighted children. 
In relation to this point, it has been proposed that having a theory of mind is different from using 
theory of mind abilities spontaneously to describe, explain and interpret other people's behaviours 
(Meins, Fernyhough, Johnson, & Lidstone, 2006). For this reason, mental state discourse in 
children may not necessarily be an indicator of the child's theory of mind ability per se, but rather 
of their tendency to use it. In line with this, several studies have failed to find an association 
between theory of mind competence (i.e., false-belief task performance) and spontaneous use of 
such capacities (e.g., using mental state narrative to account for the behaviours of storybook 
characters) in school-age typically developing children (Charman & Shmueli-Goetz, 1998; Meins 
et aI., 2006; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 1995), even though such association is present in young 
pre-school children (Dunn et aI., 1991). The presence of this association in young children may 
be down to the fact that they may still be in the process of acquiring the theory of mind ability, 
which is then likely to constrain their mental state language use. However, once the baseline 
stage of representational theory of mind is complete, the fact that a child possesses this capacity 
does not necessarily entail that it will be applied on-line, particularly in a non-interactional context. 
This reasoning may throw some light on the present findings. While the Emotion task may have 
provided evidence that primary school-age children with congenital VI and normal VIQ have an 
active theory of mind (based on the fact that they use mentalistic language), we are still uncertain 
if there may be subtle differences between children with VI and sighted children in the way they 
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use this ability to deal with real-life social demands17. This uncertainty is particularly qualified by 
the findings in Chapter 3. For this reason, future research may need to consider (and potentially 
develop) a theory of mind measure that is sensitive to such demands, as well as to the individual 
differences in socio-cultural variables that interact with these processes in children. 
The Emotion task itself may provide a more useful measure in future research studies, if 
appropriate modifications are adopted. For instance, the task may benefit from removing the 
emotion prediction factor. Children could be provided with a greater number of stories, where 
typical and atypical emotional scenarios (with a wider repertoire of emotions, ranging in 
complexity) would be presented by the experimenter in a counter-balanced order, requiring 
children only to provide explanations for the given emotions. Importantly, this would remove the 
methodological problem of having to treat a certain number of responses as invalid (i.e., if the 
child predicted an atypical emotion to begin with). Furthermore, a larger number of stories would 
provide a basis for a greater number of explanations, increasing the experimental power to 
potentially distinguish between the frequencies of desire and belief terms in children's 
explanations. For the purposes of future research, such modified version of the Emotion task, in 
addition to a range of theory of mind measures of different complexity, would help to chart the 
socio-cognitive abilities of children with VI and, more comprehensively, at different ages. 
However, these abilities in children are likely to be mediated by certain socio-interactive factors 
that are involved in theory of mind development and would also need to be considered in more 
detail. Interestingly, the role of one of these factors (Le., maternal mental state language input) is 
addressed in the following chapter. 
17 In its current form, the Emotion task may still lack the naturalistic aspect of everyday social reasoning, because of 
the structured way in which the children's responses are cued. 
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Chapter 5 
The Role of Language Input to Children with Congenital VI: Mother-
Child Mental State Discourse 
SUMMARY 
The research presented in the previous chapter investigated children's social understanding by 
examining the extent to which they used mental state discourse in their explanations of emotions. 
Despite its methodological limitations, it is implied from this research that school-aged children 
with congenital VI do have an implicit understanding of subjective mental states, judged by their 
ability to use the language that represents those states. The purpose of the research presented in 
this chapter was to consider the context within which learning of such language occurs in children 
with VI. An impressive body of evidence now shows the developmental link between mothers' 
mentalistic language input and children's growing understanding of the mind in typically 
developing children (reviewed by de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006). Thus far, the role of such input for 
children who are born with VI has not been considered empirically. Here, the quality of mother-
child discourse was examined in the context of a joint book-reading interaction. Mothers of 
children with VI and mothers of children who are sighted were compared in the extent to which 
they used mentalistic language to elaborate on the story-book content, and the frequency with 
which such language occurred in the mothers' language was examined in relation to the 
children's own mentalistic discourse. The results suggest that the extent to which the mothers in 
this study used mental state language to elaborate on story-book contents was comparable 
across the two vision groups, although the mothers of children with VI referred to the story 
characters' mental states (as opposed to their own or their children's mental states) to a greater 
extent than did the mothers of sighted children. Additionally, the mothers of children with VI 
provided significantly more descriptions in their overall discourse than mothers of sighted 
children, providing more detailed information of physical and behavioural aspects of the story 
which are not easily accessible to their children with VI. Both groups of children used surprisingly 
little mentalistic language overall. However, the language of sighted children included more 
descriptions than did the language of children with VI. Although further research is needed to 
understand the unique contribution of maternal mentalistic language input in the socio-cognitive 
outcomes of children with VI, the current study is the first to date that has investigated such input 
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to these children, offering a unique insight into the nature of verbal scaffolding provided by 
mothers to their children with VI and highlighting a potential area for future interventions. 
INTRODUCTION 
A growing body of evidence highlights the influence of socio-interactive input within a family 
context on children's social understanding and theory of mind development (reviewed by 
Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006; Symons, 2004). Among the factors 
believed to promote development of these processes in children is the presence of siblings 
(especially older ones), presence of older relatives, higher socio-economic status and secure 
attachment (J. R. Brown et aI., 1996; Cutting & Dunn, 1999; Dunn et aI., 1991; C. Lewis et aI., 
1998; Meins et aI., 1998). While there is no doubt that different kinds of social and conversational 
environments may have discernible effects on children's developing social cognition, some 
researchers have placed special emphasis on the role of mothers' conversational input in this 
process (Meins et aI., 2003; Meins et aI., 2002; Ruffman et aI., 2002). 
In the context of maternal language input, mental states discourse has been given specific 
emphasis and several studies have now demonstrated a direct link between maternal mental 
state language input and children's social understanding (de Rosnay et aI., 2004; Meins et aI., 
1998; Meins et aI., 2003; Meins et aI., 2002; Ruffman et aI., 2002; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 
2006). A number of these studies have provided strong evidence, which suggests that the role of 
maternal mentalistic input to their children'S social cognition is causal, providing a scaffolding 
framework upon which children learn their own verbal expression and understanding of mental 
states. For example, Ruffman et al. (2002) found a consistent correlation between mothers' early 
mental state talk and children's false-belief task performance at three different time points (Le., 
between children's ages of two and four years), and this relationship remained even after 
controlling for other potential mediators (i.e., mothers' educational levels and frequency of other 
types of utterances, and children's ages, language ability levels, own use of mentalistic language, 
and early theory of mind). In a similar vein, Meins and collaborators (Meins et aI., 2003; Meins et 
aI., 2002) found that mothers' tendency to make appropriate comments on their children's own 
mental states (or what they called mothers' mind-mindedness) in the first year of life had unique 
value in predicting the children'S performance of theory mind tasks at the age of four, even when 
other socio-environmental correlates of children's social understanding (e.g., the mothers' 
education, number of siblings, exposure to general mental state language and attachment style) 
were controlled for. 
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Whilst Meins and collaborators (Meins et aI., 2003; Meins et aI., 2002) emphasised the value of 
mothers' proclivity to comment appropriately on their children's mental states (and therefore treat 
their children as independent persons with their own thoughts and feelings), Ruffman et al. (2002) 
suggested that it is the mothers' general discussion about mental states, rather than one specific 
type of utterance, that facilitates children's learning about the mind, although it is directed at a 
level that is appropriate to that of the child (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). Just like children's 
understanding of desire precedes their understanding of belief (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004), mothers also tend to talk more frequently about desires when children are 
younger, with talk about thoughts and beliefs increasing with children's age. Thus, it appears that 
specific types of mental state language at critical points in the child's development scaffold 
children's mental state language and bootstrap their understanding of the mind (Taumoepeau & 
Ruffman, 2006). 
The positive relationship between mothers' mentalistic input and children's socio-cognitive 
outcomes has also been demonstrated with atypical groups of children with known theory of mind 
problems, namely children with autism and children with hearing impairment. For instance, 
Slaughter, Peterson and Mackintosh (2007) reported that, like in the case of typically developing 
children, children with autism whose theory of mind understanding is most advanced appear to 
have mothers who frequently talk abut mental states. However, rather than general talk about 
mental states, it was the mothers' mentalistic discourse that was explanatory, causal and 
contrastive that was found to have a unique contribution to the theory of mind task performance 
of children with autism. Similarly, in the case of children with hearing impairment (of hearing 
mothers), Moeller and Schick (2006) found a significant correlation between maternal talk about 
mental states and children's performance on verbal theory of mind tasks. Finally, as the overall 
amount of maternal talk was unrelated to the children's false-belief performance, the study 
highlighted the quality, rather than quantity of input as an important contributor to the social 
understanding of children with hearing impairment 
Given the known difficulties in theory of mind development in children with autism (Happe, 1994) 
and late-signing children with hearing impairment (Peterson & Siegal, 1995), the studies 
described so far illuminate the language input provided by mothers as an important candidate for 
early intervention. This has important implications for children who are born with significantly 
impaired vision, whose vulnerable theory of mind outcomes have been well documented (see 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 4). Crucially however, no studies to date have examined mental state 
input to children who are visually impaired. Although some attempts have been made to address 
124 
mother-child dialogue characteristics and interaction styles in young children with VI (e.g. 
Andersen et aI., 1993; V. Moore & McConachie, 1994), the specific role of mentalistic language 
input provided by the mothers to their children with VI has not been addressed by research. The 
research presented in this chapter is the first to date to examine such input to children with VI and 
it is hoped that the findings will provide a unique insight into the quality of mother-child discourse 
in this population. 
Nevertheless, it is first important to consider what is generally known about language input to 
children who are visually impaired. Andersen et al. (1993) argued that, in a conversational 
interaction involving a child with VI, where the child's attention cannot be caught and directed by 
eye-contact, parental input is likely be restricted and impoverished in a number of ways. For 
instance, it has been shown that mothers' language input to their children with VI tends to be 
highly directive and controlling, involving relatively few descriptions (e.g. on the functions and 
attributes of objects, events and people) (Andersen et aI., 1993; Kekelis & Andersen, 1984; V. 
Moore & McConachie, 1994), although these patterns may be exacerbated in children whose VI 
is of greater severity (V. Moore & McConachie, 1994). Furthermore, it has been shown that 
mother-child conversational interactions involving children with VI tend to be asymmetrical. This 
means that the mothers tend to initiate a greater proportion of topics (which are almost 
exclusively child-centred) than do their children with VI who, in turn, when compared to sighted 
children, rarely initiate conversations with their mothers and are unable to sustain conversation 
around a particular topic (Kekelis & Andersen, 1984; Kekelis & Prinz, 1996; V. Moore & 
McConachie, 1994). Others have reported that mothers of children with VI tend to be generally 
less responsive vocally (Rogers & Puchalski, 1988; Rowland, 1983, 1984). 
However, Perez-Pereira and Conti-Ramsden (1999) argued that the existing research has 
underestimated and misinterpreted the quality of maternal language input to children with VI and 
that characterising mothers of children with VI as a homogenous 'non-responsive' group may be 
too simplistic and misleading. They argued that maternal directiveness and conversational 
asymmetry is a common feature of mother-child interaction in general, particularly in young 
children (Ninio & Snow, 1996), and provides scaffolding for a young language learner. In fact, 
Dote-Kwan (1995) found mothers' responsive behaviours to be positively related to the 
development of children with VI, with a high percentage of responses and compliances, and a low 
percentage of ignoring or refusing their children's initiations and requests for help. Furthermore, 
Perez-Pereira and Conti-Ramsden (2001) observed that mothers of children with VI often speak 
more to their children than do mothers of sighted children (also Behl et aI., 1996), and use 
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significantly more descriptions when directing the child than do the mothers of sighted children. 
This lends support to the idea that parents of children with VI are able to develop alternative 
strategies when conversing with their children (Urwin, 1978) and exploit the use of language as a 
way to share the world with their child, who depends on language for social interaction and 
learning. 
The studies investigating mother-child conversational interactions in children with VI have been 
scarce and, as seen from the discussion above, the available evidence is inconclusive. However, 
the general consensus appears to be that maternal language input to children who are visually 
impaired is qualitatively different from that received by sighted children. In the present study, it is 
of interest to examine whether this difference in the quality of language input will be also reflected 
in the extent to which the mothers in of children with VI and mothers of sighted children use 
mental state discourse when interacting with their children. 
All of the aforementioned studies on mother-child discourse and interaction were carried out with 
very young and often pre-lingual children with VI, sometimes including children with additional 
non-sensory impairments. Furthermore, most of these studies have been examinations of very 
small numbers of children, and often only individual cases, generally lacking control groups. 
While such studies have been invaluable in furthering our understanding of mechanisms involved 
in the language learning and interaction of young children with VI, further controlled studies, 
including also older (i.e., school-age) children, are needed to fully appreciate the quality of 
mother-child discourse involving children with VI and the role of maternal language input in this 
process. With this in mind and in the context of the present study, one advantage of examining 
mother-child discourse with school-age children, specifically in terms of mentalistic language, is 
that the vocabularies of older children contain a wider repertoire of mental state terms and the 
quality of maternal mental state talk is likely to reflect this, providing a richer context from which to 
sample this kind of data. This follows from the research findings mentioned earlier, which suggest 
that mothers' mentalistic language input tends to be directed at a level that is appropriate for their 
child (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). Thus, given that the children in this study were of school-
age, it is expected that the mentalistic language provided by mothers would be relatively rich and 
varied. 
However, it is important to consider a context within which such language can be suitably 
examined. Researchers have used different methods and contexts for assessing mothers' 
mentalistic discourse, although in cases of young children, this has most commonly been done 
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during the play interactions, both in sighted children (e.g. Meins et aI., 2003; Meins et aI., 2002) 
and children with VI (e.g. Kekelis & Prinz, 1996; V. Moore & McConachie, 1994). In other studies 
with typically developing sighted children, mothers were asked to provide open-ended 
descriptions of their children, independent of the mother-child interactional context, and measures 
of maternal mentalistic language were sampled from such descriptions (de Rosnay et aI., 2004; 
Meins et aI., 1998). Alternatively, in the studies by Ruffman et aL (Ruffman et aI., 2002) and 
Taumoepeau and Ruffman (Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006), mothers of sighted children were 
presented with pictures depicting scenarios involving different mental states, which they were 
asked to discuss with their children. A popular method for assessing mother-child dialogue has 
been the book narrative (Slaughter et aI., 2007; Symons, Peterson, Slaughter, Roche, & Doyle, 
2005). It has been argued that the joint book reading context is facilitative of mental states 
discourse, as it provides a naturalistic setting and an opportunity to elaborate and ask questions 
by both conversational partners, including questions and elaborations about the story characters' 
thoughts and feelings (Dyer, Shatz, & Wellman, 2000; Symons et aI., 2005). Accordingly, it was 
felt that in the present study a joint-book reading session, especially when using an unfamiliar 
story-book, would provide a suitable context within which to examine the incidence and nature of 
language input to children who are visually impaired, in that it would resemble an every-day 
situation that involves processing of novel information and thus facilitate joint discourse. This 
context is also useful as a means for assessing the children's own mentalistic language, enabling 
us to provide a clearer picture of how the verbal scaffolding provided by the mother takes place. 
In summary, the aim of the present study was to gain further insight into the language input 
provided by the mothers to their children who were born with visual impairment, by focussing on 
their mental state language input in particular. Accordingly, it was of interest to examine whether 
the mothers of children with VI and mothers of children who are sighted would differ in the extent 
to which they talked about thoughts, desires and feelings during a joint book-reading session with 
their children. It was also of interest to undertake a more exploratory analysis of such input, by 
making a distinction between mentalistic language that is sensitive to mental states of a) the story 
characters, b) the conversational partners and c) participants themselves; and to examine 
potential between-group difference accordingly. For instance, whilst Meins et al. emphasised the 
role of appropriate commentary on child's mental states in particular, the story-book context 
provides an opportunity to discuss mental states of the story characters, and this may be 
reflected in the findings of this study. Furthermore, following from the idea that mothers of 
children with VI develop alternative strategies to facilitate their child's language and learning, it 
was also of interest to explore non-mentalistic features of the mothers' language input that may 
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have a particular value for children with VI and distinguish their mothers from those of children 
who are sighted. For this reason, emphasis was placed on the extent to which mothers elaborate 
on descriptive aspects of the story-book, given the limited, yet conflicting evidence regarding the 
use of descriptions in mothers' language input to young children with VI (Kekelis & Andersen, 
1984; V. Moore & McConachie, 1994; Perez-Pereira & Conti-Ramsden, 2001). Finally, it was of 
interest to examine the relationship between the language characteristics of mothers and children 
in the two groups of children and provide a clearer picture of the role of verbal scaffolding 
provided by mothers to children with VI. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
In line with the theoretical framework above, the following predictions and questions were 
addressed by the research presented in this chapter: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Mothers of children with VI and mothers of children who are sighted will differ 
in the extent to which they talk about thoughts, desires and feelings during a joint book-reading 
session with their children. 
Question 1 (Q1): Will this difference vary depending on whether the mental state refers to the 
self, child or character? 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Children with VI and sighted children will differ in the extent to which they talk 
about thoughts, desires and feelings during a joint book-reading session with their mothers. 
Question 2 (Q2): Will this difference vary depending on whether the mental state refers to the 
self, child or character? 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Mothers of children with VI and mothers of children who are sighted will differ 
in the extent to which they use descriptive attributes during a joint book-reading session with their 
children. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Children with VI and children who are sighted differ in the extent to which they 
use descriptive attributes during a joint book-reading session with their mothers. 
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Hypothesis 5 (H5): There will be an association between the language characteristics of mothers 
and the language characteristics of their children with VI, in terms of both mentalistic and 
descriptive elaborations. 
Question 3 (Q3): Can the severity of VI explain the variation in the extent to which mothers of 
children with VI use mentalistic discourse during the joint book reading session? 
METHOD 
Participants 
The participants were a subgroup of the children who took part in the research presented in the 
previous chapters, and their mothers. There were 12 children with congenital VI and 16 sighted 
children. The two groups of children were comparable in their verbal ability (t (26) = .881, P = .386), 
chronological age (t (26) = .187, P = .853), and distribution of gender Ci (1) = .012, P = .912) (Table 
5.1 ). 
Table 5.1: Matching characteristics of the sample 
Matching criteria VI Sighted p value 
N= 12 N= 16 
VIQ / WISC-III 
Mean (SO) 109 (9.2) 105.2 (11.9) .386 
Range 95 - 128 80 - 126 
Age 
Mean / months (SO / months) 101 (24.4) 100 (18.7) .853 
Range / years 6:06 -12:11 6:02-11:11 
Gender ratio 
(Female/Male) 7/5 9/7 .921 
Additionally, there was no significant association between group membership (VI/Sighted) and 
the children's ethnic background Ct (3) = .142, P = .986), birth order Ct (1) = .324, P = .569), 
number of siblings ct (3) = 1.410, P = .703), or the educational background of the mothers (the 
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distributions of mothers' educational backgrounds was identical across the two groupS)1B. These 
details are given below in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Oemographic characteristics of the sample 
Demographic data (percentages) VI Sighted 
Ethnicity 
White British 67% 73% 
Black British 8% 7% 
Asian 8% 7% 
Mixed 17 % 13 % 
Mothers' educational background a N = 10 (missing 2) N = 15 (missing 1) 
Basic (up to A levels) 40% 40% 
Higher (post A levels) 60% 60% 
Number of siblings 
0 17 % 6% 
1 67% 62% 
2 8% 19 % 
3 8% 13 % 
Birth order 
First child 42% 30% 
Not a first child 58% 70% 
a Although initially, the mother's educational levels were assigned to eight different categories (ranging from some 
secondary school education to postgraduate qualifications), they were re-assigned to two categories (basic and 
higher) because of the small numbers. 
Materials 
Following Symons et al. (2005), an illustrated children's book 'First Day Jitters' (Dannenberg, 
2000) was used for the joint book-reading session between the children and their mothers. The 
book depicts a character dealing with the anxiety about the first day of school. Given the age 
range of the children in this study, the topic was seen as relevant to their experiences. The book 
also permitted a discussion about the internal mental states as the main theme in the story 
involves a case of mistaken identity revealed at the end of the book (i.e., the main character, who 
is anxious about her first day of school, is in fact a teacher, and not a child, as the reader is 
initially lead to believe). Importantly, since the book is unavailable for purchase in the UK, it was 
expected that none of the dyads would be familiar with it (which they all later confirmed). 
18 The small sample size provided a limited opportunity to statistically examine the impact of these variables, which 
empirically have been found to be related to the levels of mothers' and children's mentalistic language. For that 
reason, here it was ensured that the groups were relatively comparable with regards to those variables. 
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Procedure 
The task was carried out in the participants' homes. The children and their mothers were asked to 
spend some time reading the book in the manner that was most typical for them. They were told 
that the experimenter wished to obtain an insight into the language used between children and 
parents in a real-life situation and were asked to read and/or discuss the book content as they 
would usually do so, for example before bedtime or when looking at magazines. The parents 
were reassured that they would not be judged on their reading skills and that the experimenter 
was only interested in the way the dyads responded to each other in a naturalistic setting. In most 
cases, the experimenter left the room in order not to discourage the parents and to reduce the 
audience effect. In a minority of the cases however, the experimenter was present during the 
session. The dyads were tape-recoded throughout their book-reading session, which took seven 
minutes on average (VI group: Mean = 7.1, SO = 2.8; Sighted group: Mean = 6.5, SO = 3.9). 
There was no significant between-group difference in the duration of the joint book-reading 
session (t (18) = .391; p = .7). 
While the book reading in the VI sample was carried out by the parents for obvious reasons, it is 
worth noting that in the sighted group, the book reading was shared between the children and 
their parents and, in a couple of cases, it was carried out by the children themselves. This is not 
surprising, given the children's chronological ages and the fact that they were asked to discuss 
the material in a manner that was typical of them. However, in both groups the discussion about 
the story events and characteristics was facilitated by the mothers. 
Scoring 
All the speech produced by children and their mothers was tape-recorded for subsequent 
transcription. Only the language that was not read directly from the book, but was added by the 
parent or child was considered for coding and the subsequent analyses. First, the number of 
utterances that were relevant to the book's content was derived for parents and children 
respectively. Off-task utterances (such as those where dyads talked about the experimenter) 
were excluded automatically. An utterance was defined as a word or string of words identified by 
a pause or grammatical completeness (Symons et aI., 2005). Then, for each partner, their 
utterances were examined and coded for the type of elaboration they contained. Even though in 
most cases the number of utterances was equal the number of elaborations (r = .998), for the 
purpose of the current study a distinction was made between utterances and elaborations 
because it was sometimes possible for one utterance to contain more than one elaboration, as 
will be explained below. 
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The elaborations were first classified broadly as either mentalistic or non-mentalistic. The 
elaborations were coded as Mentalistic according to the criteria for mental state language used 
by Ruffman et al. (2002), and in line with Bartsch and Wellman (1995) (Table 5.3). This included 
references to desires (e.g., 'She doesn't want to get up.'), emotions (e.g., 'She seems quite 
scared.'), modulations of assertion (e.g., 'I wonder why she's hiding.'), think and know19 terms 
(e.g., 'They're thinking hard.') and other mental states (e.g. 'Do you remember your first day at 
school?'). In the current study, a distinction between different types of mental states was not 
made and they were grouped together into a generic mental state category for subsequent 
between-group comparisons. 
Table 5.3: Examples of mental state language criteria used by Ruffman et al. (2002) 
Category 
Desires 
Emotions 
Modulations of Assertion 
Think and know 
Other mental states 
Examples 
Want, like, love, hope, wish, dream, prefer, keen on 
Happy, sad, feel, cross, angry, grumpy 
Sure, guess, figure, reckon, certain, suppose, wonder, expect 
Know, think 
Remember, understand, forget 
Non-mentalistic elaborations were classified as descriptive and general, following the categories 
specified by Symons et al. (2004). Descriptive elaborations involved language referring to 
behavioural and physical aspects of the story and the book which added a descriptive quality to 
the dyad's language (e.g., 'the girl has brown hair'; 'the doggy is barking'). General elaborations 
were all the other utterances that did not add to the descriptive value of the book-reading 
discourse (e.g., 'What's that?', 'Oh, no!', 'Let's continue', etc). Mentalistic and descriptive 
elaborations appeared not to be exclusive and utterances containing both types of elaboration 
were often produced (e.g., 'do you think her heart is beating fast or slow?). On those occasions, 
the elaborations were assigned to both mentalistic and descriptive elaboration category. On their 
own, general elaborations were not examined further in the present study, and only mentalistic 
and descriptive elaborations were analysed in the subsequent between-group comparisons. 
Each child and mother received a score for mentalistic and descriptive elaborations, expressed 
as a proportion of all elaborations (e.g., proportion mentalistic = total number of mentalistic / [sum 
of all elaborations: mentalistic + descriptive + general]). The proportional data were seen as more 
19 In line with Ruffman et al. (2003), 'I don't know' responses (i.e., responses that consisted of only these three words 
and which did not elaborate on what was unknown) were not treated as mentalistic because of their possible use to 
mean simply 'I can't answer'. 
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appropriate than frequency data for the current independent samples design as they were not 
susceptible to the confounding effect of mothers' verbosity (i.e., this ensured that the dyads' 
mentalistic language was not simply picking up on mothers' involvement). 
In the first stages of the study, it was of interest to look at the incidence of references to mental 
states overall, for children and parents respectively, and a distinction was not drawn between 
mental state language relating to characters in the story and participants themselves. However, in 
further analyses, within the mentalistic language produced by the participants, mental state 
elaborations were classified as those referring a) to self (e.g., 'I don't remember seeing that), b) 
to partner (e.g., 'What do you think about this book?'), c) to the character (e.g., 'She thinks it's 
horrible) and d) other, less specific, mental state references (e.g., 'It's a mind trick'; 'It's an idea. ). 
These different mental state references were not exclusive. If two mental state elaborations were 
produced in one utterance (e.g., 'I think she's scared.), the responses were then assigned to both 
categories (e.g., 'I think' = self mentalistic; and 'She's scared' = character mentalistic). In the 
main, the mentalistic language produced by the dyads consisted of the more specific references 
made to character, self and partner, whereas other mental state references, which were more 
general, were made rarely. Only the incidence of mental state references to the former three 
types of referent was of interest for subsequent analyses. The scores for each of the three types 
of mental states in question (for children and mothers respectively) were expressed as 
proportions of all mental state elaborations (e.g., proportion of self mentalistic = number of self 
mentalistic / [total number of mentalistic: character + self + partner + other]). 
An independent rater, unaware of the children's characteristics or the hypotheses of the study, 
coded approximately 50% of randomly selected transcripts from each vision group (see Appendix 
C1 for coding instructions, and Appendix C2 for an example of a coded transcript for a child with 
VI). Overall, the reliability ratings were high (Table 5.4). 
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Table 5.4: Inter-rarer reliability coefficients for mother and child elaborations during the joint 
book-reading task 
Elaborations 
Mother 
Mentalistic (all) 
Self 
Partner 
Character 
Other 
Non-mentalistic (all) 
Descriptive 
General 
Child 
Mentalistic (all) 
Self 
Partner 
Character 
Other 
Non-mentalistic (all) 
Descriptive 
General 
Pearson's correlation coefficient r 
.990 
.988 
.942 
.961 
.402 a 
.949 
.929 
.880 
.889 
.492a 
1b 
.912 
.645 a 
.999 
.821 
.977 
a Certain elaborations were made rarely (e.g. mentalistic self and other for ch ildren and mentalistic other for parents) 
resulting in less variation, potentially explaining low inter-rater reliability on these components 
b None of the children for whom the reliability rating was carried out made references to the mothers' mental states 
(i.e., partner) resulting in an inter-rater correlation coefficient of 1. 
RESULTS 
Table 5.5 shows the total number of elaborations produced by the children and mothers in each 
vision group, and the proportion scores for mentalistic and non-mentalistic elaborations. Here, it 
can be seen that in both groups, unsurprisingly, mothers elaborated on the book content more 
than did their children overall (VI group: t (11) = -5.440, P ::; .001; Sighted group: t (15) = -3.229, P 
= .006). In both groups, individual children and parents varied greatly in the number of 
elaborations they produced during the joint book-reading discourse. However, the overall 
numbers of elaborations spoken by children were comparable between the two groups (t (26) = 
.632, p = .533, d = .23). Interestingly, the direction of the means in Table 5.5 suggested that the 
mothers of children with VI produced more elaborations overall than mothers of children who are 
sighted, although statistically this was only a trend with a medium effect size (t (26) = 1.811, p = 
.08, d = .67). It is worth noting that one mother in the sighted group made many more 
elaborations than did the other mothers (3.5 standard deviations above the group mean, Figure 
5.1). The t tests revealed a highly significant difference between the two groups on the total 
number of mothers' elaborations, after this particular dyad was excluded (equal variances not 
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assumed: t (13.8) = 2.981, P = .01), implying that the mothers of children with VI typically 
elaborated more during the book-reading session than the mothers of sighted children. Because 
of the small sample size, it was decided to retain the data of this parent (and her child) in the 
subsequent analyses on proportional data. Importantly, the results from the subsequent between-
group comparisons on proportional data were the same with or without retention of the data 
belonging to this dyad. 
Table 5.5: Number of al/ on-task elaborations and the proportions of mentalistic and non-
mentalistic elaborations for mothers and children in each group 
Measure 
Mother 
All on-task elaborations - raw number 
Mean (SO) 
Range 
Mentalistic / Non - mentalistic a 
Means - proportions of all on task elaborations 
(SO) 
Child 
All on-task elaborations - raw number 
Mean (SO) 
Range 
Mentalistic / Non - mentalistic 
Means - proportions of all on task elaborations 
(SO) 
a Mentalistic + Non-mentalistic = 1 (100 %) 
VI 
75.3 (48.4) 
13 - 159 
.27/.73 
(.11 ) 
24.8 (21.8) 
1 - 56 
.15/.85 
(.28) 
Sighted 
42.1 (47.7) 
1 - 207 
.34/.66 
(.12) 
19.6 (21.3) 
3 - 89 
.12/.88 
(.13) 
From Table 5.5 it can also be seen that non-mentalistic elaborations made up a large proportion 
of the dyad's language (over 80% for children and approximately 70% for mothers). 
Approximately a third of all the elaborations spoken by the mothers were those referring to mental 
states, compared to 12-15% of elaborations spoken by the children. A similar proportion of 
mentalistic language within the overall discourse produced by mother-child dyads during joint 
book-reading was reported previously with 5 - 7 year olds (i.e., 10% for the children and 28% for 
the mothers) (Symons et aI., 2005) Therefore, the incidence of mental state language spoken by 
mothers and children in this study may provide a relatively realistic picture of the frequency with 
which mental state language occurs in parent-child conversations (i.e., in a context such as joint 
book-reading) in the general population. 
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of on-task elaborations for mothers and children in the two groups and an 
outlier dyad (57) in the sighted group 
(Note: black band represents the group median/ 50h percentile) 
Between-group comparisons 
A set of independent-samples t tests was carried out to examine the extent to which the two 
groups differed in the proportions of mentalistic and descriptive elaborations during the joint book-
reading discourse, for mothers and their children respectively. The mean proportion scores of 
mental state and descriptive elaborations for children and mothers in each vision group are given 
in Table 5.6. It is interesting to note that there is a larger variation in the proportions of mentalistic 
language of children in the VI group, although this apparent difference in group variation was not 
found to be statistically significant (i.e., Levene's test for homogeneity of variances was not 
significant, p = .395). 
Contrary to the experimental predictions (H1 and H2), there was no significant difference between 
the two groups in the proportions of mentalistic language spoken by mothers (t (26) = - 1.619, P = 
.118, d = - .50) or their children (t (26) = .455, P = .653, d = .14). However, in line with H3 and H4, 
the two dyad groups differed with regards to their use of descriptive elaborations during the joint 
book-reading discourse. More specifically, while the sighted children's language contained 
significantly more descriptive elaborations than did the language of children with VI (t (26) = -
2.617, P = .015, d = -.93), the language of mothers of children with VI contained significantly more 
descriptive elaborations about the book than did the language of mothers of sighted children (t (26) 
= 2.855, p = .008). These results are also graphically illustrated in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3. 
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Table 5.6: Proportions of mentalistic and descriptive elaborations for children and mothers in 
each group 
Proportion scores VI 
Mean (SO) 
Mother 
Mental States 
Mean (SD) .27 (.11) 
Descriptions 
Mean (SD) .49 (.20) 
Child 
Mental States 
Mean (SD) .15(.28) 
Descriptions 
Mean (SD) .17 (.15) 
o VI B Sighted 
~ 0.8 ~------------, 
e: 0 
::: ~ 0.6 
:E e: 
-;: ~ 0.4 
... 0 
£CL ~ ~ 0.2 
e 
Q.. 0 +-----'----'..;..;. 
Ment31 Slaes DeSCriptive ** 
Elaboration 
Figure 5.2: Mother elaborations 
(error bars representing SOs, ** p ~ .01) 
Sighted p value 
.33 (.12) .118 
.29 (.17) .008 
.12 (.13) .653 
.32(.16) .015 
o VI [:J Sighted 
~ 0.6 -y-------------, 
e: 0 
::: ~ 0.4 
:::Ee: _ 0 
;g ~ 0.2 
..e CL U o 
a:. 0 +-----L-..-"'~"_____,__---'-------'-
Menial St3es Descriptive * 
Elaboration 
Figure 5.3: Child elaborations 
(error bars representing SOs, * p ~ .05) 
As an illustration of these findings, Table 5.7 shows an example of the mother-child discourse 
from each vision group about the same section in the book. More specifically, the two columns 
illustrate the differing quality of the discourse in the two vision groups, with an emphasis on the 
descriptive language produced by a mother of a child with VI in the left column, and the 
descriptive language spoken by a sighted child in the right column. 
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Table 5.7: Examples of mother-child discourse 
VI group -boy, 9 years and 2 months 
I hate my new school, "Sarah said. She 
tunnelled down to the end of her bed. * 
Mother: What does tunnelled down mean? 
Child: I don't know. 
Mother: She buried herself under the bed, 
hoping that her dad won't make her get out of 
bed. The cat's licking his paw on top of, I think, 
Sarah's bottom. 'Cause he's sitting on Sarah's 
duvet, and the father's got his hand on his 
head and he's thinking: 'Oh, my goodness'. 
And then he says: 
"How can you hate your new school, 
sweetheart?" 
Sighted group - girl, 7 years 
I hate my new school, "Sarah said. She 
tunnelled down to the end of her bed. 
Mother: I still haven't seen Sarah, where is 
she? 
Child: There's her bed, and there's her 
pyjamas, and there's a big lump where she is ... 
Mother: I still don't know what she looks like, 
do you? 
Child : Just keep going so we can find out. 
Mother: OK, let's see. The cat is so cute, isn't 
it? 
Child : It looks more like a bird to me. 
*The text in Italics represents the text that is directly from the book 
Mothers' mentalistic elaborations 
To gain further insight into the nature of maternal mental state language input, a more detailed 
analysis of the mentalistic language produced by the mothers in the present study was carried 
out. It was of interest to examine whether the mothers in the two groups differed in the types of 
mental state references they made (Le., difference in the proportions of references to the mental 
states of the story characters, mental states of the children and their own mental states) (Q1) . 
From Table 5.8 and Figure 5.4 it can been seen that in both groups the proportions of mothers' 
mentalistic language that is sensitive to the child's mental states (Mentalistic Partner, e.g., 'What 
do you think?') were considerably larger than the proportions of mental state references made to 
self (Mentalistic Self, e.g. 'I'm wondering iL') and the story characters (Mentalistic Character, 
e.g. 'She's frightened). More specifically, over 40 % of all mentalistic elaborations produced by 
mothers in both groups were those that referred to their child's mental state, implying that 
mothers generally may be sensitive towards their child's subjective beliefs, desires and emotions 
(in line with Meins et al.'s, 2003 concept of mind-mindedness) . However, in relation to this, it may 
be worth noting that the variation in the VI group was substantially larger than in the sighted 
group (also Figure 5.4). Independent-samples t tests showed that the proportions of child-minded 
mentalistic language of the mothers (Mentalistic Partner) in the present study did not differ 
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between the two vision groups, and the effect size was medium (equal variances not assumed: t 
(16.2) = - 1.519, P = .148, d = -.60) . Additionally, the mothers in the two groups did not differ in the 
extent to which they referred to their own mental states (Mentalistic SelD (t (25) = .639, P = .529, d 
= .25) . However, despite the heterogeneous variances in the two groups, the proportions of 
references to the mental states of the story characters were significantly higher in the mothers of 
children with VI , compared to the mothers of sighted children , and the size of this effect was 
substantial (equal variances not assumed: t (14.3) = 2.416, P = .03, d = .89). 
Table 5.8: Proportions of mothers' mentalistic elaborationsa 
Proportion scores VI Sighted p value 
Mean (SO) N missing = 1b 
Mentalistic Self .19(.11) .16 (.12) .529 
Mentalistic Partner .40 (.31) .55(.17) .148 
Mentalistic Character .27 (.20) .13(.10) .03 
a Proportions # 1, because the other mentalistic elaborations were not included in analyses (see Scoring section) 
b One mother in the sighted group did not produce mentalistic language referring to self, partner or character, so her 
proportion scores for these elaborations could not be calculated. 
~ j ::: 
- 8 I ~ 0.4 
~ I 0.2 
0 +---'---
Self 
D VI 0 Sighted 
Partner Character * 
Mentalistic Elaboration 
Figure 5.4: Mean proportions of different mentalistic elaborations spoken by mothers (error bars 
representing SOs, * p ~ .05) 
Children's mentalistic elaborations 
As seen earlier from the proportion scores in Table 5.6, the proportions of mentalistic elaborations 
in the mothers' language were twice as large as the proportions of mentalistic elaborations in the 
overall language produced by the children. Children generally elaborated less on the book 
content than did their mothers, resulting in fewer data points, particularly in terms of their 
mentalistic elaborations. Furthermore, the proportion scores of mentalistic language referring to 
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self, partner and character could only be calculated for 8 children in VI group and for 11 children 
in the sighted group (presented in Table 5.8 below), as some children did not produce any 
mentalistic language. However, while this was likely to be problematic in statistical terms, it was 
still of interest to explore whether the pattern of different mental state elaborations for children 
was similar to the pattern observed for their mothers (Q2). 
Table 5.9: Proportions of children'S mentalistic elaborations 
Proportion scores VI Sighted p value 
Mean (SO) N missing = 4 N missing = 5 
Mentalistic Self .35 (.35) .66 (.37) .085 
Mentalistic Partner .06 (.13) .02 (.05) .323 
Mentalistic Character .43 (.36) .19(.29) .119 
Whereas the largest proportion of mothers' mentalistic language consisted of mental state 
references to partner (Table 5.8), from Table 5.9 above it can be seen that this type of elaboration 
made up the smallest proportion of children's mentalistic language. Here, it can also be seen that 
the mentalistic language of sighted children was largely about self, whereas the mentalistic 
language of children with VI was about the character and self. Independent-samples t tests 
showed that the groups did not differ with regards to the proportions of mentalistic language 
about partner (equal variances not assumed: t (8.63) = 1.047, P = .323, d = .34) or character (t (17) = 
1.643, P = .119, d = .71), whereas there was a trend towards a significant between-groups 
difference in the proportions of mentalistic language to self, with a large effect size (t (17) = - 1.829, 
p = .085, d = -.82). It is possible that children who are sighted may reflect on their own mental 
states (e.g., 'I think that...), particularly as a result of the mother's child-minded mentalistic 
language (e.g., 'What do you think?'), whereas children with VI may be more likely to rely on their 
mother's input, without explicitly reflecting on their own thoughts and feelings. However, 
considering the substantially small numbers of children on which these analyses were performed, 
and importantly, the scarcity of data points (particularly with regards to the mentalistic 
elaborations about partner), any further interpretations relating to these results would be 
speculative. 
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Relationship between mothers' and children's mentalistic discourse 
Although the relationship between mothers' and children's mental state discourse was of 
particular interest in this study (H5), it was understandable that the small sample, as well as the 
general scarcity of language produced by the children, would pose a problem for conducting 
correlational analyses. The proportion scores in general, particularly those of the children, were 
not suitably distributed to allow correlational analysis. Unsurprisingly, when correlating the 
proportion scores for elaborations produced by children and mothers, no significant relationship 
between the mothers' and children's discourse was obtained for either mental or descriptive 
elaborations (r range = .195 - .308, P values ~ .05). Hence, an attempt was made to illustrate the 
quality of mother-child language relationship by reverting to the absolute (raw) numbers of 
elaborations produced by the dyads. 
Raw scores analysis 
Firstly, there was a highly significant correlation between the mother's and children's overall 
numbers of on-task elaborations in both groups (VI: r = .843, P :5 .001; and Sighted: r = .961, P :5 
.001), signifying that the quantity of children's discourse was directly related to the extent to which 
the mothers elaborated on the book content. This was not surprising, considering that the 
mothers consistently facilitated the discussion about the book. Using Fisher's Z transformation 
revealed that the correlations between mothers' and children's on-task elaborations were not of 
significantly different strength across the two groups (z-score = - 1.68, P = .093). 
Mothers' and children's mentalistic (overall) and descriptive elaborations were then correlated in 
order to see whether these correlations would also reflect the same pattern of the mother-child 
language relationship. With regards to descriptive language during the mother-child discourse, 
there was a significant positive correlation between mothers' and children's total number of 
descriptive elaborations, both in the VI (r = .624, P = .03) and the sighted groups (r = .940, P :5 
.001). This shows that the more descriptive input the mothers provided the more likely were the 
children to elaborate on the book content in the same manner. However, the correlation in the 
sighted group was significantly stronger than that in the VI group (z-score = -2.3212, P = .020). 
In terms of the mentalistic elaborations, in the VI group there was a highly significant positive 
correlation between the mothers' and children's mentalistic language (r = .802, P = .002) (Figure 
5.5). Interestingly however, this correlation was not significant in the sighted group (r = .202, P = 
.453). From Figure 5.6 below it is clear that one mother in the sighted group was an outlier. As 
mentioned previously at the beginning of this section, the extent to which this particular mother 
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spoke to her child in general distinguished her from the rest of the group (i.e., the overall number 
of elaborations she produced was 3.5 SOs higher than the mean of the sighted group), which 
would have naturally resulted in a distinctively high overall number of her mental state 
elaborations (Figure 5.1). Consequently, removing this dyad from the analyses resulted in a 
highly significant positive correlation between mothers' and children's mentalistic language in the 
sighted group (r = .648, p = .009), which was not of a significantly different strength to that 
observed in the VI group (z-score = 0.75, P = .451). 
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It is clear from these correlations that the more mentalistic language the mothers produced, the 
more mentalistic language was also spoken by their children. However, given the highly 
significant relationship between the overall number of elaborations spoken by mothers and 
children (as well as the descriptive elaborations spoken by the dyads), it cannot be ascertained in 
this study whether the mothers' mentalistic language accounted for any unique variance 
(independent of their verbosity) in the relationship with the children's mentalistic language. The 
unsuitability of the current proportional data, particularly regarding the children, prevents us from 
answering this question at the present time. However, the current results confirm previous 
findings that the type of verbal scaffolding that is provided by mothers and which includes talk 
about thoughts, desires and feelings is an important feature of the child's learning environment in 
general and both children with and without sight equally benefit from it. A qualitative example 
illustrating how such scaffolding takes place can be seen in the two short extracts of mother-child 
discourse presented in Table 5.10. Given that this is the first study to date to investigate 
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mentalistic language input to children with congenital VI , it was of particular interest to show 
examples of mentalistic language exchange between children with VI and their mothers. 
Table 5.10: Examples of mother-child mentalistic discourse in the VI group 
Girl with PVI, age 7 years 
'They walked to the car. Sarah's hands were cold and clammy' 
Mother: Why do you think that could be? 
Child: I don't know. 
Mother: Well, ~hat makes your hands go cold and clammy? Can you think? 
Child: When you're sick! 
Mother: When you're sick, yeah. What else? 
Child: I've no idea. 
Mother: No idea? Do you ever get cold and clammy hands when you feel a bit nervous? 
Child: Yeah! 
Mother: Now, there you go. 
Child: I felt well nervous ... 
Mother: When? 
Child: When I went to that music thing, oh, my ... 
Girl with SVI, age 6 years and 6 months 
Mother: Aaaah that might be what it is ... jitters ... 
Child: What? 
Mother: That means you're a bit nervous. First day at school. That might be why she's nervous. 
Child: So she doesn't want to get up .. . 
Mother: She doesn't want to get up. That's why she's got a pillow over her head, so she can't 
hear the alarm clock. 
"The text in Italics represents the text that is directly from the book 
Accounting for the VI severity 
The numbers of children in each VI subgroup were very small (PVI n = 5; and SVI n = 7), 
preventing us from examining in more detail potential effects of the degree of VI on the mother-
child discourse characteristics in this study (03). Thus, here non-parametric analyses were seen 
as more appropriate. The Mann-Whitney test revealed that the groups of children with PVI and 
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SVI did not differ significantly in terms of the overall number of elaborations produced by mothers 
(z = -.731, P = .465) or children (z = -.570, P = .568). Furthermore, the PVI and SVI groups did not 
differ significantly with regards to the proportions of mothers' mental state elaborations and 
descriptions (z = -.731, P = .465; and z = -.406, P = .685 respectively), or children's mental state 
elaborations and descriptions (z = -1.653, p = .1; and z = -.653, P = .1 respectively). These results 
imply that the extent to which mothers and children spoke and elaborated during the joint 
discourse was unrelated to the degree of the child's visual impairment. However, these analyses, 
with their small numbers, preclude us from drawing any firm conclusions. 
DISCUSSION 
The present study was the first to date to examine mothers' mentalistic language input to children 
who are visually impaired and the present findings provide evidence that the language input 
provided to children with VI is qualitatively different from that received by sighted children. 
However, the unique contribution of the current investigation is twofold. Firstly, it is shown that, in 
the context of a joint book-reading session, language input by mothers of children with VI consists 
of the same amount of mental state talk as does the language of mothers of sighted children. 
However, mothers of children with VI elaborate significantly more on the mental states of story 
characters than do mothers of children who are sighted. Furthermore, mothers of children with VI 
do not only seem to elaborate more than do mothers of sighted children in general, but these 
elaborations consist of significantly more descriptive information than the elaborations provided 
by mothers of sighted children. 
The finding that the mothers in the two groups of children were comparable in the extent to which 
they elaborated on mental states is an important one. Approximately one third of all elaborations 
produced by mothers in both groups were about mental states. A similar proportion (i.e., 28%) of 
mentalistic language within the overall discourse produced by mothers during joint book-reading 
with their children (using the same story book as in the present study) was reported previously by 
Symons et al. (2005). Therefore, it appears that the extent to which mothers elaborate on mental 
states is a feature that is inherent in the language input that they direct to their children (at least in 
the context of joint book-reading behaviours), and the current findings imply that this important 
aspect of mothers' contribution to their child's learning may be unaffected by the child's sensory 
deficit. Furthermore, the finding that the mothers of children with VI refer to the mental states of 
the story characters more than do the mothers of sighted children may be of particular 
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significance. It illustrates the sensitivity of mothers of children with VI in terms of their readiness to 
contribute to their child's understanding of important details of the social world (e.g., what other 
people are feeling or thinking), which for their children are otherwise difficult to access, and which 
sighted children may obtain spontaneously through vision (e.g., through observing facial 
expressions). The current findings therefore bear important implications for early intervention, 
where certain aspects of mother-child interaction should particularly be encouraged. 
Interestingly, the finding regarding the mothers' mentalistic elaborations of story characters' 
mental states may throw some light on the findings presented in Chapter 4, where the children's 
own ability to refer to the mental states of story characters was investigated. To reiterate, the 
same children with VI who took part in the research presented in this chapter were also found to 
be comparable to the sighted controls in the extent to which they referred to mental states in their 
explanations of emotions of story characters. Perhaps it is not surprising to find that these 
children have good sensitivity towards other people's subjective mental states (at least in the 
context of the Emotion task, Chapter 4), because their mothers appear to be sensitive to the 
context in which they may need explicit encouragement. It is likely that the proclivity of the 
mothers of children with VI to elaborate on the mental states of others is beneficial to their 
children'S understanding of those states. Perhaps they have learnt from their children that this is 
helpful to them. However, the causal nature of this relationship was not explicitly addressed in 
this research, and the data on children's own mentalistic language during the joint book-reading 
was not very revealing. Hence, we cannot be certain in this study to what extent the mothers' 
mentalistic language itself may be influenced by the children'S level of socio-cognitive 
understanding. Nevertheless, the significant correlations that were found between the mothers' 
and children's overall language, including their mental state elaborations, are affirmative of an 
existing relationship that binds mother-child dialogue and interaction (for both children with VI and 
those who are sighted). Furthermore, while in this study it was not possible to isolate the unique 
contribution of the mothers' mentalistic language input (Le., independent of mothers' verbosity) in 
the VI child's understanding of mental states, these correlations do offer an insight into the 
scaffolding mechanism that maternal language provides in this process. Alongside these 
correlations, the examples of mother-child dialogue in Table 5.10 provide further evidence for 
such scaffolding. 
In addition to their mentalistic language input, the tendency of mothers who have a child with VI to 
provide a greater volume of descriptive language than do mothers of children who are sighted 
implies that maternal language input is largely adaptable to the child's needs, affirming its role in 
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the child's learning processes. However, it was interesting to find that, in terms of the children's 
own discourse, sighted children elaborated on the descriptive aspects of the story-book to a 
greater extent than did the children with VI. These results are very meaningful, in that children 
with VI may produce fewer descriptive elaborations than their sighted peers because the 
information upon which to base such elaborations is not available to them. For this, they may 
instead rely heavily upon their parents' sensitivity to provide them with this information, resulting 
in mothers of children with VI describing people, objects and events to a greater extent than do 
mothers of children who are sighted. The descriptive nature of the language input provided by 
mothers of children with VI does seem to reinforce the notion that such mothers are able to adopt 
alternative strategies in order to bring the external events closer to the experiences of their child 
and this is likely to be facilitative of the child's development (Perez-Pereira & Conti-Ramsden, 
1999; Urwin, 1978). The current finding also may be particularly meaningful, given the evidence 
of impoverished descriptive language input to such children in early development (Kekelis & 
Andersen, 1984; V. Moore & McConachie, 1994). 
The present findings have emphasised the strengths of the language input provided by the 
mothers of children with VI, which contrasts with some of the previous research which suggests 
that this input tends to be restricted (e.g., Andersen et aI., 1993). However, the previous research 
studies, which addressed mother-child conversational characteristics involving children with VI, 
were carried out primarily with young and often pre-lingual children. Thus, we cannot be certain to 
what extent the level of mothers' language input in this research is determined by the children's 
own developmental level and the fact that these children are exceptionally verbal (as shown in 
Chapter 3). It is likely that the mothers' input would have been to an extent adapted to their child's 
level (in line with Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2006). However, what remains uncertain is whether 
the same mothers would have experienced a certain level of difficulty when these children were 
much younger. This highlights the importance of longitudinal research in such processes 
(although this is a particular challenge with samples of children with VI). Another uncertainty 
stems from the fact that the aspects of maternal language input to children with VI that have 
previously been identified as an area of weakness (e.g., the level of maternal directiveness, 
control and responsiveness) were not assessed in this study. 
Another factor that may have impacted on the current findings is the book-reading context itself. 
Although the strengths of this context had been identified previously (Dyer et aI., 2000; Symons et 
aI., 2005), the shared book narrative prevented us from drawing any firm conclusions regarding 
the children's own discourse (which was relatively scarce) or the mother's language input in other 
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contexts. One reason for the reduced output by children in this study is that the children were too 
old to be stimulated by the task2o. Another reason is that the nature of the task may have required 
the children, particularly those with VI, to be passive by default, despite their good verbal skills. 
Thus, the reduced verbal contribution by the child would have been likely to affect, at least to 
some extent, the level of parental involvement. Future studies therefore may benefit from a 
different context for examining the mother-child mentalistic discourse. For instance, while the 
method used by Ruffman et al. (2002) (whereby mothers were asked to discuss photographs 
depicting mental state scenarios with their children) may impose the same constraints on the 
mother-child dialogue as the book narrative, this method could be adapted to be more suitable for 
use with school-age children. For example, mothers could be provided with a set of topics (e.g., 
topics about friends, family members and familiar events, such as holidays) and encouraged to 
facilitate a discussion with their child, improving the ecological validity of the assessment context. 
Finally, it is important to reflect on the current findings once more, from an intervention 
perspective. Despite the methodological limitations highlighted above, assessing the 
characteristics of mother-child discourse in a joint book-reading context has thrown a positive 
light on the mother-child relationship that involves children with VI. This is crucial, given that this 
relationship has been given a central role in the socio-cognitive development of typically 
developing children. Although the constraints that visual impairment may impose upon this 
relationship may indeed be present in the early years (Andersen et aI., 1993; V. Moore & 
McConachie, 1994), the current findings suggest that, given a suitable context, maternal input to 
children with VI may receive a positive boost. For this reason the mothers' verbal involvement 
with their children with VI, while sharing book-reading time, should be highlighted as a strength 
that can be capitalised on, implementing it as an intervention strategy as early as possible. 
20 In the Sighted group, for instance, even the youngest child (approximately age 6) would have been a competent 
print reader, impacting on the dynamics of the joint book-reading context. 
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Chapter 6 
Neuro-cognitive Processes in Children with Congenital VI: 
Implications for Executive Functioning and Attention 
Thus far, this thesis has focused on socio-developmental outcomes in children with VI. In relation 
to this, it has been argued that poor social communication and autism-related characteristics in 
children with congenital VI may be a consequence of disruptions to joint visual attention in early 
childhood and related inability to participate in social attention sharing through eye-contact and 
gestures. Hence, despite normal intelligence, proficient language skills and adequate socio-
conversational input provided by the caregiver (as it has been demonstrated by the present 
research), such children are likely to experience difficulties in social relating long term. Hobson's 
account of vision-driven interpersonal engagement in childhood has played a key part in 
explaining the nature of social impairments in children with VI in general, as well as in the current 
study. However, this account does not provide a sufficient explanation for why some children with 
VI, despite intact intelligence and regardless of their VI severity, have more difficulties than others 
in relating to other people, and why some children with VI do not seem to show marked difficulties 
with social engagement and/or autistic-like characteristics. It is therefore important to ask what 
other underlying mechanisms may playa part in their socio-developmental outcomes. 
One such mechanism that has been linked to social functioning in sighted children, including the 
achievement of the milestones such as joint attention and theory of mind, is the executive 
function (Carlson & Moses, 2001; C. Hughes, 1998a; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). Executive 
function (EF) is a broad neuro-cognitive construct used in psychology to refer to goal-directed and 
problem-solving behaviours that are thought to be mediated by the frontal lobes and which are 
involved in the processes of planning, impulse control, inhibition, the deployment of attention, 
mental flexibility, working memory, the initiation of activity and monitoring of action (Rabbit, 1997; 
Stuss & Knight, 2002). Rather than a single neuro-cognitive function, EF is best described as a 
collection of neuro-anatomically related processes with a common need to regulate behaviour 
and organise cognitive activity (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996; Stuss & 
Knight, 2002). 
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Importantly, executive functioning is not confined to cognitive processes and behavioural action, 
and has been implicated also in emotional control and social interaction. Evidence for the 
relationship between social and executive functioning comes from several studies with sighted 
children who are typically developing and also from children with autism (e.g., Carlson, Mandell, 
& Williams, 2004; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Gilotty, Kenworthy, Sirian, Black, & Wagner, 
2002; McEvoy, Rogers, & Pennington, 1993; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994). While this has important 
implications for children with VI, understanding how difficulties at the level of EF may contribute to 
impairments in social functioning in such children is a great challenge, particularly because very 
little is known about EF skills in this population. Although some inferences can be made from the 
measures that indirectly assess certain executive processes (e.g., verbal fluency and digit-span 
performance on intelligence tests), no research studies to date have explicitly addressed 
executive capacity and control in children with congenital V\' However, given the developmental 
vulnerabilities in social communication and social cognition in this population of children and their 
similarities with autism, it is plausible to suggest that such vulnerabilities may link in to some 
underlying neuro-cognitive factors that involve the executive processes of cognitive flexibility and 
attentional control. The aim of the research presented in this chapter was to provide a preliminary 
insight into this area of development in children with V\' Following from this, the data from two 
research investigations relating to EF processes in children with VI are presented. The first 
provides a broad outlook onto a range of EF skills in children with VI, in terms of the relevant 
everyday behaviours seen at school age (Part 1). The second investigation, which takes a 
retrospective approach, has a more specific focus on attentional capacity and control in the pre-
school stages of development in young children with VI (Part 2). Finally, the findings from these 
two investigations are synthesised in Part 3 for further insight and clarification. 
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PART 1: EVERYDAY EXECUTIVE FUNCTION BEHAVIOURS IN CHILDREN WITH 
CONGENITAL VI 
INTRODUCTION 
Executive functions develop continuously and rapidly through childhood and adolescence and, 
although many of EF aspects do not appear to mature until later childhood, it is now believed that 
their development begins in early infancy (Diamond, 1991; Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; 
Welsh & Pennington, 1988). For instance, maturational changes in the ability to hold a goal in 
mind in the absence of external cues, and to use that remembered goal to guide behaviour, are 
evident in infants between seven and twelve months of age (Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989). 
Although inhibiting previously learned responses is difficult for infants younger than nine months 
of age, by twelve months, most children are able to inhibit certain behaviours and shift to a new 
response set (Diamond, 1985; Diamond & Doar, 1989). Importantly, such developments in EF 
coincide with the period of emergence of joint attention skills in young children (Butterworth & 
Grover, 1990). Similarly, developmental changes in attentional systems, which are an integral 
part of general executive functioning (P. Anderson, 2003), seem to overlap with and/or precede 
socially-based attention sharing in the context of joint attention; before children can co-ordinate 
attention between people and objects for the purpose of referential communication, they require 
more basic attentional capacity and the voluntary control involved in following attentional cues 
such as direction of eye-gaze and head-turn (Atkinson et aL, 1992; Butterworth & Cochran, 1980; 
Hood et aL, 1998). As well as with early social communication, EF has been linked to children's 
theory of mind development and a number of empirical studies to date have demonstrated a 
close relationship between flexible goal-directed behaviour in children, such as self-monitoring, 
working memory, planning and cognitive flexibility, and performance on theory of mind tasks 
(Carlson et aL, 2004; Carlson & Moses, 2001; C. Hughes, 1998a, 1998b). Additionally, EF has 
been implicated in pragmatic language functions, which depend on adaptive responses to 
changes in conversational topic, planning a coherent narrative and monitoring the consequences 
of particular speech acts (Martin & McDonald, 2003). 
Importantly, the theory of EF deficit has played a role in explaining some of the key features of 
autism, most notably restricted interests, behavioural stereotypes and perseveration (reviewed by 
Hill, 2004). Research has suggested that such behavioural features in autism mirror executive 
dysfunctions such as poor mental flexibility on tasks that employ the ability to shift to a mental set 
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depending on the changes in a given situation (Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Ozonoff et aI., 1991; 
Prior & Hoffmann, 1990), failure in self-monitoring on tasks that require error correction and 
avoidance (J. Russell & Jarrold, 1998), difficulties with strategic planning (C. Hughes, Russell, & 
Robbins, 1994; Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Ozonoff et aI., 1991), difficulties with generating novel 
ideas (Turner, 1999), and impairments in inhibition of prepotent responses (C. Hughes & Russell, 
1993; J. Russell, Hala, & Hill, 2003). As well as accounting for some of the non-social 
characteristics of autism, the specific executive dysfunctions in autism have proven useful in 
explaining the socio-communicative problems that typify the disorder. Analogous to the demands 
of complex EF tasks, dealing with the demands of the social context, which is an autism-related 
challenge, also requires executive capacity and control (e.g., on-line planning, regulation of social 
behaviour, shifting of conversational topics to deal with continuously changing contextual 
demands, holding social information in mind while processing the dynamic features of the social 
world and inhibiting socially inappropriate responses). Not surprisingly, research has 
demonstrated connections between executive function difficulties in autism and joint attention 
impairments (Dawson et aI., 2002), poor socio-communicative competence (Gilotty et aI., 2002; 
McEvoy et aI., 1993) and theory of mind deficits (Ozonoff et aI., 1991). 
Although its causality is not yet well understood, the developmental link between executive and 
social functioning is a relatively robust finding. This certainly has intriguing implications for 
children with VI, although very little is known about their executive function abilities in general. 
Assessing executive functions in children with VI poses a particular challenge as the existing 
structured measures of the relevant cognitive processes and behaviours are mostly of visual 
nature. While future research is required to adapt such measures for use with children with VI, the 
present research has employed a parental/teacher report of EF behaviours that can be observed 
in everyday context, in home or school environments. An advantage of sampling children's 
everyday EF behaviours in a naturalistic setting is that such a method has greater ecological 
validity and generalizability value than performance-based neuropsychological measures (V. A. 
Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs, & Mikiewicz, 2002; Gioia, Isquith, Kenworthy, & Barton, 
2003). For the purpose of the present research, the recently developed and validated Behavioural 
Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF) (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000) has 
been utilized. The BRIEF has not only been shown to be a developmentally appropriate measure 
for assessing day-to-day executive functioning that may have important implications for clinical 
diagnosis and treatment management of individual children; its utility has also been demonstrated 
as a comprehensive battery of wide-range developmentally-related domains, which allows for 
comparative description of EF profiles across different clinical populations (e.g., autism, attention 
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deficit and hyperactivity disorder - ADHD, traumatic brain injury - TBI, reading disorder) (V. A. 
Anderson et aI., 2002; Gioia et aI., 2003; Gioia, Isquith, Retzlaff, & Espy, 2002). 
Behavioural rating inventories are not without their limitations, and ideally should be utilized in 
conjunction with performance-based measures. However, the current investigation is an 
exploratory one. Its aim was to provide a preliminary insight into executive functioning in children 
with VI, by comparing their EF-related behavioural outcomes with those of age and ability 
matched children who are sighted. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
The following hypotheses and the related questions were addressed in the research presented in 
this chapter: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The behavioural profiles of executive function, as measured by the BRIEF, in 
children with VI will differ from the profiles of sighted children. 
Question 1 (Q1): Will this difference vary as a function of a specific BRIEF subscale? 
Question 2 (Q2): Will this difference be confined to a particular BRIEF domain (e.g., behavioural 
vs. metacognitive)? 
Question 3 (Q3): Can verbal ability, chronological age and severity of VI explain the variation in 
the BRIEF profiles in the VI group? 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Children with VI will be more likely to show executive function behaviours of 
clinical significance than their sighted developmentally matched peers. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
The participants were the same children as those who took part in the research presented in the 
previous chapters, except for one child in the sighted group whose parents did not complete the 
BRIEF. Hence, BRIEF ratings were obtained for 15 children with congenital VI and 25 children 
with normally developed vision. After the sighted child, whose BRIEF data were missing, was 
removed from the dataset, the two groups remained well matched on verballQ (t (38) = -.185, P = 
.855), chronological age (t (38) = -.445, P = .659) and gender (X2 (1) = .242, P = .622). Average VIQ 
across the two groups was 106.4 (SD = 10.9) and the mean chronological age was 8 years and 3 
months (SD = 1.7, range = 6 years and 3 months - 12 years and 11 months). In both groups there 
were somewhat more girls than boys (VI group gender ratio: 9/6; Sighted group gender ratio: 
13/12). 
Materials and procedure 
The Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function/BRIEF (Gioia et aI., 2000) was used as a 
measure of executive functioning. The BRIEF is a questionnaire for parents and teachers of 
children ages 5-18 years, designed specifically for assessing children's everyday executive 
function behaviours in the home and school environments. In the present study, the BRIEF 
questionnaire for each child was completed by parents, except in the case of two children with VI 
whose BRIEF ratings were obtained by a teacher who knew the children well. 
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Table 6.1: Domains measured by the BRIEF and the corresponding scales 
Measure Item descrietion Item examele 
Behavioural Sum of scales a) - c) 
Regulation Index 
a) Inhibit Control impulses, appropriately stop Interrupts others 
behaviour at the proper time 
b) Shift Move freely from one situation to Has trouble getting used to 
another; transition; flexible problem- new situations (classes, 
solving groups, friends) 
c) Emotional Control Modulating emotional responses Overreacts to small 
appropriately problems 
Metacognition Index Sum of scales d) - h) 
d) Initiate Begin activity and generate ideas Has trouble organizing 
independently activities with friends 
e) Working Memory Hold information in mind for purpose of When given three things to 
completing a task; stick to an activity do, remembers only first or 
last 
n Plan/Organize Anticipate future events; set goals; Underestimates time needed 
develop appropriate steps ahead of time; to finish tasks 
grasp main ideas 
g) Organization of Keep work space, play areas and Leaves playroom a mess 
Materials materials in an orderly manner 
h) Monitor Check work; assess own performance; Does not notice when his/her 
keep track of the effect of own behaviour behaviour causes negative 
on others reactions 
Global Executive Sum of BRI and MI 
Composite 
The BRIEF questionnaire contains 86 items grouped into eight non-overlapping clinical scales, 
which are theoretically and statistically grounded, and which measure distinct aspects of 
executive functioning (scales a - h in Table 6.1). On each item, the rating of frequency of 
occurrence of a relevant behaviour is made on a 3-point scale, with 1 corresponding to Never, 2 
corresponding to Sometimes and 3 corresponding to Often. These ratings are added to derive a 
raw score for each clinical scale, from which further composite scores can be calculated. More 
specifically, the raw scores on scales a) - c) are added to derive a Behaviour Regulation Index 
(BRI) and the scales d) - h) are summed to derive a Metacognition Index (MI). The sum of these 
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two indices is in turn calculated to derive the Global Executive Composite (GEC) (Table 6.1). Raw 
scores on the clinical scales and the indices are then transformed into standardised (T) scores, 
using age and gender appropriate norms. The T scores, which are used to interpret the child's' 
level of executive functioning, have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. Higher raw and 
T scores indicate greater executive dysfunction. Scaled scores of 65 or above (T ~ 65) are 
considered to be of potential clinical significance. 
To derive a T score for each clinical scale on BRIEF the parental/teacher responses on no more 
than two items that contribute to a scale raw score should be missing. In the case of one or two 
missing responses that contribute to a scale raw score, the items with missing responses are 
assigned the lowest value (i.e., 1 corresponding to Never) in order to calculate the scale raw 
score and proceed with deriving the T score for that scale. With regards to the current study, all 
but two items on the BRIEF were considered appropriate for use with children with VI, as a 
substantial number of parents of children with VI felt these two items did not apply to their child 
and omitted completing them. These items were Item 31 ('has poor handwriting') from the Monitor 
scale, and Item 53 ('written work is poorly organised) from the Plan and Organise scale. For that 
reason, in order to avoid systematic data skewing, each child in the study (both in the VI and 
Sighted groups) was automatically assigned a value of 1 for each of these two items. In cases of 
children where more than two items that contribute to a scale score were missing, raw and scaled 
scores for that scale, or the relevant indices, were not calculated. This was the case for one 
sighted child only, for whom the scaled scores on Organisation of Materials, and subsequently MI 
and GEC, could not be calculated. 
Before interpreting BRIEF scores, it is possible to ensure validity of the data provided by the 
teachers and the parents, by considering the Inconsistency (i.e., the extent to which the 
respondent answers similar BRIEF items in an inconsistent manner relative to the clinical 
samples) and Negativity scales (Le., the extent to which the respondent answers selected BRIEF 
items in an unusually negative manner relative to the clinical samples). All of the questionnaires 
provided by the parents and teachers in the present study passed the validity checks specified by 
the BRIEF manual. 
Although the BRIEF is a useful screening measure of possible executive dysfunction, it is not an 
appropriate diagnostic tool. For the purpose of diagnosing a disorder of executive dysfunction the 
BRIEF should be accompanied by a full clinical assessment that includes a detailed history of the 
child and the family, performance-based testing and behavioural observation (Gioia et aI., 2000). 
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In line with this, the purpose of using the BRIEF in the current study was not to establish the 
presence of executive dysfunction in children with VI, but to gain an insight into the children's 
everyday behaviours associated with specific domains in self-regulated problem solving and 
cognitive functioning. 
RESULTS 
The means and SOs of the two groups on the standardised (T) scores on the individual BRIEF 
scales, as well as the BRIEF index and composite scores, are summarized in Table 6.2. Here it 
can be seen that the mean T scores in both groups are generally within the average range (T =:; 
65) although, relative to the sighted group, the scores of the VI group appear particularly elevated 
in certain domains. The SOs in the VI group are also somewhat wider than those seen in the 
sighted group, which is not surprising given the differing sample sizes in the two groups. 
However, Levene's tests of heterogeneity of variances between the two groups for each scale 
were not statistically significant (p values ranging from .09 - .86). 
Table 6.2: Mean standardised (T) scores on the BRIEF scales and indices 
Measure VI Sighted p value 
Mean (SO) N=15 N=25 
Behavioural Regulation Index (BRI) 57.4 (11.3) 47.8 (9.3) .007 
Inhibit 52.7 (11.8) 48.3 (7.8) .164 
Shift 61.3 (11.6) 49.8(11.1) .003 
Emotional Control 57.0 (10.8) 48.4 (8.1) .007 
Metacognition Index (MI) 53.1 (9.1) 47.8 (8.3) .07 
Initiate 55.9 (10.7) 47.4 (8.1) .007 
Working Memory 51.3 (9.5) 49.9 (9.5) .652 
Plan/Organ ise 52.5 (6.6) 49.3 (6.8) .156 
Organisation of Materials 52.5 (11.9) 50.9 (10.2) .652 
Monitor 50.9 (10.6) 43.1 (8.8) .016 
Global Executive Composite (GEC) 55.2 (8.4) 47.9 (8.6) .014 
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First, it was of interest to examine and compare the pattern of scores (Le., profiles) of the children 
in the VI and the Sighted groups across the eight distinct clinical scales and a Profile Analysis21 
was carried out with this purpose (H 1 and Q1). The Profile Analysis comparing the behavioural 
profiles of the two groups across the BRIEF scales revealed a significant test of Flatness, 
indicating that when averaged across the two groups the children'S performance differed across 
individual clinical scales (Pillai's Trace criterion: F (7, 31) = 3.011; p = .016). Furthermore, the test 
of Levels revealed a significant difference between the two groups when their scores were 
averaged across BRIEF scales (F (1, 37) = 6.95; p = .012). These tests are qualified by a Significant 
test of Parallelism, indicating distinguishable executive functioning profiles between the two 
groups (Pillai's Trace criterion: F (7, 31) = 2.375; p = .046). In summary, in line with the 
experimental prediction (H1), the Profile Analysis results suggest that the two groups differed 
significantly in terms of their executive function profiles as measured by the BRIEF. However, this 
between-group difference varied as a function of particular BRIEF scales on which specific 
executive function behaviours of the children were rated (Q1). 
The differing BRIEF profiles in the two groups are graphically illustrated in Figure 6.1. This figure 
also highlights the results of the post hoc analyses aimed at testing which specific BRIEF 
subtests differentiated the two groups (Q1). More specifically, the unrelated t-tests (which were 
carried out following the significant test of Parallelism) revealed that the individual BRIEF scales, 
which differentiated children with VI as having Significantly more behavioural difficulties than 
sighted children, were Shift (t (38) = 3.116, p = .003), Emotional Regulation (t (38) = 2.852, P = 
.007), Initiate (t (38) = 2.854, P = .007), and Monitor (t (38) = 2.516, P = .016; d = .80). Additionally, 
the t-tests also revealed that the children in the VI and the Sighted groups did not differ on Inhibit 
(t (38) = 1.419, P = .164; d = .46), Working Memory (t (38) = .455, P = .652; d = .14), Plan/Organise 
(t (37) = 3.116, P = .156; d = .47), and Organisation of Materials scales (t (38) = .455, p = .652; d = 
.14). 
21 See Chapter 3, p. 79 for details on Profile Analysis. 
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Figure 6.1: Differing profiles between the two participant groups across the individual 
BRIEF scales (** p:$ .01; and * p:$ .05) 
In response to Q2, a mixed 2 x 2 ANOVA showed that, even thought the groups differed 
significantly on the BRIEF overall (i.e., BRI and MI combined) (i.e., significant main effect of 
Group: F (1, 37) = 7. 353; P = .010), this difference did not appear to be confined to a particular 
BRIEF domain (i.e. , non-significant Group x Index interaction: F (1, 37) = 1. 716; P = .198). 
Furthermore, the BRI and MI scores were not discrepant when averaged across the two groups 
(non-significant effect of Index: F (1 , 37) = 2 .080; p = .158). In line with these findings, it was not 
surprising to find a significant post hoc between-group difference on the measure of overall 
executive functioning, with the VI group obtaining higher GEC scores than the Sighted group (t 
(37) = 2.577, P = .014; d = .83). However, with regards to the post-hoc tests for the individual 
indices that form the GEC, the results were significant only with respect to the BRI (t (38) = 2.847, 
P = .007), while the difference on the Mi was only a strong trend (t (37) = 1. 842, P = .07; d = .60) . 
This pattern of findings is graphically illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
158 
D VI • Sighted 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
BRI** MI GEe* 
Figure 6.2: Between-group differences on the BRIEF index and composite T scores 
(error bars represent the SO, ** P !5 .01, * P !5 .05) 
Furthermore, in response to Q3, the children 's behavioural ratings on the BRIEF appeared to be 
independent of their verbal intelligence, as no significant correlations between the VIQ and the 
BRIEF T scores was found in either the VI group (p range = .254 - .987, n = 15), nor in the 
sighted group (p range = .317 - .967, n = 25) (Table 6.3). This may have been due to relative 
homogeneity of the two groups in terms of their intellectual levels. Interestingly, age was largely 
uncorrelated with BRIEF ratings in the VI group (except for the Organisation of Materials scale), 
unlike the sighted group where a clearer developmental pattern emerged across the BRIEF 
scales (i.e. , negative correlations suggesting that the older the children, the better their EF skills). 
Thus, verbal ability and chronological age do not seem to explain the variation in the severity of 
the BRIEF profiles in the VI group (Q3). 
Furthermore, in response to Q3, it may be worth noting that the clinically elevated scores on 
either one or both of the BRIEF indices were not confined to children whose VI was of greater 
severity, as out of the four children with clinically elevated indices, only one child had PVI based 
on his preschool functional vision assessment (participant 10: 19). Additionally, some of the best 
BRIEF outcomes overall were observed in children with PVI (i.e ., participant IDs: 10 and 16). 
Similarly, the Shift scale (in terms of the prevalence of clinically significant scores), which most 
notably differentiated the VI group from the sighted, did not significantly distinguish children with 
PVI from those with SVI (x2 (1) = .227, P = .634) . 
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Table 6.3: Pearson coefficients for the correlations between age, VIQ and the BRIEF T scores 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Age .046 -.482 -.214 -.470 -.449 -.348 -.497** -.608** -.173 -.533** -.519** -.554** 
2 VIQ -.434 -.201 .052 .208 .009 -.209 .153 -.017 .071 -.143 -.046 -.031 
3 Inhibit -.169 -.005 .622** .671** .900** .776** .395 .660** .473 .772** .734** .874** 
4 Shift -.115 .048 .537 l .599** .794** .499** .288 .216 .340 .388 .429 .674** 
5 Emotional Control .157 .025 .790** .570 l .855** .593** .374 .389 .357 .422 .502** .724** I 
I 
6 SRI -.030 .018 .919** .757** 
.920** 1 .742** .436 .514** .448 .654** .674** .884** 
7 Initiate -.086 -.222 .425 .454 .362 .465 .500** .493** .520** .548** .737** .796** 
8 Working Memory -.136 -.050 .349 .307 .101 .289 .740** 1 .543** .709** .533** .858** .740** 
9 Plan /Organise -.219 -.167 .100 .182 .018 .109 .691** .537 .573** .623** .794** .726** 
10 Organising -.537 .248 .105 -.074 -.182 -.041 .343 .508 .618 .373 .825** .741** Materials 
11 Monitor -.381 .315 .404 .339 .211 .362 .394 .605 .465 .712** .756** .765** 
12 MI -.307 .033 .342 .252 .120 .277 .786** .854** .808** .797** .771** .933** 
13 GEC -.269 -.311 .745** .594 .586 .742** .796** .751** .627 .535 .737** .847** 
Red - VI; Blue- Sighted; ** - significant at p s .01 
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The Pearson's correlations testing the relationship between the BRIEF scores in each group 
(Table 6.3) further support the differing profile pattem in the two groups (H1). In the sighted 
group, children's BRI and MI scores were highly correlated with one another (r = .674, P $ .001, n 
= 24), as well as individually with the GEC (BRI: r = .884, p $ .001, n = 25; MI: r = .933, p $ .001, 
n = 24). However, in the VI group, while children's BRI and MI scores were each correlated with 
the GEC (BRI: r = .742, P = .002, n = 15; MI: r = .847, p $ .001 , n = 15), they did not correlate 
with one another (r = .277, P = .318, n = 15). This suggests that, relative to the presentation in the 
Sighted group, elevated scores on one BRIEF index did not necessarily imply elevated scores on 
the other in children with VI, and vice versa. This is also evident from the correlations on the 
individual clinical scales in Table 6.3. Although the clinical scales that form BRI and MI were inter-
correlated in both groups within each domain, significant correlations across the scales in two 
domains were only seen in the sighted group. In the VI group, the correlations between the scales 
that form the BRI and those that form the MI were generally not significant, suggesting 
independence of the processes involved in behavioural regulation and metacognition in children 
with VI. However, the scatter-plot presented in Figure 6.3 implies that the discrepant pattem of EF 
skills across the two broader BRIEF indices in the VI group may be confined to a certain 
percentage of children with VI with clinically elevated scores in one index domain, but not in the 
other. 
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Figure 6.3: Relationship between BRI and MI for individual children (including the clinical cut-off 
reference T ~ 65) 
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Following from this, the differing profiles between the two groups were compared by examining 
the percentage of cases within each group that reached the clinical cut-off on the BRIEF scales, 
in order to illustrate the relative risk in children with VI of obtaining clinically significant BRIEF 
scores, compared to sighted children of similar age and intelligence (H2). The children in the two 
groups were categorised as those whose T scores fell within the normal range limits (T < 65) and 
those whose T scores were deemed clinically elevated (T ;::: 65). The proportions of children 
reaching clinically significant scores in each group are shown in Table 6.4 below. Here, it can be 
seen that a higher percentage of children with VI, compared to sighted children, have obtained 
clinically elevated scores on all BRIEF scales, except for Plan and Organise, where sighted 
children appeared weaker by comparison. Crucially, however, the proportions of children whose 
scores were the within normal range and those whose scores were above the clinical cut-off were 
significantly different between the two groups only on Emotional Control (p :5 .01) and Initiate (p :5 
.05), where children with VI appear to be at a significantly higher risk of clinically elevated scores 
than sighted children. 
Table 6.4: Proportions (%) of VI vs. Sighted groups reaching clinical cut-off on the BRIEF scales 
BRIEF scale 
a) Inhibit 
b) Shift 
c) Emotional Control 
d) Initiate 
e) Working Memory 
D Plan/Organize 
g) Organization of Materials 
h) Monitor 
a N missing = 1 
VI 
13.3 
26.7 
26.7 
26.7 
13.3 
o 
20 
13.3 
Sighted 
8 
12 
o 
4 
4 
4.2 a 
12 
4 
Chi-square statistics 
X2 (1) = .296, P = .586 
X2 (1) = 1.397, P = .237 
X2 (1) = 7.407, P = .006 
X2 (1) = 4.404, P = .036 
X2 (1) = 1.171, P = .278 
X2 (1) = .641, P = .423 
X2 (1) = .471, P = .493 
X2 (1) = 1.171, P = .278 
162 
DISCUSSION 
In the present investigation, the BRIEF questionnaire captured a striking profile of everyday 
executive function behaviours in children with VI whose verbal intelligence is in the normal range. 
This profile was found to be uneven in comparison to the EF profiles of developmentally matched 
sighted children, with specific executive domains emerging as areas of relative weakness. A spiky 
profile of EF strengths and weaknesses in children with VI appears to be unlike the BRIEF 
profiles seen in children with autism and children with ADHD, who have been found to obtain 
significantly poorer ratings across all the BRIEF scales compared to sighted controls (Gilotty et 
aI., 2002; Gioia et aI., 2003). 
The BRIEF scales which differentiated the VI group as poorer than their sighted counterparts 
were Shift, Emotional Control, Initiate and Monitor. Here, it is worth noting that, judging by the 
BRIEF developmental norms, the means of the VI group on these specific scales still appeared to 
be within the limits of the normal range. For that reason, it is potentially presumptuous to 
conceptualise these specific EF domains of children with VI as 'dysfunctions' that characterise 
this clinical group. On the other hand, given that the specifically matched sighted group obtained 
significantly better ratings by comparison, it is crucial to understand why the children with VI in 
this study have not achieved the levels on these domains that would be expected from children of 
their age and intelligence. To address this question it may be helpful to take a closer look at the 
individual results and their meaning. 
For instance, the Shift scale assesses mental flexibility in children, in terms of their ability to 
switch cognitive set from one situation or activity to another depending on the contextual 
demands. A possible explanation for why this domain may be vulnerable for children with VI is 
that the mechanisms that underlie the functioning of this domain may particularly benefit from 
visual processing. For instance, an important aspect of the shift domain (i.e., cognitive flexibility) 
is attentional control (e.g., Alexander & Stuss, 2000; Norman & Shallice, 1986). According to the 
executive function model proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986), attention provides higher-
level 'supervision' over lower-level cognitive functions that include over-learned automatic 
processes or 'action schemas' (e.g., crossing the road at a pedestrian crossing), which tend to be 
triggered by environmental stimuli or routines (e.g., being at the same zebra crossing used every 
day). The 'attentional supervisory system' modulates these automatic responses in a flexible or 
adaptive way, for instance, in dealing with novelty or danger and in decision making (e.g., if the 
zebra crossing is not in use). Importantly, it is clear how visual perception can be an important 
163 
vehicle for transferring attention and its executive control from one activity or stimulus to another 
(e.g., shifting attention away from the non-functioning zebra crossing to a traffic assistant helping 
the pedestrians cross the road at a different location). With regards to sighted children's everyday 
behaviours, visual experience may facilitate the process of shifting attention and cognitive focus 
onto a novel set of activities (e.g., in getting used to new situations, such as a new classroom), 
whereas children with VI cannot benefit from visual guidance in the same way and may be more 
prone to being 'stuck' on the routine-based automatic schemas. 
In relation to this, perseverative and repetitive behaviours, and difficulties in modulation of motor 
acts in children are thought to be a result of poor shifting functions (i.e., reduced mental 
flexibility), the evidence for which comes from research with children with autism (e.g., Lopez, 
Lincoln, Ozonoff, & Lai, 2005). Importantly, researchers and clinicians have noted occurrence of 
these behaviours in children with VI in a social context (Brambring & Troster, 1992; Hobson et aI., 
1999; Wills, 1968). This pattern is also supported by the present research in Chapter 3, where 
children with VI obtained significantly elevated scores on the Restricted, Repetitive and 
Stereotyped Patterns of Behaviour domain on the SCQ. Such behavioural outcomes of children 
with VI are certainly in line with their scores on the BRIEF Shift scale here. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the disruptions at the level of environmental (i.e., visual) 
stimuli, would also affect a child's inhibitory abilities, which may use the same attention 
mechanisms as shift. This is because this supervisory attentional system enables automatic 
responses to be suppressed when they are not satisfactory, such as impulsive actions and 
behaviours (e.g., crossing at the usual zebra crossing, even though it is exposed to road works). 
This, for instance, seems to be the case with children with ADHD (e.g., Barkley, 1997). However, 
the children with VI in this study did not differ from sighted children in terms of their Inhibit scores. 
An obvious explanation for this finding would be the lack of power, given that the direction of the 
group means was more favourable to sighted children. Additionally, in both groups of children in 
the study, the scores on Inhibit and Shift were significantly correlated, suggesting their 
interdependence. Similarly, 13 % of children with VI were still above the clinical cut-off on this 
scale, implying that inhibitory control may not be preserved in all children with VI. However, the 
lack of significant difference between the two groups precludes us from drawing firm conclusions. 
A further BRIEF domain that differentiated the VI group as poorer than the sighted comparison 
group was Emotional Control. Moreover, almost a third of children with VI were reported to show 
levels of emotional control that are of clinical concern, compared to the sighted group where none 
of the children were above the clinical cut-off. This scale assesses executive functioning within 
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the emotional domain, focussing on the child's ability to appropriately regulate emotional 
responses. Poor emotional regulation in a child is mirrored in angry outbursts and temper 
tantrums in response to seemingly minor events, the severity and frequency of which are not 
appropriate for that child's age. Successful regulation of emotional responses is likely to depend 
on the use of certain behavioural and cognitive strategies. For instance, such strategies may 
involve selectivity (i.e., avoiding upsetting situations/stimuli) or deployment of attention (i.e., using 
attention to distract oneself from situations/stimuli that provoke negative emotions) (Gross, 2002). 
Children with VI may not be able to benefit from such strategies in the same way as sighted 
children. For instance, where sighted children may be able to modulate their emotional responses 
by shifting attention and cognitive focus away from what causes strong emotional reactions, 
reduced shifting ability in children with VI may also affect their emotion regulation. Indeed, the 
significant correlation between the scores on the Emotion Control and Shift scales in both groups 
of children supports this explanation. Hence, as with shifting ability, emotional modulation 
strategies may also be facilitated by visual processing. In a social context in particular, feedback 
from other people, in terms of their facial expressions and gestures, may be particularly important 
in this process in that it may help children regulate their levels of distress (or laughter in 
inappropriate situations) so as not to cause upset to others. Lack of vision is likely to limit 
perception of such feedback and may provide an explanation for why children with VI may be 
more vulnerable to poorer emotional modulation than their sighted peers of similar developmental 
level. 
A particularly interesting finding was the poorer initiation behaviours in the VI group. The Initiate 
scale on the BRIEF assesses the generativity component of EF, which relates to initiating a task 
or activity and independently generating ideas, responses and problem-solving strategies. 
Difficulties in this domain are often demonstrated in the form of difficulty with word and design 
fluency tasks and the need for additional cues from the adult to begin tasks. The present result of 
poorer Initiation in the VI group is particularly striking, considering that the VI group performed 
well on a performance-based test of verbal fluency presented in Chapter 3. More specifically, on 
the Word Association test on the expressive language domain of the CELF-3 there was a trend 
towards a significant between-group difference in favour of the VI group, which is in contrast to 
the poorer Initiate ratings on the BRIEF, according to which nearly a third of the VI group was 
above the clinical cut-off. Furthermore, some of the children who generated most items on the 
Word Association task scored in the clinical domain on the Initiate scale (e.g., participant 10: 26). 
Such dissociation between performance-based and questionnaire-based measures of initiative 
ability suggests that the two measures may tap different underlying abilities for children with VI. A 
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closer inspection of the BRIEF items reveals that some of the Initiate items target children's 
initiating behaviours in free-time and in relation to activities with friends. Thus, it is possible that 
the poorer behavioural ratings of the VI group on the Initiate scale on the BRIEF questionnaire 
are a secondary outcome of their impoverished social skills. 
A similar explanation may account for the poorer behavioural ratings in the VI group on the 
Monitor scale. This BRIEF scale assesses the habits of checking work/task performance for the 
purpose of effective goal achievement. Children who are poor at self-monitoring tend to rush 
through assigned work, making careless mistakes. Importantly, this scale also evaluates personal 
monitoring functions in terms of whether a child keeps track of the effect their behaviour has on 
other people (e.g. 'does not realize that certain behaviours bother others). This suggests that 
there is a certain pragmatic and socio-cognitive element to this scale. In fact, children with VI may 
find it difficult to monitor their own actions and behaviours in relation to other people because they 
may be perceptually unaware of other people's perceptions of such behaviours. On the other 
hand, sighted children may be at an advantage in this domain as they can rely on other people's 
non-verbal cues to know whether their behaviour is undesirable and correct it accordingly. 
However, while the socio-cognitive perspective explains the difference between the VI and the 
sighted groups on the Monitor scale, it does not explain the unusual pattern of the mean scores 
on this scale for Sighted children. More specifically, sighted children seemed to have received 
particularly positive ratings from their parents on this scale, resulting in Monitor scores that were 
considerably better (i.e., lower) than would be expected based on the BRIEF norms. With regards 
to this, it is worth reiterating that one item from this scale was not included in the calculation of the 
T scores as it was considered unsuitable for children with VI (see p. 152). Hence, all the children 
(VI and sighted) were assigned the lowest value (i.e., best potential outcome) on this item (,has 
poor handwriting). However, handwriting is such an important part of sighted children's daily 
lives. Thus, it is possible that removing this particular item also removed a certain level of 
variation that is an inherent part of this behaviour, resulting in particularly good Monitor outcomes 
in the sighted group. It is unclear how the same issue would have affected the scores of the VI 
group whose mean on the Monitor scale was virtually indistinguishable from the average mean in 
the normative data. However, it is important to highlight that the VI group was closely matched to 
the sighted comparison group in this study, hence their significantly poorer behaviours on this 
scale (relative to their sighted matches), may still have important developmental implication (e.g. 
see the socio-cognitive explanation above). 
Thus far, it can be argued that the specific EF weaknesses of the VI group seen in this 
investigation are related to the possibility that visual perception (e.g., via attentional systems and 
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socio-environmental factors) may mediate the functioning of certain executive domains. The 
same explanation may also account for why children with VI generally did well on other aspects of 
the BRIEF, like Working Memory, Plan/Organise and Organisation of Materials, which are 
processes that may not necessarily be vision-dependent. Working memory strength of children 
with VI is often evident from their Digit Span performance, where they have been found to 
outperform sighted children (Hull & Mason, 1995; Smits & Mommers, 1976; Tillman & Osborne, 
1969). Similar superiority has been demonstrated in the present research in Chapter 3, using the 
Recalling Sentences task from the receptive language domain of the CELF-3. Thus, from the VI 
children's Working Memory scores on the BRIEF, it is clear that their short-term memory strength 
is likely to transpire in real life. Finally, with regards to planning, organising and organisation of 
materials, these processes may require similar levels of cognitive mapping that are involved in 
the process of spatial orientation. Importantly, research evidence suggests that children and 
adults with VI can achieve this efficiently by relying on alternative, non-visual strategies (e.g., 
tactile mapping, echolocation) (Eardley & Pring, 2007; Millar, 1994; Ungar, Blades, & Spencer, 
1995a, 1995b, 1996). 
However, an important issue remains to be considered. More specifically, some children with VI 
seemed to show more behavioural difficulties in the area of EF than others, as their scores were 
in the clinical domain across different BRIEF scales. Interestingly, while some of these children 
showed clinically significant weaknesses on some, but not other aspects of the BRIEF, only one 
child was above the clinical cut-off across all of the BRIEF domains. It is possible that the 
'concerns' we see here in some children with VI are also picking up on the children's social 
difficulties (e.g., in Chapter 3), because the BRIEF targets the expression of EF behaviours in 
those environments which are inherently social (i.e., at school and home). It was argued in the 
introduction of this section that executive and social functions are not mutually exclusive, and 
convincing evidence for this relationship comes from considering children with autism. Thus, it is 
possible that the children with VI who showed more behavioural difficulties in the domain of 
executive functioning are those with poorer socio-communicative outcomes, because the same 
vulnerability that may contribute to the poorer socio-developmental outcomes of children with VI 
may also affect their executive function. However, as it was argued earlier in this section, it is also 
possible that the higher-level mechanism (e.g., the attentional system), which operates from the 
frontal lobes, may be particularly vulnerable when visual input is restricted, and it is disruption to 
this mechanism that may affect a child's executive functioning, of which triadic joint attention and 
metarepresentational social cognition are likely to be a part. Interestingly, the following section of 
this chapter (i.e., Part 2) may shed further light on this particular issue. 
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PART 2: ATTENTIONAL PROCESSES IN YOUNG CHILDREN WITH CONGENITAL VI 
This investigation has been published in a peer reviewed journal as: Tadi6, V., Pring, L. and Dale, N (in press). 
Attentional processes in young children with congenital visual impairment. British Journal of Developmental 
Psychology; (available online in May 2008). 
INTRODUCTION 
While the research in Part 1 looked at the broader presentation of EF in forms of everyday 
behaviour in school-age children with VI, the research presented in this section focuses on 
attention capacity and regulation as a specific aspect of general executive functioning and in 
young pre-school children with VI. As discussed earlier in this chapter, attentional control is 
thought to be central to EF; it influences the operation of other executive domains (e.g., cognitive 
flexibility, information processing, goal setting), which depend on it for the selection of specific 
stimuli, inhibition of prepotent responses, the ability to stay focussed over time, regulation and 
monitoring of actions, error identification and goal attainment (e.g., P. Anderson, 2003; Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). 
Importantly, as it has previously been discussed, attention has been closely related to early socio-
communicative development, which at its earlier stages involves social attention sharing 
(Butterworth & Grover, 1990; Corkum & Moore, 1995, 1998). Ability to co-ordinate attentional 
focus in the context of socially-driven joint attention experiences reflects maturation in attentional 
systems which undergo considerable changes in the first few months of child development 
(Atkinson, 1984; Butterworth & Cochran, 1980; Hood et aI., 1998). Vision is likely to playa major 
role in these processes, given that attentional capacity and control in children is most readily 
measured in terms of their ability to orient to visual stimuli and follow and direct the visual focus of 
others (e.g., using eye-gaze as an attentional cue). 
The link between the development of attention and social communication has also been 
demonstrated in research with children with autism. Researchers have drawn connections 
between social impairments that are characteristic of the disorder and attention difficulties, 
suggesting that disruptions to early joint attention, and subsequent deficits in higher-order 
cognitive processes such as theory of mind and executive functions characteristic of autism, may 
be preceded by early occurring attentional abnormalities (Landry & Bryson, 2004; Leekam et aI., 
2000; Swettenham et aI., 1998). For instance, children with autism have been found to 
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experience difficulties with orienting their attention in tasks which require them to disengage 
attention from one stimulus and shift it to another (Landry & Bryson, 2004; Pascualvaca, Fantie, 
Papageorgiou, & Mirsky, 1998), and this difficulty is particularly pronounced with stimuli of social 
nature (i.e., people as opposed to objects) (Leekam et aI., 2000; Swettenham et aI., 1998). In line 
with this, Leekam et al. (2000) found preschool children with autism to be less responsive than 
developmentally delayed children without autism in orienting to the attention bids and head-
turning cues provided by another person, in line with their general joint attention impairment. It 
follows from this that, if adequate attention capacity and control are necessary prerequisites for 
joint attention skills and subsequent socio-cognitive developments, specific socio-developmental 
difficulties that are associated with visual impairment may also be a result of early occurring 
difficulties in attentional processes. 
Cass et al. (1994) were amongst the first to hypothesize that early attentional processes may be 
a potential risk factor in the development of young children with VI. These authors (also Dale & 
Sonksen, 2002) identified a serious developmental outcome, which they referred to as 
'developmental setback', occurring in a subgroup of children with congenital VI. They noted that 
the setback, which involves plateauing or loss of skills in cognitive and language development, 
emerged in the second and third year of life and manifested behaviourally in form of autism-
related characteristics such as social withdrawal, self-directedness and resistance to social 
approach. According to these authors, the period when the developmental setback begins to 
occur coincides in childhood with the development of behavioural independence and changes in 
attentional control. In typical development, the second year of life is characterised by a drive for 
autonomy and independence, and therefore greater behavioural inflexibility, non-compliance and 
temper tantrums (Colson & Dworkin, 1997; Ruff & Rothbart, 1996). Furthermore, the child's 
attention becomes more controlled, focussed and sustained, less driven by novelty and more by 
what others attend to (Rothbart & Posner, 2006). For children who are visually impaired this 
period may be particularly vulnerable. In the absence of the integrative visual input of a sighted 
child, developing attentional control and responding to adult-directed attention may rely on the 
auditory channel and be more difficult for such children, resulting in potentially serious 
consequences for their subsequent developmental outcomes. 
Because of the dominant role of vision in early attention development, early attentional ability may 
differ for those children with VI who have some, although severely degraded, functional vision 
(i.e., SVI), compared to children with a total absence of vision or light perception only (i.e., PVI). A 
distinction has often been drawn between the two groups of children, as young children with PVI, 
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compared to those with SVI, have been found to show poorer developmental outcomes, in terms 
of general cognitive functioning (Dale & Sonksen, 2002; Reynell, 1978), language (McConachie 
& Moore, 1994), and socio-communicative competence (Preisler, 1991). Although visual 
impairment of significant severity (SVI, as well as PVI) is likely to have an effect on a child's 
developmental outcomes in general, it has been argued that presence of functional vision, 
however limited, can serve as a protective factor in the developmental processes of young 
children with VI (Sonksen & Dale, 2002). It is therefore of interest in the current investigation to 
examine whether the presence of functional vision in children with SVI may positively impact on 
their early attentional processes, compared to children with PVI. 
Visual impairment in childhood is associated with a relatively high prevalence of developmental 
delay and global learning difficulties (Sonksen & Dale, 2002), which is likely to interfere with 
children's attentional processes. Even when a group of children with VI is rigorously selected for 
research purposes to reduce the confounding effects of additional learning difficulties (e.g., by 
excluding children with cortical VI), the incidence of learning difficulties is still 17% (Dale & 
Sonksen, 2002). In their sample of young children with autism, Leekam et al. (2000) found that 
the differences in specific attentional abilities between children with autism and their 
developmentally matched controls were largely confined to the children with autism of lower 
cognitive ability. Similarly, difficulties in the ability to regulate attention in young children with VI 
may be more prevalent in those with cognitive impairments. 
Importantly, the attentional processes of children with varying levels of visual impairment have not 
been empirically addressed to date. The aim of the current observational study was to attempt 
such an investigation, by making use of existing clinical video observations of children with 
congenital VI undergoing a semi-structured developmental assessment. In the absence of 
experimental manipulation, this method allowed for the eliciting and observation of children's 
attentional behaviours in a naturalistic setting. 
Existing models of attention divide it into unique components that involve the ability to focus on a 
particular stimulus, to sustain that attention over a period of time and to shift it flexibly and 
adaptively (Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, & Kellam, 1991; Posner & Petersen, 1990). It is 
thought that, while integrated into a single functional entity, these processes are mediated by 
distinct neuroanatomical regions. Drawing on these models, attention was conceptualised in the 
current investigation in terms of establishing attentional focus on objects, maintaining attention on 
those objects over a continuous period of time and shifting attention flexibly onto a novel object. 
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Establishing attentional focus on objects occurs as the adult in interaction introduces a toy of 
relevance to the child and the child responds to this attentional bid by engaging with the given 
toy. Maintaining attention on objects, on the other hand, occurs as the adult continuously 
attempts to hold the child's attention on the toy to which attention has been established and the 
child responds to these adult bids by sustaining concentration on the given object. Finally, shifting 
attention to novel objects occurs as the adult in interaction tries to disengage the child's attention 
from the toys with which they are engaged by introducing a novel object and the child responds 
by orienting towards the novel objects. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
In line with the theoretical issues outlined so far, four research questions remain unanswered and 
the research presented here makes an attempt to address them: 
Question 1 (Q1): Do children who are visually impaired from birth experience attentional difficulties 
(i.e., in terms of establishing, maintaining and shifting adult-directed attention) in their early years 
of life? 
Question 2 (Q2): Do attentional outcomes in children who are visually impaired vary as a function 
of severity of visual impairment? 
Question 3 (Q3): Do attentional outcomes in children who are visually impaired relate to their 
general cognitive abilities? 
Question 4 (Q4): Are different aspects of attentional behaviour (i.e., establishing, maintaining and 
shifting adult directed attention) in children with VI and their sighted peers independent from each 
other? 
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METHOD 
Participants 
The participants were 32 children with congenital VI and 17 children with normally developing 
vision. The children with VI were consecutively identified through a tertiary level developmental 
vision clinic (DVC), where they were referred for specialist assessment and management of their 
vision and development by paediatricians or ophthalmologists. They were included based on their 
age at time of assessment (10-56 months) and diagnostic classification using the diagnostic 
taxonomy by Sonksen and Dale (2002) (i.e., CDPVS). These children were separated into two 
groups depending on whether they had PVI or SVI at the time of the assessment (see Chapter 2, 
p.52 for details). There were 16 children with PVI: 7 girls and 9 boys, age range 15 - 53 months 
(Mean age = 32.2 months, SD = 10.9). Similarly, there were 16 children with SVI: 8 girls and 8 
boys, age range 17 - 36 months (Mean age = 26.6 months, SD = 6.1). Individual children's visual 
diagnoses, as well as their vision levels, are summarised in Table 6.5. 
A comparison group of 20 sighted typically developing children was recruited through the local 
nurseries, creches and parent - toddler groups. Three children were subsequently excluded for 
the purpose of successful developmental matching, which lead to 17 sighted children being 
included in the study. There were 10 girls and 7 boys, age range 10 - 36 months (Mean age = 
20.2 months, SD = 8.3). The sighted group was recruited and tested during the period of the 
present PhD research, whereas the VI sample was a clinical population whose archived clinical 
and video data were accessed retrospectively, for the purpose of this thesis. 
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Table 6.5: Characteristics of individual children with congenital VI 
Child Sex VI Age in Visual Diagnosis 
level months 
M PVI 20 Leber's amaurosis 
2 M PVI 23 Familial exudative vitreo-retinopathy / Norrie's Syndromea 
3 F PVI 45 Optic nerve hypoplasia and bilateral congenital cataracts 
4 M PVI 31 Optic nerve hypoplasia 
5 F PVI 28 Leber's amaurosislretinal dystrophy 
6 M PVI 40 Retinal dysplasia/Norrie's Syndrome 
7 M PVI 23 Leber's amaurosis 
8 F PVI 42 Bilateral microphthalmia 
9 M PVI 30 Persistent hyperplastic primary vitreous 
10 F PVI 15 Bilateral retinal coloboma and optic nerve aplasia. 
11 M PVI 27 Bilateral microphthalmia and optic nerve aplasia 
12 F PVI 53 Bilateral optic nerve hypoplasiaa 
13 F PVI 44 Hypoplastic optic disk (right eye) and absence of the optic disk 
(left eye) 
14 F PVI 37 Bilateral optic nerve hypoplasia 
15 M PVI 38 Norrie's disease 
16 M PVI 19 Bilateral optic disc and optic nerve hypoplasia 
17 F SVI 31 Leber's amaurosis 
18 M SVI 17 Corneal opacities/Microphthalmia 
19 F SVI 26 Multiple opacities/ Sclerocornea 
20 M SVI 19 Retinal dystrophy 
21 M SVI 24 Bilateral optic nerve hypoplasia 
22 M SVI 20 Congenital cataracts 
23 M SVI 32 Leber's amaurosis 
24 F SVI 22 Bilateral microphthalmia with anterior segment malformation of 
both eyes 
25 F SVI 36 Bilateral microphthalmia/ Sclerocornea 
26 M SVI 33 Multiple corneal opacities/ Micropthalmia 
27 F SVI 30 Retinal folds and microcephaly 
28 F SVI 24 Bilateral optic nerve hypoplasia 
29 F SVI 28 Severe retinal dystrophy and most likely Leber's amaurosis 
30 M SVI 36 Congenital bilateral Aniridia, glaucoma and Peter's anomaly in 
one eye 
31 M SVI 20 Leber's amaurosis 
32 F SVI 28 Leber's amaurosis 
aBased on the functional vision assessment records these participants had a PVI status up until the age 16 months 
and have gained functional form vision after this age giving them SVI status. Their inclusion in the PVI group was 
justified based on evidence that form vision before the age of 16 months seems to exert protective effects on 
developmental processes of children with VI (Sonksen et aI., 1991). 
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Materials 
Cognitive characteristics of the sample 
All the children, VI and sighted, were assessed on the Reynell-Zinkin Scales of Mental 
Development for Visually Handicapped Children (RZS) (Reynell, 1979). The RZS were 
specifically designed to monitor the cognitive progress of very young visually impaired children in 
the areas of sensory motor development, expressive and receptive language, social adaptation 
and exploration of environment. For the current research purposes only a subset of the test 
scores were used: 1) Sensory-motor understanding (SMU); 2) Verbal comprehension (VC) and 3) 
Expressive Language (Structure) (ELS). SMU scales show the level of learning in relation to 
concrete objects (e.g., exploration, manipulation, recognition and meaningful use of objects); VC 
scales concern the ability to understand language (Le., recognition of familiar phrases in context, 
understanding of verbal labels and verbal instructions); and ELS concerns the ability to produce 
vocal patterns, words and sentences with appropriate use of different parts of speech. 
Raw, and not age-equivalent, scores on these scales were chosen to be the most appropriate 
measure for a number of reasons including the fact that the RZS are only partially standardised 
across the subtests and according to vision level (Le., Blind, Partially Sighted or Sighted). 
Furthermore, children with congenital VI typically may lag behind children who are sighted on all 
of the areas assessed by RZS, even though their development may fall within a 'normal' range 
when the severity of their VI is taken into account (Reynell, 1978). This is generally problematic 
when utilizing a typically developing control group by which to make comparisons. Hence, in 
order to achieve successful developmental matching, the raw scores were retained as they gave 
a direct access to the performance levels the children achieved. 
The raw score profiles for the overall sample are summarised in Table 6.6. Here, it can be seen 
that there was a significant difference between the groups in chronological age (omnibus test: F 
(2,46) = 7.909; P s; .001; individual post hoc tests: PVI vs. Sighted: t (31) = 3.56, P s; .001; PVI vs. 
SVI: t (30) = 1.781, P = .085; and SVI vs. Sighted t (31) = 2.52, P = .017) and sensory-motor 
understanding (omnibus test: F (2. 46) = 4.301; p = .019; individual post hoc tests: PVI vs. Sighted: 
t (31) = - 2. 68, p = .012; PVI vs. SVI: t (30) = -1.17, P = .105; and SVI vs. Sighted t (31) = -1.401, P = 
.171). However, there was no difference between the groups on verbal comprehension (F (2, 46) = 
.120; p = .887) and expressive language (F (2, 39) = .305; P = .739). Relatively equal verbal ability 
profiles in the three groups of participants suggest successful matching on verbal mental age. 
Gender was also found to be equally distributed across the groups (X2 (2) = .759; P = .684). 
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Table 6.6: Matching characteristics of the sample 
Matching criteria PVI SVI Sighted p value 
N=16 N= 16 N=17 (F test) 
Chronological age (in months) 
Mean (SO) 32.2 (10.9) 26.6 (6.1) 20.2 (8.3) .001 
Gender ratio 
Girls/Boys 7/9 8/8 10/7 .684 
Reynell- Zinkin (raw scores) 
Sensory-motor understanding (SMU) 
Mean (SO) 12.7 (4.3) 14.9 (3.2) 16.9 (4.6) .019 
Verbal comprehension (VC) 
Mean (SO) 13.2 (6.6) 14.1 (5.4) 14.2 (7.8) .887 
Expressive language (structure) (ELS) 
Mean (SO) 12.7 (4.8) 12.8 (3.7) 11.7 (4.9) .739 
Administration of RZS took approximately 30 minutes per child. All the assessments were video 
recorded with a signed parental consent. 
Observational data 
The administration of the RZS scale items is flexible and allows for naturalistic aspects of the joint 
play within which it is carried out. This semi-standardised context was chosen for the current 
observational coding of attention-related responses as the assessor during the assessment has 
to make frequent attentional demands on the child in terms of gaining child's attention on the test 
items (i.e., toy material), maintaining child's attention on the toys and the task, and shifting child's 
attention between different test items. 
Equal testing conditions, as far as possible, were ensured across the three groups, in terms of i) 
the cognitive and/or linguistic demands they required from each child; ii) the toy materials 
presented to the children during the play interactions with an adult; and iii) the adult directing 
behaviours, which were adapted to individual children's vision levels. With regards to the adult 
directing behaviours, for example, where a toy may be introduced to a sighted child primarily 
through visual means, for a child with VI the adult uses a combination of verbal commentary (e.g., 
'Look, what I've got here!'), auditory stimulation (e.g., shaking or winding the toy to make a sound 
or tapping it on the table) and touch (e.g., tapping the toy on the back of the child's hand). 
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In order to further maximize the standardised quality of the play interactions across the sample for 
coding purposes, five standardised structured-play episodes were selected from the videotaped 
RZS assessments for their consistency of presentation across the children (Appendix D1). The 
average time taken for the five scenarios was approximately 20 minutes per child. During these 
scenarios, when children were introduced various toys to engage with, the experimenter scored 
the ease or difficulty that the child had in following the attentional demands of the adult by 
selecting the type of attentional behaviour of interest (below) and judging how successful the child 
was in responding to the adult's attempt to elicit that behaviour (Appendix D2). 
Establishing was defined as a child's ability to respond to adult's attempt to gain the child's 
attention onto the toy material when the child is not attending to the adult or object of relevance. 
For each scenario, one of three possible success codes was given: Immediately successful (2), 
Successful with difficulty (i.e., requiring more prompting by the adult) (1), and Unsuccessful (0). 
An Establish score was calculated by summing the success codes over the 5 scenarios and 
converting this into a percentage of the maximum possible establish score (i.e., 10). For the 
majority of children the number of scenarios was five. However, owing to technical difficulties 
(e.g., child being obscured by adult in the video, or child moving outside the video framework), 
not all of the 5 scenarios were available for some children (n = 5). Thus, the establish score for 
these children represented the summed scenario codes as a percentage of the maximum 
possible establish score. 
Maintaining was defined as the child's ability to respond to adult's attempt to hold the child's 
attention onto toy material after the child's attention on a task had been established. For every 
scenario in which attention was established, one of three possible maintenance success codes 
was given: Continuous (2); Somewhat disrupted (1), and Disrupted (0). A Maintain score was 
then calculated by summing the success codes over the scenarios in which attention had been 
established and converting this into a percentage of the maximum possible maintain score (i.e., 2 
x the number of scenarios in which attention had been established). 
Shifting was defined as the child's ability to respond to the adult's attempt to shift the child's 
attention from an object the child was engaged with to a novel object. For every scenario in which 
attention was maintained (after successful establishment of attention), one of three possible 
shifting success codes was given: Immediately successful (2), Successful with difficulty (1), 
Unsuccessful (0). A Shift score was then calculated by summing the success codes over the 
scenarios in which attention had been established and maintained and converting this into a 
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percentage of the maximum possible maintain score (Le., 2 x the number of scenarios in which 
attention had been established and maintained). Table 6.7 below summarises the frequency of 
participant's data upon which the Establish, Maintain and Shift scores were calculated. 
Table 6.7: Distribution of the number of valid instances upon which Establish, Maintain and Shift 
scores were calculated for the 49 children (VI and Sighted) 
Number of valid Number of children 
instances Establish Maintain Shift 
(i.e., scenarios) (based on scenarios) (based on established) (based on maintained) 
0 2 
1 
2 1 2 4 
3 2 2 5 
4 2 3 9 
5 44 42 29 
Reliability was calculated by an independent coder who was unaware of the hypotheses of the 
study, for 12 randomly selected children (4 per vision group, 24.5% of the videos in total). The 
inter-rater Pearson correlations were r = .93, r = .75 and r = .72, for the Establish, Maintain and 
Shift categories respectively. 
This coding system made it possible to view the children's performance on three attentional 
components independently. However it must be borne in mind that the scores children achieved 
on Maintaining were based on fewer scenarios than those they achieved on Establishing and in 
turn, the same was for Shifting. For instance, due to poor scores on Maintaining, two children in 
the PVI group could not be scored on Shifting and were excluded from subsequent analyses 
including this component. 
General procedure 
Each child was assessed by one assessor, in a quiet testing room in the presence of one or both 
parents. They were sat at a small table facing the assessor. The children with VI were assessed 
by a consultant clinical psychologist or a consultant developmental paediatrician at DVC as part 
of a clinical assessment which also included a paediatric assessment of functional vision. The 
assessors were unaware of the purpose of the study, which was conceived retrospectively. The 
sighted group was assessed by the PhD researcher, trained to administer the RZS by the 
consultant clinical psychologist who assessed the majority of the children in the VI group. 
177 
RESULTS 
The attention data were not normally distributed and the variances between the three groups 
were heterogeneous enough to warrant the use of non parametric alternatives to test the 
between-subjects differences and relationships between the variables in the study. 
Between-group comparisons 
Table 6.8 shows the mean percentage scores the three groups of children achieved when they 
responded to adult-directed attention broken down into the three components. It is evident that 
these young children showed good sensitivity to being directed by an adult in general, 
considering that the majority of children in all three groups achieved relatively high percentage 
scores (see also Figures 6.4,6.5 and 6.6). However, the direction of the group means (Table 6.8) 
suggests a difference between the three groups on all three attention categories, with a trend 
towards lower scores increasing with severity of visual impairment. 
Table 6.8: Performance (%) on the three attention components for the three vision groups 
Measure PVI SVI Sighted p value (F test) 
Mean (SOl 
Establish 79.4 (20.5) 89.4 (12.4) 98.2 (7.27) 
.001 
Maintain 67.03 (32.45) 80.26 (16.59) 92.94 (7.72) 
.016 
Shift 80.29 (20.95) a 93.28 (18.72) 96.91 (6.09) 
.007 
a Missing N = 2 
As the attention data were negatively skewed in the three groups and the variances between the 
groups were largely heterogeneous (with the heterogeneity increasing with the severity of visual 
impairment) the Rank Transformation approach advocated by Conover and Iman (1981) was 
adopted as a more appropriate alternative to a parametric analysis. This approach does not 
depend on normal distribution. Hence, in order to address Q1, the scores that the children 
obtained on the three attention categories were transformed into rank order prior to running three 
separate 1-way ANOVAs. 
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Figure 6.4: Establish performance (%) of individual children in each group 
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Figure 6.5: Maintain performance (%) of individual children in each group 
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Figure 6.6: Shift performance (%) of individual children in each group 
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Firstly, an ANOVA showed a highly significant difference on establishing adult directed attention 
on toys between the three groups of children (F (2, 48) = 10. 909, P s; .001) (01). It is important to 
note that, equal variances were not assumed for this or any of the following F and t tests. Planned 
contrasts, comparing the three groups individually (02), significantly distinguished each VI group 
as being significantly poorer at establishing adult directed attention than the sighted children in 
the study (PVI: t (21.95) = -4.395, P s; .001; SVI: t (25.6) = -3.903, p S; .001). However despite the 
directions of the scores illustrated in Figure 6.4, the children with PVI and the children with SVI in 
the study were not significantly different from one another (t (28.3) = - 1.037, P = 0.309, d = -.57). 
A separate 1-way ANOVA also showed significantly different performance on maintaining adult 
directed attention on toys between the three groups (F (2, 48) = 4.551, P = .016) (01), and similar to 
the scores in the establish category, individual contrasts revealed that the sighted children 
obtained significantly higher scores at maintaining adult directed attention than did the children 
with PVI (t (23.34) = - 2.693, P = .013, d = - 1.09) or the children with SVI (t (28.1) = - 2.757, P = .01). 
The PVI and SVI groups did not differ between each other (t (27.6) = - .436, p = .67, d = - 0.51) 
(02). 
Finally, a 1-way ANOVA revealed a significant between-group difference on how well children 
shifted adult-directed attention (F (2, 46) = 5.513, P s; .007) (01). Interestingly based on the 
individual planned contrasts, the children with PVI were significantly poorer at shifting adult 
directed attention than both the SVI (t (24.5) = - 2.538, p = .018, d = - 0.64) and sighted children in 
the study (t (22.25) = - 2.837, P = .01), whereas children with SVI were not significantly different 
from the sighted (t (29.92) = - .210, P = .835, d = - 0.27) (02). 
Relationship between variables 
Due to the relatively small group sizes, as well as the prevalence of ceiling scores for attention, it 
was decided that the non-parametric correlational analyses (i.e., Spearman's rho p) would be 
more appropriate for the current data. Table 6.9 summarizes the Spearman coefficients for the 
correlations testing the potential relationship between the attentional outcomes and children'S 
developmental levels (i.e., chronological ages and scores on the RZS scales) (03), as well as for 
the correlations between the scores relating to the three attentional components (04). For clarity, 
these correlations are described further in subsequent paragraphs for each vision group 
separately. 
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Table 6.9: Spearman coefficients for correlations between age, cognitive characteristics and 
attention components in the three groups 
Age SMU VC EL (Sl Establish Maintain Shift 
Age PVI .264 .368 .805** .035 -.103 -.164 
SVI .428 .520 .552 -.204 -.096 -.345 
Sighted .978** .972** .976** -.128 -.507 .006 
SMU PVI .959** .780** .376 .497 .637 
SVI .663** .720** .041 .136 -.146 
Sighted .960** .975** -.179 -.490 .061 
VC PVI .854** .354 .493 .493 
SVI .899** .033 .011 -.262 
Sighted .962** -. 154 -.480 .023 
EL (S) PVI .337 .382 .330 
SVI -.108 -.239 -.219 
Sighted -.102 -.485 .048 
Establish PVI .750** .549 
SVI .423 .542 
Sighted .388 -.137 
Maintain PVI .498 
SVI .367 
Sighted .089 
Shifting PVI 
SVI 
Si9hted 
Red - PVI; Green - SVI ; Blue- Sighted; ** - significant at p s .01 
Sighted children 
Even though the sighted children were significantly younger than the children with VI , their 
attention was easy to gain and modify, so much so that their attention behaviour scores were 
virtually at ceiling level (Figures 6.4. 6.5 and 6.6). Unfortunately, this meant that it was 
methodologically problematic to analyse their attention scores through correlations and their 
performance needs to be interpreted with caution when compared on a statistical basis to either 
of the two VI groups. However, sighted children's chronological ages were significantly correlated 
with RZS subtest performance, in terms of SMU (p = .978, p S .001, n = 17), VC (p = .972, p S 
.001 , n = 17), and EL(S) (p = .976, p S .001 , n = 17), and their scores on the three RZS subtests 
correlated with one another (p coefficients = .960, .962, .975, p S .001, n = 17). The sighted 
children's ages and cognitive characteristics on the RZS also correlated with maintaining of 
attention, with the negative direction of the correlation suggesting that the younger children (and 
subsequently, children with lower RZS raw scores) were better at maintaining adult-directed 
attention; however, the prevalence of ceiling scores on the attention measures makes it difficult to 
further interpret attention-related correlations in the sighted group. 
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Children with PVI 
The PVI group showed a greater heterogeneity of responses in all three categories of attention 
than any other group. Here, the ease with which children established adult-directed attention 
correlated highly with how well they maintained (p = .750, P :5 .001, n = 16) and in turn shifted 
attention (p = .549, P = .042, n = 14). However the children's scores on maintaining and shifting of 
attention did not appear to be correlated, despite a very strong trend (p = .498, p= .07, n = 14). 
Interestingly, the ease with which the children maintained and shifted their attention was 
positively associated with their cognitive ability; the children's scores on sensory motor 
understanding were significantly correlated with how well they maintained attention (p = 0.497, P 
= .05, n = 16) and how well they shifted attention (p = .637, P = .014, n = 14). With regards to 
their language ability, there was a possible association between the children's verbal 
comprehension and how well they maintained attention (p = .493, p = .052, n = 16) and the 
correlation between verbal comprehension and how well children shifted attention showed a trend 
(p = .493, P = .073, n = 14). Similar to the Sighted group, the PVI children's sensory motor 
understanding, and receptive and expressive language were correlated with one another (p = 
.959, p :5.001, n = 16; P = 0.780, P = .003, n = 12; and p = .854, P :5 .001, n = 12). However, only 
the children's expressive language scores correlated with their chronological ages (p = .805, p 
=.002, n = 12). 
Children with SVI 
In the SVI group, the ease with which children established adult directed attention correlated with 
how well they shifted attention (p = .542, P = .03, n = 16), whereas maintaining of attention 
appeared to be unrelated to either establishing or shifting of attention. These children's attention 
behaviours did not correlate with any of their cognitive characteristics. However, there was a 
significant relationship between all of the aspects within the children's cognitive profiles, as their 
scores on the three RZS subtests (SMU, VC, ELS) were highly correlated with one another (p = 
.663, P = .005 , n = 16; P = .720, P = .006, n = 13; and p = .899, p:5 .001, n = 13). Children's 
cognitive characteristics seemed to an extent to be associated to their chronological ages. Age 
was found to be correlated with verbal comprehension (p = .520, P = .039, n = 16) and expressive 
language (p = .552, P = .05, n = 13), whereas the correlation between age and sensory motor 
understanding was a trend (p = .428, p = .098, n = 16). 
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Association of attentional processes and low IQ in children with VI 
The positive association of certain cognitive characteristics and some of the attentional 
components in children with PVI raised a question of whether their overall performance may have 
been related to the presence of children with low IQ in this group (Q3). Given also that the groups 
differed significantly in their sensory-motor understanding it was important to address potential 
contribution of intellectual impairment to the attention performance in the present sample. 
Developmental delay is a common characteristic of the VI population. For that reason, the 
children with low IQ were not removed from the initial analyses, in order to retain the variance that 
is inherent in the presentation of congenital VI and illustrate the factors underlying the particular 
patterns of attentional responses shown by both the children with PVI and those with SVI in this 
research. However, in the second set of analyses, in order to account for potential confounding 
effect of intellectual impairment, it was decided to identify those children with VI who showed a 
cognitive delay both in the areas of sensory-motor understanding and verbal comprehension. The 
children's developmental levels (i.e., normal or delayed) were determined by deriving a 
Developmental Quotient (DQ), which is calculated based on the ratio of the children's raw-score 
age equivalents on the appropriate RZS norms (i.e., Blind, Partially Sighted or Sighted) and their 
actual chronological ages (Dale & Sonksen, 2002). Following from this, 'delayed' status does not 
imply a developmental delay by sighted norms, but the fact that the child's cognitive ability is at a 
lower lever than what would be expected even when the degree of their visual impairment is 
accounted for. In the study by Sonksen and Dale (2002) a cut-off of 80 was used to identify 
children with a cognitive delay. However, based on their findings as well as their clinical 
observations, these authors argued that the RZS overestimated the developmental levels of 
children with VI. Following from this, it was decided to adopt a more conservative cut-off of < 90 
for the purpose of the present research. Based on this cut-off, 7 out of 16 children in the PVI 
group were found to show developmental delay compared to 3 out of 16 in the SVI group (all of 
the children considered as developmentally delayed had DQ < 90 both in SMU and VC). 
Furthermore, the children with VI were divided into two groups, depending on whether they were 
performing in line with or below the level of sighted children on the three attention measures. To 
categorise children in this way, the 50th percentile of the sighted group was taken as a reference 
point because it corresponded to the ceiling performance achieved by the majority of the sighted 
sample. More specifically, 94% of sighted children were at or above this cut-off on Establishing, 
82 % on Maintaining, and 76% on Shifting (see Figures 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6). Thus, this cut-off was 
used as a benchmark against which the performance of children with VI could be compared. 
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Importantly, while this cut-off was helpful in describing the children's performance in the present 
study, it must be treated with caution and is recommended that more sensitive measures should 
be developed in the future. 
Table 6.10 shows that there were nearly equal numbers of children with low IQ and those who 
were not cognitively delayed in the PVI group. However, it can also be seen that low scores on all 
three attentional components were not found solely in the children with PVI who are cognitively 
delayed. Moreover, at least 40% of children with PVI (i.e., 67% in Establishing; 44% in 
Maintaining and 50% in Shifting) whose DQ was considered to be in the normal range, scored 
below the 50th percentile of the Sighted group on all three attentional components. 
Table 6.10: Number of children with PVI with and without developmental delay - a comparison 
with the near (or at) ceiling performance cut-off of sighted children 
Establish cut-off Maintain cut-off Shift cut-off a 
at/above below at/above below at/above below 
OQ normal 3 6 5 4 4 4 
delayed 2 5 6 1 5 
aMissing data, n=2 
With regards to the children with SVI (Table 6.11), even though 81 % of children were within 
normal IQ range, a considerable number of those children scored below the 50th percentile cut-off 
in the Establish (69%) and Maintain category (54%), as well as a small percentage in the Shift 
category (23%). Additionally, out of three developmentally delayed children in this group, at least 
one child scored aUabove the 50th percentile on all three attention components. This further 
confirms that lower attention scores are not confined to developmentally delayed children, nor is 
the higher attentional performance seen only in children with VI of normallQ. 
Table 6.11: Number of children with SVI with and without developmental delay - a comparison 
with the near (or at) ceiling performance cut-off of sighted children 
OQ normal 
delayed 
Establish cut-off 
at/above 
4 
1 
below 
9 
2 
Maintain cut-off 
at/above 
6 
below 
7 
2 
Shift cut-off 
at/above 
10 
2 
below 
3 
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DISCUSSION 
The first question this investigation attempted to address was whether children with congenital VI 
experience attentional difficulties in their early years of life. When compared to typically 
developing sighted children with the same verbal comprehension ability, the present research has 
indeed shown that VI, especially if profound, does significantly reduce the capacity of a young 
child to regulate their attention between people and objects, in terms of establishing, maintaining 
and shifting attention. However, the current findings also indicate that lack of vision does not 
provide a sufficient explanation for why attentional processes of some children with VI are not as 
proficient as those of children who are sighted. Indeed, not only is the overall attention 
performance of the children with VI appears relatively good, a number of children both with PVI 
and SVI have shown ceiling performance, matching the level of children who are sighted. 
Crucially, this illustrates that certain attentional control is possible to achieve through other, non-
visual, modalities. This is an important insight in light of known concerns about joint attention in 
this population. Hence, the findings support the idea of intervention as they highlight the 
developmental potential that should be capitalised on using alternative non-visual techniques 
(Dale & Salt, 2007). 
The second question concerned the severity of VI and whether the attentional processes in young 
children with VI would vary according to vision level. The current findings were not clear cut. 
Contrary to other studies, where SVI has been associated with better developmental outcomes 
than PVI, the current findings suggest that at this developmental stage (i.e., pre-school and 
mainly pre-lingual) establishing and maintaining adult-directed attention is not different between 
children with SVI and PVI and is less well developed than in children who are sighted. It seems 
that the limited form vision in children with SVI is not a fully protective factor, implying that certain 
attentional outcomes in early childhood may be particularly sensitive to reduced vision. However, 
the findings also suggest that the available form vision of children with SVI may serve a protective 
factor in their ability to shift adult-directed attention, as this was in line with the ability of sighted 
children. This confirms the importance of the early promotion of functional vision to achieve form 
vision, wherever possible, in children with VI (Sonksen et aI., 1991). Nevertheless, the current 
contrasting findings highlight that, despite the more promising developmental results, children 
with SVI should still be considered a vulnerable population. 
The third research question concerned the relationship between attentional outcomes in children 
with VI and their general cognitive functioning. The present findings suggest that the 
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developmental levels of the children with VI in this study must at least to some extent account for 
their attentional performance. With regards to children with PVI, the demands of having to 
maintain attention on toys and then flexibly shift this focus while being guided by an adult were 
related to what can be considered their performance ability level (SMU) and to an extent their 
verbal comprehension. However, even though higher IQ may equip a child with VI with a tool for 
dealing with attentional demands, the lower attentional performance seen in some of the children 
with VI in this study cannot be attributed solely to their lower developmentalleve/' This is because 
lower attentional responses are not confined entirely to the low IQ group and a number of children 
with VI whose IQ is in the normal range showed lower attentional performance than some of the 
children with VI who are cognitively delayed. This double dissociation between IQ and attentional 
performance seems to suggest the independence of attention processing. 
However, it must be noted that the present VI sample may have included some children with 
developmental setback in terms of their cognitive and language levels. The 'setback' (i.e. 
plateauing and/or loss of cognitive and language skills) has been identified by previous research 
studies as a serious developmental outcome in VI population, occurring in the second and third 
year of life, with a higher proportion of children with PVI (33.3%) than SVI (3%) being affected 
(Cass et a/., 1994; Dale & Sonksen, 2002). The age range of the children with VI in the present 
study covers the period when the setback is first behaviourally manifested. Hence, based on 
previous research statistics, it is likely that the present VI sample may have included some 
children with setback, although it is not yet possible to identify them cross-sectionally. 
It is important to emphasise some methodological limitations of the current experiment, relating 
not only to potentially low statistical power due to the small sample size, but also to the lack of 
variation and presence of the ceiling scores, which relate directly to the coding system that was 
used here. The limitation of the current coding schedule to produce variant responses perhaps 
echoes the challenge of attempting to devise a reliable coding measure, which takes the non-
visual behaviours of a child with VI into account. By comparison, attention coding protocols used 
in studies with sighted groups of children frequently relied on vision and gaze behaviours to 
measure attentional capacity and control (Corkum & Moore, 1998; Leekam et a/., 2000; 
Swettenham et a/., 1998). Visual experimental stimuli as well as visually-driven attentional 
responses may not only be easier to measure and code, they may testify that certain attentional 
regulation can only be achieved by visual means, and this may partly account for the ceiling 
performance of sighted children in our study. In fact, it has been shown that sighted infants as 
young as 10-12 months are able to reliably use another person's head turn and eye-gaze to 
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locate targets even when the targets are not visible in the visual field (Corkum & Moore, 1998), 
signifying the beginnings of being able to engage in joint attention. The ceiling performance of the 
sighted children (age range 10-36 months) in this study may therefore not be surprising. 
Unfortunately, the prevalence of ceiling scores precludes us from drawing firm conclusions. With 
regards to the comparisons of the children with SVI and sighted children, we cannot be sure if the 
sighted children could have performed even higher if other measures of attention were 
incorporated in the study. Similarly, the apparent result suggesting no significant difference 
between the groups of children with PVI and SVI in establishing and maintaining attention, 
despite the directions of the means, may have indeed been due to the prevalence of the ceiling 
scores in both groups, and in particular preventing us from seeing if the children with SVI could 
potentially score even higher. Relating to this, we must bear in mind also the possible attrition in 
scores, as the children's Maintaining scores were based on fewer scenarios than their 
Establishing scores, and in turn their Shifting scores were based on fewer scenarios than the 
Maintaining scores. 
Despite the methodological difficulties outlined above, the findings relating to different attentional 
components do seem to be in line with current models of attention (Mirsky et aI., 1991; Posner & 
Petersen, 1990). According to these models the three attentional components are functionally 
related; however they are mediated by distinct brain regions, implying that dissociation between 
different attentional processes may not be surprising. Indeed, despite the prevalence of ceiling 
scores in the two VI groups (especially in establishing) the correlational analyses indeed suggest 
some dissociation between ability to maintain and shift attention in both the children with PVI and 
those with SVI. It is plausible to suggest that the shifting component of attention may particularly 
be perceptually driven, when compared to the process of establishing and maintaining attentional 
focus. When an adult in interaction brings in a novel toy, a child with SVI may be able to benefit 
from the visual cues of the whole object required for flexible perceptual reaction to novel stimulus. 
This visually-driven advantage, however, may not be sufficient to secure attention on the toy 
offered by an adult and hold that attention while being adult-guided. More specifically, the vision 
available may not be sufficient to identify what the object is or to see details of the object which 
might capture the child's continuing interest. This may explain why the ability of children with SVI 
to establish attention on toys is not in line with the ability of those children who are sighted. 
Furthermore, successful maintaining of attention, which is possibly the most socially driven of the 
attentional components in joint interaction, may be particularly difficult for any visually impaired 
child, since it requires shared attention to an object on which the child is focussing. Arguably, 
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sustaining attention on a toy, while being guided by an adult, is facilitated by a level of vision that 
allows for eye-gaze monitoring, eye-contact and facial expression recognition. This indeed may 
further explain the performance of the SVI group in the current study, as in the absence of joint 
visual attentional cues and gaze behaviours, children with SVI may be at a similar disadvantage 
as children with PVI. 
In summary, the present findings suggest that significant VI in childhood reduces the child's early 
attentional capacity and control, with those children whose VI is of greater severity (i.e., PVI) and 
those with lower cognitive levels being particularly vulnerable. Importantly, however, it seems that 
neither vision nor general cognitive level can fully account for the present pattern of findings. This 
is because poorer attention performance was not confined to children with VI who had lower 
levels of intelligence. Similarly, reduced attentional performance was not seen only in children 
with PVI, and some children with SVI showed poor attentional outcomes, even on attention 
shifting. This pattern of findings is in line with the findings in Part 1, where cognitively advanced 
children with varying levels of VI showed significantly poorer EF outcomes (notably in the domain 
of cognitive shifting) than a developmentally matched sighted group, with a certain proportion of 
children obtaining scores of clinical significance. It is possible that the difficulties at the level of 
executive functioning at school age reflect early vulnerability in attention development. This 
hypothesis is addressed in the following section, where connections between Part 1 and Part 2 
are made. 
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PART 3: LONGITUDINAL CONNECTION BETWEEN EARLY ATTENTION AND LATER 
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN CHILDREN WITH CONGENITAL VI 
INTRODUCTION 
The children who took part in the research presented in Part 1 also participated in the research 
presented in Part 2.22 This means that longitudinal connections between the two investigations 
could potentially be made. With this in mind, it is important to emphasise that the coding and 
analyses of attentional data in Part 2 had been carried out before the BRIEF ratings were 
obtained at school age, so the analyses of the BRIEF data had no bearing on the results relating 
to attentional processes. 
Because of the small sample at the follow-up stage (Part 1) it was not possible to examine the 
longitudinal performance of the VI group cross-sectionally, separating those with PVI (who were 
fewer in numbers at the follow-up) and SVI. Further difficulty arose from the lack of variation and 
the ceiling effect associated with the attentional data, making it statistically difficult to connect this 
data to the children's later outcomes, which were more varied. However, establishing connections 
between the early attentional outcomes in the present VI sample, and their later executive 
function behaviours may have important clinical and developmental implications, particularly as 
very few longitudinal studies with children with VI exist. 
Theoretically, it is expected that both the early attentional behaviours and the later executive 
function behaviours (i.e., BRIEF scores) are based on the same underlying processes (see the 
introductory section of this chapter). Hence, it would not be surprising to find a number of 
significant negative correlations between the children's outcomes at the two time points. 
However, it was of specific interest to test the hypothesis predicting the relationship between the 
aUentional shifting in the early years of the VI group, and their performance on the Shift 
component on the BRIEF, which is defined by cognitive flexibility and deployment of attention. 
22 It is worth mentioning that one child with SVI from the present VI sample of 15 children (Le., participant 10: 25) was 
not included in the research in Part 2, in order to achieve successful developmental matching between the participant 
groups. However, her data on attention behaviours was available and was included in the analyses presented here. 
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RESULTS 
Spearman's coefficients resulting from correlational analyses are presented in Table 6.12. First, it 
is worth noting that the early ability to establish and maintain adult-directed attention was found to 
be uncorrelated with any of the BRIEF behaviours at school age. On the contrary, as predicted, 
ability to shift adult-directed attention in early development was found to be negatively correlated 
with the Shift, although only at a p =:; .05 level (p = -.570; P = 033, n = 14). The Initiate scale on 
the BRIEF at school age was also found to be highly correlated with the early attention shifting (p 
= -.674; P = 008, n = 14). Interestingly, it may also be worth noting that there were trends towards 
a significant negative correlation with Emotional Control (p = -.488; P = 077, n = 14) and the 
Behavioural Regulation Index (p = -.491; P = 074, n = 14). 
Table 6.12: Spearman coefficients between the children's early attentional performance and their 
BRIEF ratings at school age 
Establish Maintain Shift 
Inhibit -.036 .075 -.250 
Shift .006 .144 -.570 
Emotional Control -.240 -.071 -.488 
BRI -.082 .130 -.491 
Initiate -.342 -.313 -,674** 
Working Memory .114 .039 -.180 
Plan / Organise -.146 -.396 -.336 
Organisation of Materials .008 -.262 .145 
Monitor -.197 -.057 -.056 
MI -.003 -.025 -.025 
GEC -.178 -.309 -.361 
** - significant at p s 0.01 
Although interpretation of these results requires caution, it is intriguing to establish a potential 
association between attention shifting in early childhood and those BRIEF domains which, at 
school age, differentiated the VI group from sighted children as having significantly more 
behavioural difficulties. The scatter graphs below (Figures 6.7 and 6.8), showing individual 
children's data points, graphically illustrate the negative correlations between attention shifting 
and the Shift and Initiate BRIEF scales, and show that those children who in fact scored below 
ceiling on the shift component (and did not match the performance of the majority of the sighted 
comparison group in pre-school period) were the ones who were more likely to show elevated 
scores on the two BRIEF domains later in childhood. Remarkably, the same non-parametric 
correlations remain significant at p =:; .05 level even after the outlier child (10: 17) is removed from 
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the analyses (Attention Shift and BRIEF Shift: p = -.606; P = 028, n = 13; Attention Shift and 
BRIEF Initiate: p = -.626; P = 022, n = 13). Based on these findings, it is plausible to suggest that 
the measure of attention shifting tapped the same processes as those involved in specific BRIEF 
domains, lending some support to the attention coding methodology in Part 2. 
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The present findings are the first to date to provide evidence relating to neuro-cognitive 
processes of executive functioning and attention of children with congenital VI. In Part 1, it was 
found that, in the school-age period of development (Le., 6-12 years), children with congenital VI 
with normal verbal intelligence showed irregular profiles of everyday executive function 
behaviours, with the domains of cognitive shifting, emotional regulation, initiating and monitoring 
emerging as areas of weakness. A potential explanation for the lower levels of ability in these 
particular EF domains in children with VI is that the functioning of these domains may be 
mediated by, although not dependent on, visual perception. This is because visual perception 
may be facilitative to the functioning of the systems (i.e., attention) that provide higher-level 
executive control of cognitive actions and behaviours. 
In relation to this, in Part 2, an observational investigation of early attentional processes of young 
children with VI (including also the children with VI who participated in research in Part 1) was 
carried out. The results revealed that early attention may be a risk factor for some children with 
VI, particularly those with lower cognitive levels and whose VI is of greater severity. However, 
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although related to general cognitive functioning, reduced attentional capacity and control was not 
found to be exclusive to children with low IQ and children whose VI is of greater severity. This 
may explain why in Part 1, some children with SVI in their early years and at normal levels of 
intelligence showed behavioural difficulties in broader executive functioning at school age. 
These findings received some support from the findings in Part 3, where a longitudinal 
examination between early attentional and later executive functioning outcomes unearthed some 
significant correlations. More specifically, in the present sample of children with varying levels of 
VI and with verbal intelligence that is within the normal range, those children who showed poorer 
ability to shift adult-directed attention in their early childhood also seemed to show higher levels of 
behavioural problems in the area of cognitive shifting and initiation at school age, as reported by 
their parents. These findings seem to lend support to the measures of attention behaviours 
developed for this study. More importantly, the findings imply that, in some children with VI, early 
vulnerability in attention development, specifically in terms of attention shifting, may be a potential 
marker for long-term difficulties in certain executive functions. 
What are the general implications of such findings? With regards to executive function behaviours 
at school age, it is important to emphasise that the scores of clinical significance were present 
only in some children with VI. Additionally, the areas of specific weakness were not consistent 
across the group, and varied across different executive functions measured by the BRIEF. 
Hence, it is clear that specific executive 'dysfunctions' are not a universal feature of the VI 
population. However, given the differences with the sighted group, visual impairment does seem 
to impose a degree of vulnerability in these processes, the impact of which may be evident very 
early on in development (i.e., in early attention). Considering this vulnerability may be crucial in 
furthering our understanding of autistic-like presentation in this population. 
Firstly, reduced functions in specific executive domains (e.g., shifting) may provide an explanation 
for certain behavioural patterns seen in children with VI, like repetitive and stereotyped 
behaviours and restricted interests23 . Second, such behaviours, as well as underlying EF 
difficulties, may be a concurrent outcome of the primary socio-developmental vulnerability that is 
associated with significant vision loss in childhood. Understanding of the children's early attention 
23 It is important to emphasise that certain behavioural characteristics in this domain (e.g., stereotypies or 'blindisms' 
such as eye-poking) are considered to be normal and unique to VI population (Cass, 1998), although the elevated 
levels in a wider presentation of perseverative, repetitive and sterotyped behaviours may have clinical significance. 
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development may prove useful in unpacking the nature of this vulnerability in children with VI, as 
well as its potentially complex relationship with overall executive functioning. Involvement of 
attention in both executive and social processes has been a recurrent theme throughout this 
chapter, and it is easy to appreciate how the early disruptions to its visual manifestations (e.g., 
eye-gaze cueing, directing and following) may be detrimental to the development of higher-order 
social and cognitive functions later on (e.g., executive control and theory of mind), both in children 
with VI and in children with normally developing vision (i.e., as evident from sighted children with 
autism). However, with regards to children with VI in particular, it is possible that these early 
vulnerabilities in individual children may need to interact uniquely with the influences of other 
variables (e.g., socio-environmental and neurological factors, as well as general intelligence 
levels and the severity of vision loss) to determine the severity of the autism-like picture that is 
seen later in childhood in this population. To capture the aspects of such potential interactions, 
the performance of individual children is considered in the following chapter through correlational 
analyses across the various measures reported so far and additional qualitative observations. 
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Chapter 7 
Cross-study considerations 
SUMMARY 
The goal of this chapter was to consider the relationships between the outcomes that were 
examined in the empirical chapters thus far. This was to help sum up the developmental picture 
provided by the current sample of children with congenital VI throughout this thesis. First, specific 
research questions were raised regarding the connections between the children's pre-school 
language and attentional outcomes (i.e., the data presented in the Part 2 of Chapter 6) and their 
developmental patterns obtained from their assessments at school age (Chapters 3 - 6). Then, 
specific relationships were considered across the outcomes obtained at school age. 
Subsequently, the findings presented in this chapter and their brief discussion helped to bring 
together the findings across the thesis before they are discussed in greater detail in the final 
discussion chapter. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the present chapter an attempt was made to provide some further correlational patterns across 
the experimental chapters thus far. Hence, specific questions arising from these chapters have 
been addressed as follows: 
Question 1 (Q1): Is structural language strength stable over time in children with VI? 
The findings in Chapter 3 demonstrated structural language strength of children with VI at school-
age. These findings are of particular significance in light of some early language irregularities and 
delays in structural language domain reported in other research studies (e.g., Andersen et aI., 
1984; McConachie & Moore, 1994). Hence, they support the idea that children with VI are able to 
overcome the early language concerns by middle childhood (e.g., Landau & Gleitman, 1995). For 
this reason, in this chapter it was of interest to determine if there is a longitudinal relationship 
between the early language and cognitive outcomes and later linguistic competence in the 
present VI sample of children. 
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Question 2 (Q2): Are early attentional behaviours markers of later socio-communicative 
competence in children with VI? 
Socio-communicative difficulties in children with VI have been attributed to the breakdown in joint 
attention in early childhood (Hobson, 1993; 2002), although the longitudinal relationship between 
early joint attention capacity and poor outcomes in social communication in later childhood in 
such children has not been established empirically. In fact, given its largely visual nature, very 
little is known about the developments of early joint attention in visual impairment. Research 
presented in Chapter 6 has offered some insight into these processes by highlighting some 
specific challenges in the ability to respond to adult-directed attention in pre-school children with 
VI. Similarly, the research in Chapter 3 has emphasised ongoing socio-communicative concern in 
a group of children with VI at school age, some of whom are the same children whose early 
attentional behaviours were assessed in Chapter 6. Therefore, it is helpful to determine if there is 
a potential longitudinal relationship between the early attentional behaviours in the present 
sample children with VI and their later socio-communicative outcomes. 
Question 3 (Q3): Are characteristics of mother-child discourse influenced by the child's own 
linguistic and socio-communicative competence? 
The findings in Chapter 5 emphasized some specific strengths of maternal language input to 
children with VI, and highlighted the potential contribution of sensitive and mind-minded language 
input provided by mothers to developing socio-cognitive knowledge of their children with VI. 
However, given that the children with VI in this research all have good and potentially advanced 
linguistic abilities, it remains uncertain if their mothers' language input is independent or is a 
reflection of the children's s own language ability and socio-communicative competence. For this 
reason, it was of interest to investigate a potential relationship between the mother's (as well as 
the child's) discourse characteristics during the joint-book reading task with the child's language 
and socio-communicative outcomes, although the causality of these factors may not be possible 
to establish at the present time. 
Question 4 (Q4): What evidence is there for the potential role of short-term memory in structural 
language skills of children with VI? 
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In Chapter 3, it was argued that the structural language strength in children with VI may, at least 
partly, be explained by their strong (potentially superior) short-term memory. Although the 
children with VI group did not excel at Digit Span, they showed superior performance on a test of 
verbal recall (i.e., Recalling Sentences), in comparison to their sighted peers. This performance 
was also found to correlate with the children's verbal IQ. Whilst unpacking the relationship 
between verbal ability and short-term memory in children with VI is likely to be difficult, here it was 
of interest to examine what other evidence is there to support it. Thus, the measures of structural 
language were correlated with the measure of working memory in a behavioural context (i.e., 
BRIEF). 
Question 5 (Q5): Can the pattern of stereotypical and repetitive behaviour and restricted interests 
in children with VI be explained in terms of specific executive function difficulties? 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the pattern of repetitive and stereotypical behaviours and restricted 
interests that characterise children with autism have been explained in terms of the children's 
difficulties at a level of executive functioning (Lopez, et aL, 2005). As similar behaviours have 
been observed in children with VI (in the current as well as in the previous research) it is plausible 
to suggest that their manifestation may be related to challenges with specific executive functions. 
Hence, it was of interest to investigate a potential relationship between the children's behavioural 
ratings on the BRIEF and the two socio-communicative checklists used in this research. Given 
the theoretical framework in the discussion of Part 1, Chapter 6, a particular focus was placed on 
the possible correlations between the cognitive flexibility component (i.e., Shift) on the BRIEF and 
the CCC-2 and the SCQ scales assessing stereotypical and repetitive behaviours, and restricted 
interests. 
Question 6 (Q6): Did the same children with VI who showed executive function difficulties also 
show poor socio-communicative outcomes? 
As discussed in Chapter 6, evidence from children with autism demonstrates that executive and 
social functions are not mutually exclusive. Thus, it is possible that those children with VI who 
show more behavioural difficulties in the domain of executive functioning are those with poorer 
socio-communicative outcomes. Here, it was of interest to test this hypothesis by examining if the 
same children with VI who showed clinically elevated scores on the behavioural rating of 
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executive function on the BRIEF also showed clinically significant scores on the behavioural 
ratings of social communication on the SCQ and the CCC-2. 
RESULTS 
Small sample size and high data variability imposed certain constraints on correlational data 
analyses. With this in mind, while Pearson coefficients were used to correlate the performance on 
all the structured assessment, Spearman coefficients were used on those occasions where 
structured assessments were correlated with proportional data. Additionally, given the issues of 
power, in some circumstances the correlations were carried out only on composite/index scores 
rather than on individual scales that make up those composites. 
In order to investigate stability of language competence over time in children with VI (Q1) 
correlational analyses were carried out between the language and cognitive outcomes at pre-
school age, as assessed by the Reynell-Zinkin Scales (RZS), and at the follow up stage in 
primary school years, as assessed by the WISC-III and the CELF-3. There was a potential issue 
with correlating the children's' performance on the RZS in their early development with their later 
language outcomes, as the RZS are not a standardised measure and provide only raw scores or 
age equivalents. In relation to this, as discussed previously (Chapter 6), Dale and Sonksen 
(2002) proposed a derivation of RZS developmental quotients (DQs), which can be calculated as 
a ratio of the children's raw-score based age equivalents on the appropriate RZS norms (i.e., 
Blind, Partially Sighted, or Sighted) and their chronological ages. The DQs are not without their 
problems, as they are, like raw scores and age equivalents, affected by differing developmental 
progress of children with differing vision levels. However, statistically they resemble scaled scores 
(by taking into account where the child's performance lies relative to their chronological age), so 
they were seen as a more appropriate measure for the current correlation analyses. 
Pearson's correlations were calculated between the DQs on the three RZS domains (i.e., 
Sensory Motor Understanding, Verbal Comprehension and Expressive Language Structure) that 
children were tested on between the ages 17-36 months and the scaled scores on the WISC-III 
and CELF-3 at school age (i.e., 6-12 years) (Q1). First, it may not be surprising to find a lack of 
correlations between the sensory-motor domain of the RZS, and the WISC-III and the CELF-3. 
This is because the latter tests are language-based, compared to the Sensory-Motor 
197 
Understanding scale of the RZS, which is performance-based. Second, no highly significant 
correlations (Le., p values :s .01) have been detected between the language outcomes at the two 
time points. However, it is interesting to point out that two correlations were significant at p :s .05 
between the children's early and later language outcomes, namely those concerning the two 
verbal domains on the RZS and the Word Associations on the CELF-3 (r = .588, P = .021, n = 15; 
r = .601, p = .030, n = 13). While it is not clear why only the Word Associations (i.e., test of verbal 
fluency) produced significant correlations between the RZS and the language-based measures in 
later development, these correlations are not surprising, given that Word Associations is a 
vocabulary-based test. However, in answer to Q1, those correlations suggest possible stability of 
verbal ability levels over time in this sample of children with VI, and imply that certain scales 
across different assessment measures are likely to tap the same linguistic/cognitive skills. 
Interestingly, the trend towards a significant correlation between the Verbal Comprehension OQ 
on RZS and Comprehension Scaled score on the WISC-III (r = .477, p = .072, n = 15), and the 
trend between the Expressive Language Structure OQ on RZS and Expressive Language 
Composite score on the CELF-3 (r = .524, P = .066, n = 13) may also be supportive of this 
pattern. 
With regards to addressing Q2, correlations between the children's early attentional performance 
and their scores on the measures of social communication (as assessed by the SCQ and the 
CCC-2) were calculated. Rather than examining the correlations with the individual CCC-2 
scales, the sums of scaled scores across the three broad CCC-2 domains (Structure, Pragmatics, 
Social) were used instead. Interestingly, no highly significant correlations (Le., p values :S .01) 
have been established between the early attentional performance and later socio-communicative 
outcomes. However, it is of importance to highlight a number of meaningful correlations found to 
be significant at p :S .05. First, the ability to establish adult-directed attention in preschool stages 
of development was positively related with the children's summed scaled scores on the CCC-2 
Social domain (p = .557, P = .039, n = 14). This suggests that the children with better attention 
establishing outcomes early on achieved more positive parental ratings in terms of their social 
competence later in childhood. Second, in line with this result was the negative correlation of 
attention establishing and the children's total SCQ scores (p = - .516, P = .049, n = 15), indicating 
that the better outcome on early attention establishing was related to lower incidence of socio-
communicative difficulties later in childhood. Importantly, it is worth noting that these non-
parametric correlations remained significant at the p :S .05 level after the outlier child (10: 17, see 
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Chapter 6, Part 3) was removed from the analyses (CCC-2: p = .564, P = .044, n = 13; and SCQ: 
p = - .556, P = .039, n = 14). 
In order to address Q3, correlations were calculated between the mother-child discourse 
outcomes in Chapter 5 and the children's language and their socio-communicative outcomes in 
Chapter 3. From Table 7.1 it can be seen that the mothers' mentalistic language use (potentially 
independent of their overall verbosity) was found to be related to the children's language 
competence, particularly in terms of their comprehension (i.e., mothers' Mental State proportion 
scores and the children's Receptive and Total Language on the CELF-3: p = .800, p = .002, n = 
12; and p = .733, P = .007, n = 12). Further correlations significant at p :5 .05 further support this 
pattern. Mothers' overall use of mentalistic language during the joint book-reading session was 
related to the children's VIQ levels on the WISC-III (p = .585, P = .046, n = 12), although this did 
not take into account the total number of elaborations produced by the mother. 
Additionally, the children's own mentalistic language during the joint book-reading session was 
found to be related to the children's VIQ levels on the WISC-III, although only at p < .05 (Child: p 
= .612, p = .035, n = 12). Even though this did not take into account the total number of 
elaborations produced by the child, it is possible that the total number of elaborations was not a 
factor in the relationship between children's verbal ability and their use of mentalistic elaborations, 
as their proportion Mental State scores correlated highly with their VIQ's (p = .720, p = .002, n = 
12). Interestingly, children's discourse during the book reading session appeared unrelated to 
their language performance on the CELF-3. Overall, this pattern of correlations suggests a 
general relationship between the quality of the mother-child conversational dialogue and the 
children's own language levels in the present VI sample (Q3). 
Importantly, both children's and mothers' mentalistic language during the joint book-reading task 
was correlated to the children's pragmatic and social competence on the CCC-2. As expected, 
the children's proclivity to use mental state language (i.e., Mental States proportion scores) 
appeared was correlated to their scores on the pragmatic CCC-2 domain (p = .639, P = .034, n = 
12). However, this may not be independent of their overall elaboration level, considering a trend 
with Mental States total score (p = .575, P = .065, n = 12). The same may be said for the mothers' 
language characteristics, given the correlations of their total number of Mental State elaborations, 
as well as their total number of all elaborations, with their children's pragmatic levels (p = .633, p 
= .036, n = 12; p = .629, p = .038, n = 12). Similarly, general proclivity to elaborate in both 
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children and mothers correlated with the children's social competence on the CCC-2 (p = .755, P 
= .007, n = 12; P = .687, P = .02, n = 12). Overall, in response to Q3, these findings imply that 
those children with VI who showed better pragmatic and social outcome on the CCC-2 were the 
ones whose mothers, as well as the children themselves, showed a greater tendency to elaborate 
on the book content, using also mentalistic language. 
Table 7.1: Spearman coefficients for the correlations between the mother-child discourse 
elements, and the children's language and socio-communicative outcomes 
Mother-child discourse Mother-child discourse 
Child Mother 
Mental Mental All Mental Mental All 
States States elaborations States States elaborations 
(total) (proportion) (total) (total) (proportion) (total) 
WISC·III 
VIO .612 .720** .262 .585 .067 .459 
CELF·3 
Receptive 
-.076 -.180 -.056 .095 .800** -.225 Language 
Expressive 
.196 .023 .216 .245 .459 .070 Language 
Total 
Language .177 .045 .125 .288 .733** .000 
SCQ 
Total -.145 -.075 -.171 -.158 .218 -.137 
CCC·2 
Structure .254 .428 .194 .205 -.310 .337 
Pragmatics .575 .639 .447 .633 -.196 .629 
Social .507 .263 .755** .572 -.206 .687 
•• - significant at p ::;.01 
With regards to Q4, correlations between the children's scores on Working Memory scale of the 
BRIEF and their scores on the structural language scales on the CCC-2, as well as their scores 
on the standardised tests of verbal ability (CELF-3 and WISC-III) were calculated. Firstly, no 
significant correlations were found between the Working Memory BRIEF scores and the scores 
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on either the WISC-III or the CELF-3 (p values> .05). However, there seemed to be a consistent 
pattern of significant negative correlations between the children's Working Memory levels on the 
BRIEF and their scores on certain CCC-2 structural language scales (Speech: r = -.657, P = .01, 
n = 14; Coherence: r = -.558, P = .038, n = 14; summed Structure score: r = -.562, P = .037, n = 
14). This pattern of results does seem to support the idea that short-term (Le. working) memory 
may playa role in structural language skills of children with VI, although unpacking the nature of 
this relationship may need to be investigated further. 
In response to Q5, it is quite surprising that, potentially owing to the lack of power, the BRIEF 
Shift scale did not correlate with the scales that tap the behavioural stereotypes and repetitions 
on either SCQ or CCC-2 (p values> .05, Table 7.2), particularly as cognitive inflexibility (e.g., 
high Shift scores) has been implied in these behaviours (e.g., Chapter 6). However, a striking 
pattern of correlations in Table 7.2, which suggests associations of these behaviours with the 
other behavioural scales that are interdependent with BRIEF Shift, may be meaningful in this 
respect. More specifically, there was a notable pattern of correlations between the behavioural 
stereotypes, repetitions and restricted interests on the SCQ and the BRIEF Behavioural 
Regulation/BRI (r = .649, p = .009, n = 15), BRIEF Inhibit (r = .650, p = .009, n = 15) and BRIEF 
Emotional Control (r = .571, P = .026, n = 15). Similarly, there were significant negative 
correlations between BRIEF Emotional control and CCC-2 Stereotyped language (r = -.680, P = 
.007, n = 14), and BRIEF Emotional control and CCC-2 Interests (r = -.566, P = .035, n = 14). 
Additionally, BRIEF BRI correlated with Stereotyped language on the CCC-2 (r = -.560, P = .037, 
n = 14). 
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Table 7.2: Pearson coefficients for the correlations between the socio-communicative behaviours 
on the CCC-2 and SCQ, and the BRIEF 
o~ 0 3" 3" ~~ :S:cd :s: ~ o 0 OJ 3! ~II) 0 G) ::r ::s .... ~ 3 ~ CD ::s ::s ~ ." t;: Q! II) :$ a g' o -. ::s :::!. in' ;=;: 0 ~. CD -<~ ~ s· 0 
-!!.. ... CQ 
eee 
Speech -.321 -.183 -.269 -.310 -.355 -.657** -.072 -.161 -.339 -.422 -.489 
Syntax -.176 .279 -.140 -.045 -.047 -.089 .341 .196 .145 .095 .048 
Semantics -.489 -.170 -.307 -.392 -.273 -.523 -.057 -.093 -.297 -.316 -.454 
Coherence -.369 -.381 -.298 -.384 -.396 -.558 .082 -.024 -.349 -.320 -.455 
Initiation -.438 -.357 -.555· -.512 -.150 -.158 .380 .121 -.233 -.032 -.314 
Stereotype -.406 -.382 -.680** -.560 -.050 .078 .433 .472 .204 .272 -.135 
Context -.486 -.158 -.300 -.385 -.245 -.431 .005 .093 -.040 -.173 -.346 
Non-verbal -.537 -.263 -.286 -.429 -.345 -.622 .005 -.324 -.643*· -.487 -.590 
Social -.380 .094 -.379 -.298 -.299 -.433 -.038 -.256 -.485 -.401 -.451 
Interests -.301 -.195 -.566 -.415 .049 .015 .508 .210 -.119 .146 -.135 
GCC -.523 -.264 -.479 -.497 -.301 -.472 .204 .067 -.236 -.209 -.438 
Structure -.415 -.131 -.313 -.345 -.329 -.562 .099 -.021 -.253 -.293 -.411 
Pragmatic -.609 -.401 -.639 -.639 -.240 -.322 .313 .168 -.195 -.088 -.431 
Social -.395 -.049 -.539 -.407 -.154 -.254 .254 -.041 -.359 -.163 -.348 
SeQ 
Total .351 .201 .352 .365 .472 .433 .236 .527 .479 .540 .572 
Social 
Interaction -.074 -.119 -.135 -.105 .273 .356 .258 .611 .412 .483 .266 
Communication .165 .165 .395 .281 .403 .162 .481 .319 .282 .398 .418 
Stereotyped 
Behaviours .650*' .441 .571 .649** .262 .258 -.145 .121 .226 .187 .506 
** - significant at p ~.O1 
In relation to these correlations, it was of interest to see if the BRIEF was sensitive to the same 
children who scored in the clinically significant domain on the SCQ and the CCC-2 and (Q6). 
Table 7.3 illustrates the individual children's profiles on the three parental questionnaires. The 
areas shaded in dark grey indicate that the child's profile on that measure is in the clinical 
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domain. The areas shaded in light grey indicate that the child 's profile, although not reaching the 
clinical cut-off, is in line with the bottom 10% of the children in the sighted comparison group (only 
possible to calculate for the SCQ and the BRIEF). Here, it can be seen that only one child with VI 
obtained a profile that was in the clinical domain on all three measures. This was an 8 year old 
girl with SVI in her early years and VIQ = 95 (i.e., participant 10: 26) . Interestingly, it may be worth 
noting that, although her attentional performance in early childhood was near the ceiling, it was 
still below the level of the sighted comparison group. Additionally, although she did not have an 
additional diagnosis at the time of her participation in this research, it may be worth emphasising 
that she is the only participant in the present VI sample who did not attend a mainstream school 
at the time of the present research, but had been placed in a specialist school for children with VI. 
Thus, it is possible that her behavioural characteristics that were captured here have already 
been identified professionally outside of the context of this research . 
Table 7.3: Individual children's profiles 
Child 10 SCQ I CCC-2 BRIEF· BRI BRIEF· MI BRIEF· GEC 
02 I 
----._ .. _. ,- -- - f---04 
- 1 --07 
- -09 
-10 I 
--.-. 
16 I 
17 
. 
18 ....>.,.: .. :;:/;:;;'.-.,',,: ." 
19 .'.J ••.............. '. 
-20 -, . 
-
23 .. 
---25 
-
.•••.. f 
.f . 
26 .......... 
31 I 
-- -- - - -32 
.. Area shaded In black represents missing data 
The profiles of other children were not as clear cut. However, they may be worth discussing very 
briefly, because it was possible to discern three broad profile patterns. The first pattern 
encompasses children whose profiles are not within the area of clinical concern on any of the 
measures (participant IDs: 02, 10, 16, and 31). As discussed previously in Chapter 3, these 
children do not provide any clues, in terms of their cognitive level, family background or visual 
level and diagnosis, into their seemingly better outcomes. It may be worth noting that the early 
attention performance of three of these children was at ceiling . Interestingly, three of these 
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children (participant IDs: 02, 10, and 16) were in the PVI group at the time of the attention study, 
although the participant 02 obtained some useful functional vision (Le., SVI) after the age of 16 
months. 
The second pattern encompasses the profiles of children whose socio-communicative profiles 
may be of clinical concern, but their overall BRIEF ratings appear to be within the normal range 
(e.g., participant IDs: 04, 09, 17,20 and 23). However, despite the BRIEF index and composite T 
scores that were in the normal range, a closer examination of the individual BRIEF scales reveals 
the Shift scores to be an area of relative weakness in three of these children. One child was 
chosen here to illustrate this developmental pattern (Le., participant 10: 17). This boy with SVI in 
his early years showed particularly low attentional performance at an earlier age, especially in 
attention shifting (Chapter 6, Figures 6.7 and 6.8). During the observational analyses of this 
child's attentional behaviours in his early years, it was observed that he showed strong negative 
emotional reactions to being guided by an adult during the assessment and was distressed at the 
assessor's attempts to guide him away from the toys he was engaging with. Closer examination 
of his BRIEF profile at school age revealed that, although his overall BRIEF ratings were 
generally within a normal range, his Shift scores were just below the clinical cut-off (T = 63) and 
substantially elevated in comparison to the sighted group's mean. More importantly, his scores on 
the Emotional Control scale on the BRIEF exceeded the clinical cut-off of 65 and above (T = 69). 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that emotional regulation and cognitive shifting are related 
in both children with VI and those who are sighted. It was also discussed that executive control 
may facilitate emotional modulation, in that the ability to shift attention away from upsetting events 
may help to reduce negative emotions and vice versa. This child's data at an early, as well as at 
older age, may be illustrating this pattern. 
The third pattern encompasses the profiles of three children, who showed socio-communicative 
profiles of potential clinical significance and specific weaknesses on the metacognitive aspect of 
the BRIEF (Le., participant IDs: 07, 18, and 25). It is not easy to summarise the developmental 
pattern in this group, as the children did not show weaknesses in the same metacognitive areas. 
However, in at least two children, the scores on the BRIEF Initiate and Monitor scales were near 
or above the clinical cut-off. These children perhaps illustrate the point made in the preceding 
chapters that the poorer outcomes on these BRIEF scales may be a secondary outcome of the 
child's socio-communicative difficulties. It may also be worth noting that two of these children 
(participants IDs: 07 and 18) showed relatively low levels of attention maintaining in early 
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childhood (Chapter 6, Figure 6.6), and attention maintaining was argued to be most socially-
driven of the three attentional behaviours assessed here. 
Finally, the developmental picture of the remaining child (participant 10: 32), who obtained highly 
elevated scores on the BRIEF despite the socia-communicative profiles in the normal range are 
somewhat challenging to explain in terms of the underlying socia-communicative vulnerabilities. 
However, it is worth emphasising that this child's early attention behaviours were not as proficient 
as those in the majority of children in her vision group (i.e., SVI) (Chapter 6, Figures 6.4 - 6.6), 
and the parental ratings of her behaviours on the BRIEF appeared sensitive to the same 
underlying vulnerabilities. 
DISCUSSION 
The first question this chapter attempted to address concerned the stability of structural language 
strength in children with VI over time. In relation to this, significant correlations between the 
children's early RZS outcomes and their later performance on the CELF-3 have been detected. 
These results suggest that the verbal competence in children with VI is likely to be stable over 
time as different assessment measures presented at different time points may tap the same 
linguistic/cognitive skills. Even though the RZS are not a standardised tool, they have a widely 
recognised value in assessing the developmental progress of young children with varying levels 
of VI. Hence, despite their low psychometric properties, it is encouraging to see their potential to 
predict children's verbal levels in subsequent development. 
Second aim of the research presented in this chapter was to establish whether there was a 
longitudinal relationship between the early attentional ability and later socia-communicative 
outcomes in children with VI. In relation to this, significant correlations were found between the 
children's ability to establish adult-directed attention in their pre-school years and their scores on 
the parental measures of social competence at school-age. These correlations may reflect the 
fact that the children's attentional performance was assessed in a socia-interactive context, which 
was likely to mediate child's attentional responses. More specifically, establishing attention onto a 
toy offered by the assessor in the context of this particular assessment may involve a certain level 
of intersubjectivity from the child's side and acknowledgement of the assessor as the social 
partner. Despite the methodological difficulties with the measure of early attentional behaviours, it 
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was of value to find that aspects of this measure were sensitive enough to unearth a longitudinal 
relationship between the ability to respond to adult-directed attention in early childhood and the 
children's later social competencies. This implies an attentional basis to socio-communicative 
skills in children with VI and is in line with theories and empirical findings that emphasise a 
developmental link between attention development, joint attention skills and subsequent socio-
communicative achievements, both in typically developing sighted children and sighted children 
with autism (e.g., Butterworth & Cochran, 1980; Leekam & Ramsden, 2006). Thus, early 
difficulties with establishing adult-directed attention may potentially be an early marker of long-
term socio-communicative problems in children with congenital VI, although this needs to be 
substantiated with further research. 
In this chapter it was also of interest to examine if the characteristics of mother-child discourse 
were influenced by the child's own linguistic and socio-communicative competence in children 
with VI. In relation to this, significant correlations between mothers' discourse (including their 
mentalistic language) and the children's linguistic, pragmatic and social outcomes were obtained 
in this chapter. Interestingly, the children's own discourse and mentalistic language were found to 
be correlated with their linguistic abilities. These correlations provide evidence for an enduring, 
yet complex, relationship between language and socio-communicative development in children 
with VI, and the language input that such children receive in their daily lives. However, it was not 
possible to unearth the causality within this relationship. While it is likely that the language that 
mothers direct to their children with VI (including also certain levels of mind-mindedness) plays an 
important role in the ways that their children communicate and interact with others, it is also 
possible that the mothers' own levels of language input (including their mentalistic discourse) to 
their children are affected by their children's own language levels and social responsiveness. 
Considering that the verbal quality of mother-child interaction is intertwined with the linguistic 
ability of the child with VI, as well as their levels of social and pragmatic competence, mother-
child dialogue seems to be a clear target for future interventions. 
Following from the research presented in Chapter 3, it was of interest to examine further evidence 
for a potential role of short-term memory in structural language in children with VI. In relation to 
this, there was as significant correlation between the working memory component on the BRIEF 
and the structural language composite score on the CCC-2, as well as its individual aspects such 
as speech and coherence. On the other hand, the BRIEF working memory was uncorrelated with 
the standardised language measures (CELF-3 and WISC-III). This pattern of findings makes it 
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difficult to fully unpack the nature of the relationship between short-term memory and language. 
However, they may reflect the complexity of the short-term measures and a possibility that its 
outcomes are context dependent. This potentially explains the significant correlation pattern 
between the two variables of interest on two questionnaire measures, but not when standardised 
language measure is concerned. More specifically, the two questionnaires (where working 
memory and structural language skills were found to be related) tap those skills in terms of the 
children's everyday behaviours as perceived by their parents. Similarly, despite the lack of 
relationship between the short-term memory in the context of everyday behaviours (the BRIEF 
Working Memory) and structural language as assessed by the standardised language measures 
(WISC-III and CELF-3), this relationship was indeed established when short-term memory was 
assessed in a context of a structured assessment (Recalling Sentences). The possibility that 
short-term memory is contextually manifested may potentially explain the general lack of 
correlations between the scores on Digit Span, Recalling Sentences and Working Memory, all of 
which are measures of short-term memory. 
An additional question this chapter attempted to address was whether the pattern of stereotypical 
and repetitive behaviours and restricted interests in children with VI could be explained in terms 
of specific difficulties at a level of executive functioning. With regards to this, it was surprising to 
find that the BRIEF Shift scale scores (i.e., a behavioural measure of cognitive flexibility) did not 
correlate with the relevant behavioural scales on either socio-communicative questionnaire. This 
finding may potentially be down to reduced experimental power, particularly as there were 
correlations with other related BRIEF scales which have been found to correlate with the Shift 
component in Chapter 6 (i.e., emotional regulation and inhibition scales, which together with the 
Shift, form the behavioural regulation composite on the BRIEF). Unfortunately, no conclusion can 
be drawn regarding the relationship between cognitive shifting and behavioural repetitions, 
sterotypies and limited repertoire of interests. However, it is clear how high scores on shift-
related scale such as Emotional Control may also account for these behaviours in children with 
VI. For instance, those children with VI who are more perseverative and repetitive in their 
behaviours and interests may also be more likely to show negative emotional responses (e.g., 
tantrums) when those behaviours and interests are interrupted, because of their inability to 
flexibly shift cognitive set. Interestingly, the correlation between the BRIEF Inhibit and repetitive 
and stereotypical behaviour on the SCQ (suggesting that children with VI who have poorer motor 
inhibition may present with higher levels of stereotyped behaviour) may have implications for our 
understanding of specific 'blindisms' in children with VI, the behavioural characteristics that are 
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often considered to be a 'normal' aspect of such children's behavioural phenotype (i.e., unusual 
and repetitive motor movements, such as hand-flapping) (Cass, 1998). 
Finally, the last question this chapter attempted to address was whether the same children with VI 
who showed more behavioural difficulties in the domain of executive functioning on the BRIEF 
also showed poorer socio-communicative outcomes on the SCQ and the CCC-2. Here, an 
individual-differences approach was adopted, highlighting the behavioural profile of each child 
with VI on the three parental-report measures of everyday behaviours. It is clear from the 
presentation of these profiles that there is a certain level of consistency in terms of behavioural 
outcomes in both social communication and executive function, confirming previous argument 
that the two may not be mutually exclusive. However, it was also evident that less desirable 
scores on socio-communicative measures did not necessarily imply poorer scores on the BRIEF 
and vice versa. In relation to this, the comparison of these outcomes with the children's early 
attentional behaviours shed some light on this pattern of findings, suggesting that the poorer 
behavioural outcomes at school age can potentially be traced to lower attentional levels in some 
children with VI. This is also in line with the significant relationship between attention establishing 
in early childhood and social competence at school age demonstrated earlier in this chapter. 
Importantly, it was not possible to define the present sample of children with VI with a clear 
distinction between the children with and those without significant socio-communicative and 
executive function challenges. While this may potentially be owing to the small sample, this 
pattern of heterogeneity further highlights the remarkable nature of children with VI, the 
challenges of conducting research studies involving such children, and the subsequent difficulties 
in conceptualising their unique strengths and weaknesses. The discussion of these important 
issues is developed further in the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter 8 
General Discussion 
At the outset of this thesis it was noted that children who are visually impaired from birth are 
vulnerable in their achievement of important social milestones. It has been argued that this 
vulnerability may arise from early childhood disruptions to vision-dominated behaviours (e.g., eye-
gaze directing and following) in the context of joint attention. Moreover, subsequent socio-
communicative and socio-cognitive difficulties experienced by such children have been likened to 
the social impairments seen in sighted children with autism. While such serious effects of vision 
loss are likely to carry important implications for the children's social lives long term, the goal of 
the present thesis was to consider the potential of children with congenital VI to overcome these 
vulnerabilities, with a specific emphasis on language as a possible compensatory mechanism. 
The verbal domain has generally been highlighted as an area of strength in children with VI, so it 
is intriguing to consider what language, as an information channel, may provide for such children. 
However, to date, empirical research has not been able to establish whether language can 
compensate for the role of vision in dealing with the demands of the everyday, vision-dominated, 
and inherently social world of which children with VI are a part. It is now important to reflect on 
how the present findings link in with the existing knowledge of this area and to consider the 
unique contribution of the current research. 
The findings presented in Chapter 3 provide important original evidence on the role of language 
in the development of children with congenital VI. First, it was shown that children with VI, whose 
intelligence levels are within the normal range, may have a language-specific strength that 
distinguishes them from sighted children, as their performance on a standardised test of language 
function was shown to exceed that of sighted peers. Interestingly, what is striking about this 
potential language advantage of children with VI is that it a) may be confined to the domain of 
structural language, b) might be driven by their strong verbal short-term memory, and c) may be 
evident only when assessed in a structured context. This has been argued in some depth in 
Chapter 3, and the correlation between everyday working memory ability on the BRIEF and 
structural language skills on the CCC-2 in Chapter 7 further supports this idea. Additionally, the 
solid nature of structural language trends across development (i.e., Chapter 7) provides 
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heartening evidence that strength in this language domain is likely to be stable over time in those 
children with VI who show early developmental promise. 
However, in contrast to the strong structural language function in children with VI, their pragmatic 
language development seems to be an area of an ongoing concern at primary school age, even 
in those children with advanced intellectual and verbal capabilities. This is the first piece of 
research that has systematically demonstrated such a serious discrepancy in the language 
presentation of children with VI. Importantly, this suggests that solid cognitive grounding in verbal 
intelligence and structural language in children with VI may not be sufficient to fully compensate 
for the processes and behaviours that are required for dealing with the complexity of everyday 
demands of pragmatic communication and social interaction. This is potentially because these 
processes and behaviours may be particularly dependent on the successful development of 
visually-driven precursors, such as joint attention and triadic, interpersonal engagement. These 
arguments support the theory of Hobson (1990; 1993; 2002), who emphasised the role of visual 
behaviours that are at the heart of a child's developing intersubjectivity. According to Hobson, the 
visual means of observation and imitation allow the expression of a child's innate, affectively-
driven predisposition to identify with and relate to others (who the child perceives to be like 
him/her), and to comprehend their unique relatedness with other agents in the environment. 
Similar to Hobson, the present argument postulates that it is not visual perception per se, but the 
'easy' route to intersubjectivity that vision may provide to pre-lingual children, which allows their 
spontaneous integration into the social world that surrounds them. Thus, it may be the breakdown 
of the 'main vehicle' along this route that may predispose a child with VI to socio-communicative 
vulnerabilities, the nature of which is reminiscent of the difficulties that characterise autism in 
sighted children. 
The breakdown in visual means does not imply that intersubjectivity cannot be achieved by an 
individual with VI, because many adults with congenital VI are known to lead independent and 
fulfilling social lives. In the present school-age sample, some children with VI appeared to be 
more or less like sighted children on the current measures, while in others, there was a wide 
range of severity of socio-communicative difficulties. There clearly seems to be a potential in 
children with VI, who do not have any additional impairments, to overcome such developmental 
obstacles, even though these may still pose an ongoing challenge, in varying degrees, in their 
primary school years. It is possible that the early acquisition of language (the developmental 
process that seems relatively spared in VI), in addition to the sensitive language input by the 
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primary caregiver(s), kick-starts alternative developmental pathways for children with VI. The 
workings of these pathways may still be establishing throughout the primary school age, which is 
a prolific period of knowledge acquisition for any child. It seems an intriguing prospect to follow 
such children from the earliest stages of development, when primary intersubjectivity first 
emerges, into adulthood, by which time they would have reached full socio-cognitive potential, in 
order to capture their unique transitions between the crucial social milestones. However, at this 
point in time, the present findings may provide an invaluable snapshot into the developing social 
knowledge of such children at school age. 
The research presented in Chapter 4 may provide a useful context within which socio-cognitive 
understanding in children with VI can be considered. The previous studies (e.g., Green et aI., 
2004; Peterson et aI., 2000), which have relied on false-belief tasks, have been invaluable in 
bringing socio-cognitive concerns in children with VI into the spotlight. However, the dichotomous 
nature of the false-belief paradigm used in these studies may have somewhat obscured and 
underestimated the emerging mentalising capabilities of such children. On the contrary, by 
targeting the social understanding of children with VI in their dominant (i.e., verbal) domain, the 
research presented in Chapter 4 has captured their mentalising potential more subtly. Here, 
children with VI demonstrated good sensitivity to the subjective desires and beliefs of story 
protagonists, by spontaneously referring to these states in their explanations of the protagonists' 
emotions, and doing so as frequently as their sighted peers. Without a doubt, such language use 
is likely to be indicative of an active theory of mind and an insight into the subjective mental states 
of others (in line with Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Symons, 2004). This, in turn, is likely to be 
suggestive of socio-pragmatic language potential in children with VI. 
However, while the mentalistic language use of children with VI may reveal their existing social 
understanding, it still remains uncertain how well such children can apply this knowledge implicitly 
for the purpose of social interaction, where it is not 'scripted'. Judging by the parental reports of 
their everyday socio-communicative capabilities presented in Chapter 3, it is plausible to predict 
that representing mental states in real-life social circumstances would still be a challenge for 
many of these children. Nevertheless, language ability is thought to play an important role in 
scaffolding children's social understanding in general, providing them with both the semantic 
basis for various mental state concepts, and the grammatical basis for understanding how such 
concepts are embedded in everyday language (Ruffman et aI., 2003; Slade & Ruffman, 2005). 
Therefore, the structural language strengths of children with VI (as seen in Chapter 3) are likely to 
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have provided a foundation for their mentalistic understanding, as is evident from their ability to 
use mental state language in their discourse, and may prove to be a useful bootstrapping 
mechanism in these processes in the long term. However, the quality and nature of such 
understanding is likely to differ from that of sighted children, at least while it is actively developing, 
as it is acquired through inherently different experiences. 
The social and communicative environment within which children's social understanding is 
acquired is where the experiential differences between children with VI and sighted children 
notably come to light. The research in Chapter 5 highlighted some key aspects of this 
environment. For instance, this research demonstrated children with VI to have dependence on 
language input provided by the interacting parent, and prominently so in those circumstances 
where children who are sighted would typically benefit from their own visual experiences (i.e., the 
descriptive characteristics of the story-book content). More importantly, while this research 
pinpointed the strong inter-dependence between the children's own and their mothers' overall 
mentalistic language in general, the mothers of children with VI seemed more prone to verbalising 
the subjective mental states of the story characters than were the mothers of sighted children. 
This subtle finding may offer an important snapshot into parental sensitivity towards their child's 
socio-cognitive needs. Learning about other people's mental states may come very 
spontaneously to sighted children, through observing and imitating others' facial expressions, 
gestures and eye-gaze direction. However, similar knowledge in children with VI may need to be 
achieved more explicitly, most notably through language. As discussed above, the child's own 
structural language may provide a solid basis for acquisition of social understanding. 
Interestingly, the findings in Chapter 5 suggest that the primary caregiver's involvement in this 
process is likely to play an even more significant role. The mothers of children who are sighted 
may not always feel a need to point out to their children what seems 'obvious'. On the other hand, 
the mothers of children who cannot see other people's facial or gestural clues to their inner 
mental states may adopt the role of a compensatory information channel for their child. As well as 
interacting with the child's unique sensory needs, such maternal sensitivity was shown to be 
related to the language levels of children with VI (Chapter 7). Similarly, the mothers' overall 
language provision was shown to be related to the socio-pragmatic competence of their child with 
VI (Chapter 7). Disentangling the complex relationship between the characteristics that tie 
together the mother-child social interaction and communication is challenging, particularly in such 
a unique population. However, it is possible that the quality of a mother's input to her child with VI 
may have causal value in this relationship, given that the child is the learner. This would certainly 
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be in keeping with Ruffman at al. (2002) and Meins et al. (2003) who showed that maternal mind-
mindedness is a unique predictor of the developing social knowledge in sighted children, even 
when the children's language and their own mentalising levels are taken into account. 
Thus far, it can be argued that language can potentially make a very significant contribution to the 
development of social functioning in children with VI both through sensitive verbal input by the 
caregiver and the children's productive output. This contribution may, to an extent, interact with 
general cognition, as low verballQ has been previously identified as a confounding factor in socio 
communicative and socio-cognitive outcomes in children with VI (Green et aI., 2004; Hobson et 
aI., 1999). In this research, examining the outcomes of children with VI whose verbal intelligence 
levels are within the normal range enabled us, to a certain degree, to appreciate the role of 
language over and above general cognitive capacity. However, such language contribution does 
not sufficiently explain why some children with VI show better socio-developmental outcomes 
than others, and more importantly, why some children with VI, despite their cognitive and 
language proficiency, appear to have more profound socio-pragmatic problems. While these 
problems may be reminiscent of autism-related difficulties in sighted children, the nature of the 
autistic-like clinical picture in children with congenital VI is bound to be multi-factorial and 
intrinsically different from autism in the sighted child. 
Naturally, the inherently unique factor within this structure is the children's sensory impairment. 
The role and potency of visual provision has been specified earlier in this discussion, with an 
emphasis on the vision-driven route towards the development of interpersonal engagement in the 
early, pre-lingual child. The present research suggests that the role of such proviSion is potentially 
even greater than was previously thought, with far-reaching effects on a child's wider behavioural 
and cognitive presentation. For instance, in Chapter 6, children with VI showed vulnerable 
outcomes in certain domains of executive functioning, particularly in shifting, emotional 
modulation and initiative ability. Rather than implying a neuro-cognitive impairment per se in 
children with VI, it was suggested in Chapter 6 that these specific executive functions may be 
more vulnerable for such children because visual impairment may hinder the mechanism that 
drives these functions. More specifically, vision may play an important facilitatory role in 
attentional control. The retrospective study of young children with congenital VI (including those 
who were subsequently seen at school age) supports this argument, by providing unique 
evidence that early attentional regulation (i.e., establishing, maintaining and shifting adult-directed 
attention) is indeed an area at risk for children born with a significant sight loss, particularly in 
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those children whose VI is of greater severity. The deployment of attention has generally been 
given a central role in the execution of cognitive actions and behaviours (e.g., P. Anderson, 2003; 
Norman & Shallice, 1986), as well as socio-communicative and socio-cognitive achievements 
(e.g., Leekam et aI., 2000; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). Therefore, it was fascinating to 
find a longitudinal relationship between the early ability to shift adult-guided attention, and the 
BRIEF correlates of shifting capacity (as well as initiating and, potentially, emotional regulation) at 
school age (Chapter 6). Of similar value was the longitudinal relationship found between the early 
attention establishing capacity and parent-reported levels of social interaction later in childhood 
(Chapter 7). 
Executive and social behaviours and processes can be very difficult to separate, because of their 
developmental and functional overlap (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson et aI., 2002). Such 
overlap in children with VI has been implied by some of the correlational patterns in Chapter 7. 
Based on the present research, it could be hypothesised that the complex interaction between 
executive and social functions may be owing to the involvement of attention in both domains. 
Thus, the early attentional behaviours may be an early indicator of long term strength and 
vulnerability in these processes in all children, including those with VI. Similar developmental 
patterns can also be implied from the research with children with autism, who have been 
associated with vulnerable outcomes in social and executive functioning, as well as in attention 
development. Crucially, while such developmental pattern in autism has been suggested to link in 
with a core frontal lobe deficit (e.g., Ozonoff et aI., 2004), children with VI may differ in that their 
underlying risk factor might be their impoverished visual input. Naturally, further investigation is 
required to help us better understand these issues. 
Another crucial factor within the multi-faceted, autistic-like presentation in children with VI is the 
children's unique social environment, of which language is an important part. The nature and the 
role of this environment have already been discussed in much detail. The possibility that the 
developmental vulnerability imposed by VI in childhood could be somewhat ameliorated through 
sensitive parental language contribution, as well as through the children's own linguistic 
knowledge, has a great value from an intervention perspective. These aspects are likely to further 
interact with other important socio-cultural characteristics of the child's life, such as the influence 
of peers, siblings and other family members, and even their parents' and other people's 
continuous reactions to the demands of their disability (Warren, 1994). Although such variables 
were not examined in the present research, they certainly present an exciting prospect for future 
214 
studies. Additionally, further research might benefit from considering older children and young 
adults with congenital VI who have gone through the trajectory described in this thesis, and the 
insight these individuals can provide us with when reflecting upon their childhood. 
While the child's own verbal ability (Le., verballQ) may be an important mediator of the severity 
the autistic-like phenotype in VI (R. Brown et aI., 1997; Hobson et aI., 1999), the most severe 
presentation of autistic features in VI does not seem to be confined solely to children with learning 
difficulties. This brings into focus another factor that may be influential in shaping the nature of 
the autism-like clinical picture in children with VI: the child's innate, biological predisposition to 
specific personal qualities (e.g., temperament). In the general population, some children may be 
inherently more empathic, socially insightful, and confident in communicating and interacting with 
other people, compared to others who naturally may be socially withdrawn. There is no reason to 
believe that the same diversity of personal characteristics would not be seen also in the wider 
population of children with congenital VI. Thus, it seems that the unique interaction across time, 
between i) the vulnerability intrinsically created by the children's visual impairment, ii) the 
powerful socio-environmental and linguistic influences, and iii) the child's innate predisposition 
towards certain qualities is what may determine the severity of the autistic-like picture in children 
with VI. Through development, and the social experiences that come naturally with different 
developmental stages, the severity of such a picture may change in individual children across 
time, and may potentially even be overcome by adulthood. Ultimately, however, in some children 
with VI, the interaction between these variables may produce a disorder that is very much like 
autism in the sighted. Certain conditions, such as the presence of learning difficulties, may 
exacerbate this developmental picture, given that the child may lack the cognitive capacity to 
explicitly adopt appropriate learning and compensatory strategies. Finally, some children with VI 
indeed may have the core disorder of autism itself. 
The discussion above accentuates just how unusual and unique children with congenital VI are. 
In the present research, this uniqueness was potentially most notably captured in Chapter 7, 
where it was not possible to identify suitable groupings within the current VI sample. The unique 
nature of the VI-related developmental outcome is a stark reminder of the theoretical, as well as 
methodological, difficulty of comparing children with congenital VI to those who are sighted. As 
discussed earlier, the quality of the experiences in the two groups of children, and subsequently, 
in their overall learning process, must be genuinely different. This, in turn, may not only impact on 
the expression of their developmental trajectories, but also on the research methods which 
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attempt to capture those trajectories. For instance, at the outset of this research it was deemed 
important to adapt the available tests to the sensory needs of children with VI, for example, by 
removing individual items that did not seem suitable for such children (e.g., in the CCC-2 and the 
BRIEF), and by relying only on a partial assessment of specific developmental domains (e.g., the 
CELF-3 and the WISC-III). However, while trying to impose a certain level of rigour to suit the 
experiences of children with VI, such methods may be disadvantageous to the performance 
profiles of sighted children, for whom such tests are generally designed. Finally, as they are not 
developed with children with VI in mind, the same tests are likely to be less sensitive to the 
developmental strengths of this group, while heavily loading on the domains that may emphasise 
their inherent weaknesses. This clearly illustrates the difficulty of contrasting children with VI with 
those who are sighted. 
Comparing the outcomes between children with differing levels of sight loss (e.g., PVI vs. SVI) 
may prove to be a more realistic and informative method in the long term, than a comparison with 
the sighted. The children's ability to adapt to the various developmental tasks is likely to vary with 
the degree of their VI, and there is substantial evidence for this variation across different 
developmental domains (e.g., Dale & Sonksen, 2002; McConachie & Moore, 1994; Preisler, 
1991). In line with the earlier discussion of the fulfilling role of vision, it is not surprising to find that 
even a small amount of vision can be facilitative of certain developmental outcomes, most notably 
motor behaviour, spatial orientation and object permanence (Warren, 1994). Although it was not 
possible to carry out comparisons between children with differing degrees of VI systematically at 
all time points in the present research, the study of attentional behaviours in a larger group of pre-
school children with VI was able to capture the advantage of residual visual capability in children 
with SVI in their early years (e.g., in attention shifting). Such advantage in children with some, 
however limited, functional vision is likely to have significant developmental implications in the 
long term. Promoting residual vision in children with SVI should be an important element of 
subsequent clinical and educational intervention (Sonksen et aI., 1991). 
In empirical terms, however, even the cross-sectional consideration of children with differing 
degrees of VI can be problematic for several reasons. Visual impairment is not a categorical 
condition, but one that lies on the continuum of decreasing visual function. Very few children who 
are born with a serious sight loss have no functional vision at all, while the levels of residual 
vision in those who do (e.g., SVI) tend to vary immensely. Additionally, VI does not present as a 
stable variable across an individual'S developmental trajectory, owing to maturational changes of 
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the visual system in early childhood, so it is not uncommon to detect changes in the levels of 
residual vision in individual children across time. This creates a serious challenge for categorising 
children according to VI level at any given developmental assessment. This is particularly true 
when evaluating the long-term impact of VI on a child's developmental process, as this sub-
grouping cannot control for the potential change in the VI levels in individual children prior to or 
following any given assessment. Moreover, even when differences are found between the 
developmental outcomes of children with residual functional vision and those who suffer from 
complete sight loss, this picture can be difficult to interpret, because of the intermediate influence 
of other variables that are found to playa significant part (e.g., learning difficulties and the child's 
unique socio-cultural environment) (Warren, 1994). Certainly, even in the present research (e.g., 
an advantage of children with SVI in early attentional shifting) learning difficulties imposed a 
degree of confounding that could not be explained by the presence (or lack) of form vision. 
Nevertheless, the present research provides evidence that even those children with some limited 
levels of functional vision, despite promising cognitive outcomes, are vulnerable to socio-
communicative difficulties that bear resemblance to autism in the sighted. Although children with 
SVI in their early years may be able to locate objects and people in their immediate visual 
environment, and even perceive broad bodily gestures, their available vision may not be 
sufficiently sensitive to the subtleties of eye-gaze behaviours and facial expressions that are at 
the heart of human intersubjectivity. In this respect, all children with a serious congenital sight 
loss may be at a similar disadvantage. Eye-gaze behaviours are thought to have an evolutionary 
origin and their role has been identified in virtually all living beings (Emery, 2000). However, the 
rich information provided by the subtle expressions of the eyes and the face may have particular 
significance for humans alone. This is because the elaborate system of visual signalling through 
eyes and faces forms part of the sophisticated representational socio-cognitive system, which 
uniquely distinguishes humans from other species (Povinelli & Preuss, 1995; Tomasello & 
Rakoczy, 2003). Thus, it is easy to appreciate how disruptions to this process, as seen from 
autism and visual impairment, may have a profound impact on an individual's social life. 
Naturally, such concerns call for the implementation of appropriate intervention strategies, 
wherever possible, at an early as well as at an older age. Based on the current findings, there 
was clearly a spectrum of vulnerability that is open to intervention, even in children with 
congenital VI but proficient cognition and linguistic skills. Given that the nature of such 
vulnerabilities in these children appears to be social rather than cognitive, intervention 
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programmes for such children may need to follow the same pattern. However, implementing an 
intervention strategy with school-age children, whose socio-communicative vulnerabilities have 
already left a profound mark on their adjustment and integration into the social world, is likely to 
be challenging. In the UK, it is normal practice to integrate children with VI into mainstream 
educational settings, unless they have complex educational needs (e.g., as a result of severe 
learning difficulties). Early socio-emotional difficulties have been found to affect integration into 
mainstream nursery and preschool settings in young children with severe and profound levels of 
VI (Brambring, 2001; Preisler, 1993). Such integration may be even more difficult in middle and 
later childhood, which is the period marked by the emergence of a greater need for independence 
and the development of the self (e.g., Erikson, 1968). Interestingly, the school context may 
provide a useful framework within which the effectiveness of an intervention programme with 
school-age children with VI, with a possible emphasis on peer-assisted socio-interactive learning, 
might be evaluated. 
Without a doubt, it is in the individual child's best interest to have access to appropriate 
intervention as early as possible. The present findings imply that, in order to establish an effective 
early intervention framework for children with VI, it is crucial to identify early risk and protective 
factors and processes that have long-term implications for a child's socio-emotional and 
behavioural adjustment, with a view to reducing their negative impact (also Dale & Salt, 2007). 
Developed through such an approach (e.g., Salt, Dale, Osborne, & Tadi6, 2005), new materials 
for helping and guiding the parents of infants and young children with congenital VI, and the 
professionals who closely work with them, are now available in the UK (Developmental Journal 
for Babies and Children with Visual Impairment, DfES, 2006), although their effectiveness has yet 
to be evaluated systematically. 
In addition to informing an appropriate intervention framework, the current findings also 
emphasise the need for establishing a suitable diagnostic process for children with VI. 
Diagnostically, distinguishing core autism in children with VI from the VI-related syndrome that is 
similar to autism in the sighted may not be possible. However, from a clinical perspective, the 
present findings highlight the need to identify children with VI on a spectrum of socio-
communicative abnormalities that require professional attention. To achieve this, the 
development of appropriate diagnostic procedures for assessing a broader clinical phenotype in 
children with VI (whether this phenotype be described as 'autistic-like' or as 'VI-related socio-
communicative impairment') is of utmost importance, in order to meet the children's specific 
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clinical and educational needs. The current diagnostic criteria for autism in sighted children may 
provide a useful clinical guide, even though the existing assessment process is not fully 
satisfactory, given its heavy reliance on visual testing materials. Therefore, in order to enhance 
the diagnostic process for children with VI, it is essential to establish an assessment framework 
that is sensitive to their unique sensory experiences. 
Despite the evident challenges in research with children with VI, the present work demonstrates 
that such research can be successfully achieved, and needs to continue to make an even bigger 
impact on our understanding of their development. Needless to say, there is an outstanding 
necessity both in research and clinical practice for appropriate standardised measures for 
assessing developmental outcomes of pre-school and school-aged children with VI. However, it is 
hoped that the present findings may provide a helpful guide for some future empirical work. For 
instance, it would be useful to develop performance-based measures of such children's pragmatic 
capabilities that capitalise on their strengths in the language domain and consider their own social 
lives. This could be achieved by eliciting narratives about people who are an important part of the 
child's social environment (e.g., siblings, best friends, parents), and by cuing such narratives in 
relation to a particular social context that is meaningful to the child (e.g., a birthday party or a 
school trip). As argued previously in this discussion, considering the experiences and knowledge 
of adolescents and adults with congenital VI may be particularly revealing in this respect. Given 
that these individuals have come from the same trajectory, their insight into the social 
experiences of children with VI may be especially enlightening. Research may especially benefit 
from targeting such individuals' own awareness of their sensory impairment and their perception 
of how it might (or might not) affect their social adjustment and ability to relate to others. The 
same approach might shed light on how VI affects the functioning of other important domains in 
these individuals, and the strategies they may explicitly rely on in dealing with the cognitive and 
physical demands of everyday, as well as experimental, tasks. 
In conclusion, the research presented in this thesis is believed to offer a unique contribution to 
understanding the social development of children with congenital VI. This research brings to the 
forefront vulnerable processes in the developmental trajectory of such children, as well as the 
factors that may play a protective role along this pathway, with a potential to enhance the 
developmental climate in children with VI in the long term. As well as carrying important 
implications for intervention and diagnostic consideration with children with congenital VI, the 
current findings are believed to have significant bearing on our general understanding of the 
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mechanisms that drive the development of social functioning in childhood. They suggest that the 
role of vision-guided experience in typical child development is far-reaching and show that the 
impact on a child's life, when access to this experience is restricted, can be substantial. Crucially, 
however, they also remind us that child development is an exceptionally resilient and adaptive 
process, and one which strives to make learning possible even in the most unusual conditions. 
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Appendix A 1 • Pearson coefficients for correlations between the WISC·III and the CELF·3 
VI group - CELF·3 scaled score . Celf·3 (scaled score) 
CD:;o -uc » ,m CD:;o -uc » ,m en ,:;0 , en ,:;0 , ~~ CD CD Q) en en Q) CD Q) >< Q) ~~ CD CD Q) en en Q) CD Q) >< Q) ;an @ m g~ ::J n ::J"O ::J -i ;an @m g~ ::J n ::J"O ::J-i 
en 0 CD Q) co ::J _ . 0 co CD COco COo en 0 CD Q) co ::J -·0 co CD COco coo ~a. ::J = .., - . Q) .., C::"O c:: en c:: ....- ~a ::J = @ ::r Q) .., C::"O c:: en c:: -n - . Q) ::J =: 0.. Q) =: Q) en Q)aL n _. =: 0.. Q) =: Q) en Q) Q) 
en CD ::J "0 co 0 co < co - ' co en CD ::J "0 co 0 co< co _. co en co ::T _ ::J CD CD CDrti CD en co ~o ::J CD CD CD Ci5 CD en 0 en en 
wise ./1/ 
VIQ .524 .509 .074 .609 .426 .589 .559 .478 .640** -.036 .604** .387 .734** .715** 
Information .238 .274 -.191 .434 .145 .370 .322 .374 .522** .181 .574** .491** .642** .687** 
Similarities .572 .360 .322 .399 .526 .388 .458 .371 .456 -.042 .295 .250 .467 .461 
Vocabulary .537 .402 .051 .541 .432 .481 .491 .376 .522** .047 .354 .392 .534** .559** 
Comprehension .553 .186 -.053 .693** .389 .557 .571 .166 .320 .021 .560** .149 .476 .435 
Digit Span -.161 .409 .105 .069 -.112 .252 .081 .325 .280 -.409 .255 -.057 .296 .193 
** - significant at p s .01 
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Appendix A2 • Pearson coefficients for correlations between parental·report measures (SCQ and CCC·2) and structured assessment measures (WISC·II and CELF·3) 
SCQ 
Total Score 
eee 
Speech 
Syntax 
Semantics 
Coherence 
Initiation 
Stereotype 
Context 
Non-Verbal 
Social 
Interests 
GCC 
VIQ 
VI .094 
Sighted -.175 
VI -.244 
Sighted .270 
VI .363 
Sighted .263 
VI .184 
Sighted .376 
VI -.1 91 
Sighted .008 
VI -.367 
Sighted .009 
VI -.132 
Sighted -.095 
VI .464 
Sighted .108 
VI -.090 
Sighted -.204 
VI -.179 
Sighted .277 
VI -.439 
Sighted -.315 
VI -.017 
Sighted .1 23 
.. - signifICant at p S 0.01 
Information 
-.179 
-.019 
.136 
.371 
.399 
.089 
.622 
.250 
.011 
.042 
-.261 
-.155 
.052 
-.107 
.729** 
.076 
.299 
.005 
.231 
.362 
-. 129 
-.432 
.306 
.102 
WlSC·1II CELF·3 
Similarities Vocabulary Compreh. Digit Word Recalling Listening Word Receptive Expressive Total 
.1 59 
-.070 
-.309 
.200 
.294 
.007 
-.278 
.272 
-.222 
-.042 
-.117 
-.092 
-.257 
-.176 
.137 
-.004 
-.195 
-.296 
-.319 
.062 
-.396 
-.239 
-.1 63 
-.030 
.140 
-.211 
-.285 
.218 
.413 
.414 
.118 
.256 
-.046 
.074 
-.064 
-.018 
.053 
-.085 
.409 
-.038 
-.089 
-.092 
-.1 59 
.324 
-.203 
-.227 
.078 
.109 
-.139 
-.073 
.059 
.355 
.287 
-.101 
.159 
.240 
.012 
-.080 
-.184 
-.088 
.316 
.013 
.234 
.1 76 
-.080 
-.130 
-.043 
-.065 
-.032 
-.130 
.143 
.087 
Span Classes Sentences Paragraphs Associat. Lang. Language Language 
.316 
-.147 
-.454 
-.1 36 
-.022 
.393 
-.055 
.274 
-.278 
.054 
-.559 
.357 
-.516 
.087 
-.166 
.185 
-.266 
-.166 
-.227 
.140 
-.594 
-.024 
-.395 
.177 
.056 
.123 
-.357 
.032 
.158 
.314 
-.307 
.043 
-.192 
-.146 
-.060 
-.130 
.1 81 
-.153 
-.1 02 
-. 190 
-.472 
-.184 
-.326 
.134 
-.012 
-.081 
-.172 
-.106 
.233 
.059 
-.085 
.076 
.253 
.025 
.126 
-.071 
-.008 
-.1 07 
-.291 
-.221 
.034 
-.41 2 
.222 
-.171 
-.337 
-.219 
-.227 
.056 
-.170 
-.381 
-.007 
-.232 
-.080 
-.099 
-.183 
.046 
-.113 
.035 
-.336 
-.216 
-.122 
-.185 
-.241 
.052 
-.338 
-.004 
-.327 
-.139 
-.222 
.192 
-.318 
.312 
-.219 
.019 
-.309 
-.046 
.110 
-.106 
-.031 
.201 
.466 
.318 
.1 56 
.277 
.074 
.112 
-.093 
.039 
.322 
-.071 
.295 
.401 
-.246 
.131 
-.041 
.349 
.013 
-.056 
.1 73 
.254 
.024 
.011 
-.333 
.062 
.063 
.308 
-.324 
-.165 
-.177 
-.301 
-.151 
-.056 
.032 
-.152 
-.178 
-.320 
-.431 
.011 
-.394 
.412 
-.067 
-.090 
-.234 
-.145 
.119 
-.070 
-.046 
.115 
.404 
.149 
.155 
.062 
.043 
-.023 
-.210 
-.109 
.197 
-.337 
.271 
.111 
-.303 
-.089 
-.127 
.256 
-.090 
-.293 
.098 
-.044 
.043 
-.028 
-.139 
.092 
.324 
.200 
.014 
-.015 
.012 
-.185 
-.154 
-.126 
.196 
-.352 
.137 
-.082 
-.344 
-.119 
-.225 
.309 
-.034 
-.271 
.024 
-.139 
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Appendix 81 . The Six stories from the Emotion task 
1) This is a story about a boy called Max. One day Max comes home from school and his mother 
says: "Max, I have a surprise for you", and she gives him a little package. He doesn't know what 
is inside the package. 
2) This is a story about a girl called Anna. Anna hears that the children outside are playing hide-
and-seek so she goes outside to join them. 
3) This story is about a girl called Linda. Linda's parents had told her that they would be going to 
the zoo today. But now, Linda's mother says that they can't go, and that they will have to stay at 
home. 
4) This story is about a boy called Walter. Walter has a dog that he usually plays with. But today, 
Walter's dog is not very well and he lies in his basket. 
5) This story is about a girl called Maggie. One day Maggie comes home from school. There is no 
one home and it's very quiet. Suddenly, Maggie can hear that someone is moving in the living 
room. 
6) This story is about a girl called Nadia. Nadia is lying in her bed because she is going to sleep. 
It is night time and all the lights in the house are already switched off. Suddenly, Nadia hears a 
strange noise. 
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Appendix 82 • Example scoring sheets for the Emotion task 
Table 1: A boy with VI, age 6 years and 6 months 
Typical emotion condition Atypical emotion condition 
Child's explanation Explanation category Child's explanation Explanation category 
Story Typical Child's N of c:::: Atypical c:::: 
Emotion emotion valid -
CI) 0 ~ ~ Emotion - CI) 0 ~~ .!!! ... :;:: .!!! ... :;:: 
prediction stories Q) ·iii ca Q) ·iii ca c:::: 0 CI) ::::I .g ~ (fixed) CI) ::::I o c:::: m C ..... m C ..... C..:M:: Ci5 Ci5 
1 Present Happy Surprised He didn't know that Angry Because he didn't want 
he would have a one 
su~rise 
2 Hide- Happy Happy Because she likes Afraid Because outside is 
and- playing dangerous sometimes 
seek 
3 Zoo Angry I Sad Because she felt Happy She might think there 
Sad excited to go and now might be crocodiles and 
she can't g01 might think she'll be eaten 
4 Dog Sad Sad Because he can't play Afraid Because he might catch 
with him anymore the illness 
I 
5 Person Scared Scared She doesn't know I Happy Because when she came in 
what it is she didn't hear something, 
now she can hear it 
6 Strange Scared Scared She doesn't know Angry Because it's waking her 
noise what it is up 
Total 6 3 2 0 4 0 
1 Note that reference to emotions are not coded as mental states as they are self evident in th is context. 
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Appendix 82 (continued) 
Table 2: A sighted boy, age 6 years and 4 months 
Typical emotion condition Atypical emotion condition 
-------
Child's explanation Explanation category Child's explanation Explanation category 
Story Typical Child's N of c Atypical c 
Emotion emotion valid 
-
CI) 0 ~ ~ Emotion - ~ 0 :t'" ~ .~ .... .. .~ .. 
prediction stories Cii 'in cv Cii 'in cv 
c 0 
CI) :::J ~ J2 (fixed) CI) :::J o c m 0 
-
m 0 
-
0..:11:: 
en en 
1 Present Happy Happy Because he's really Angry Because he didn't want a 
excited and thinks it's surprise, he wanted 
gonna be a really cool something else, like a 
to~ chocolate 
2 Hide- Happy Happy Because people are Afraid I don't know. 
and- letting her play game 
seek with them 
3 Zoo Angry I Angry Because she didn't Happy Because she didn't want 
Sad get what she wanted to go to the zoo and see 
the animals because she 
doesn't like animals 
4 Dog Sad Sad Because he likes his Afraid That his dog is gonna die 
dog a lot and now his and he won't be able to 
dog gets to be sick and play with him any day. 
he cant ~Ia~ with him 
~ ~ -----------
5 Person Scared Frightened Because she thinks Happy Because she thinks it's 
it's a burglar her mum 
6 Strange Scared Scared Because she thought Angry Because she doesn't 
noise it was a monster want to go to sleep. 
Total 6 3 2 0 3 
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Appendix C1 - Mother-child discourse coding instructions 
Category 
1. Mental State 
Elaborations 
Refers to the mental 
state attributions in 
the story. 
2. Behavioural and 
physical 
Behavioural 
elaborations: 
Refers to actions and 
physical aspect of the 
story and the book 
which have add to the 
descriptive value to 
the conversation 
3. General (other) 
utterances: 
Refers to any 
statement that could 
not be classified in 
any of the categories 
above. 
Example of utterance 
Desire: Want, like, love, hope, wish, 
dream, prefer, keen on 
Emotion: Happy, sad, unhappy, feel, 
cross, angry, grumpy 
Modulation of assertion: Sure, guess, 
figure, reckon, certain, suppose, wonder, 
expect, curious, bet 
Think and Know: Do you know what it is? 
She knows what's going to happen. 
They're thinking hard. Let me think. I think 
it's lovely. 
(I think so! Used to mean yes or no are 
coded as conversational rather than 
genuine uses) 
Other mental state: We did that, 
remember? I understand that. She didn't 
mean it like that. 
Note 
1. To character: Why is 
she nervous? She is 
thinking? 
2. To self: I think, I want, I 
wonder, I recon, I like 
3. To partner: What do 
you think? Do you 
remember? You know 
that. 
4. Other: We were 
thinking she was a child. 
It's like pretending. 
Behavioural: That boy is running; The cat Also relating to the 
is sitting on the bed; They are looking for aspects of child's life: 
_h_e--,r;_W_h_a_t _is_s_he_d_o_in-",-g_? ______ It's like me when I get up 
Physical: The girl has brown hair; There is in the morning; Our cat 
a big blue duvet on the bed; I have shoes does that; I would sit on 
like those; She's a child. She is smiling; the steps 
She is crying; How many children are 
there? On this picture there is a dog. The 
illustrations are beautiful. 
What did you say?; What is that? ; We will 
find out? What?; No; Yes; Alright; Let's 
see; Lets' turn the page; 
Also utterances introducing the book text, 
e.g.: 
So this is called: First day jitters. 
So the author is: Judy Dannenberg 
The statements such as: 'I 
don't know, I've no idea, I 
know' are placed into this 
category, they do not 
count as mental states 
Some utterances will have both mental state and descriptive elaborations. If an utterance 
contains both a mental state and a descriptive elaboration, they are counted as follows: 
• I think she is going to school 
- 1 utterance, 2 elaborations (1 mental state, 1 behavioural/physical). 
• A picture of, I think it's either gonna be, a little girl or a little boy 
- 1 utterance, 2 elaborations (1 mental state, 1 behavioural/physical) 
• I guess she is a bit scared 
- 1 utterance 2 mental state elaborations 
• I think she worried about what they'll think about her 
- 1 utterance, 3 mental state elaborations 
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Appendix C2 - An example section of a coded transcript of mother-child discourse 
involving a child with VI 
Child Parent 
Non- Non-Time: hrs;min Mentalistic 
mentalistic Mentalistic mentalistic 
---l 
---l 0 ---l 
---l 0 0 0 
('") 
---l 0 (1) G> ('") ---l 0 (1) G> Q en 0 en :::T 0 ""C ('") (1) :::T 0 ""C ('") (1) Q) en Q) :::T ::::!. :::J Q) en Q) ::r ::::!. :::J 
-. (1) :::l. g;: ~ (1) Q) (1) :::l. g;: ~ (1) Q) ~ ~ ~ =+; :::J o· ('") =+; :::J o· g;: :::J ~ g;: :::J 
"First day jitters" ... 
Child: What is it, mum? 1 
Mother: Uh, we will 1 find out. 
Ok, so this is called: 1 First day jitters! 
Child: Yeah? 1 
Page 1: The dog 
holding the lunch 
box 
Mother: You've got a 
doggy with 1 
ahm ... sitting there 
and he has a lunch 1 box. 
Page2: Introductory 
page with a big 
illustration 
Page 3: 
Acknowledgement 
page and the first 
sentence in the book: 
Mother: Yeah, and it is 
written by Juddy 1 
Dannenberg. 
And the pictures are by 1 Juddy Love. 
And on the front of the 
page there's a picture 1 
of a dog 
and a picture of a cat 1 
and a picture of, /I 
think it's either gonna 1 1 be, a little girl or a little 
boy. 
And they are looking at 1 the calendar. 
Child: Yeah? 1 
Mother: Yeah, and it's 
got on the calendar: 1 
September. 
246 
Appendix C2 (continued) 
And by one of the 
numbers it's got: First 1 
day of school. 
Child: Oh, my god, this 1 is gonna be ... 
Mother: (Laugh) And 1 you know what? 
The little girl. . .1 it's 
either gonna be a little 
girl or a little boy .. .1 1 1 
she looks really sort of 
scared. 
Do you know what 1 jitters means? 
Child: No. 1 
Mother: You don't? 1 
Jitters means you are 1 
a bit worried, 
like when I make a dip 1 
with the car. 
Ok, and it's: First day 1 jitters. 
Let's see how it gets 
on 1 
Page 3: 
"Sarah, dear, time to 
get out of bed." Mr. 
Hartwell said, poking 
his head through the 
bedroom doorway. 
"You don't want to 
miss the first day at 
your new school, do 
you?" 
Child: Oh, my, I do ... 1 
Mother: Oh, dear, she 1 is still in her bed. 
10K, so ... 1 
Child: Is it bigger than 1 
my bed? 
Mother: Ahm, it's 1 higher, 
it looks higher than 1 your bed. 
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Appendix 01 . Standardised scenarios from the RZS assessment from which attentional 
behaviours were coded 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 5 
Scenario description 
Child is presented with an item from the Sensory-Motor understanding subscale of the 
RZ, usually the item assessing the child's cause-effect understanding (e.g., Music 
box: the child has to open and shut the lid on the box to start and stop the music). 
Minority of (older) children may not have been presented this particular item and an 
available substitute scenario (one of the subsequent items from the scale) with 
equivalent cognitive demands is used with these children (e.g., opening/closing a 
screw top jar in order to get a sweet out). 
The child is presented with a subsequent item from the Sensory-Motor subscale, 
usually an item following the item given in Scenario 1. In majority of the children this 
scenario involves object combination play, for instance up to 3 pots of different size 
and colour, with neutral colour lids are introduced on the table and the child is required 
to put the lid(s) on. A substitute scenario of equivalent cognitive demands may be 
used for the minority of (older) children (e.g., object sorting task with beads and cups 
of different shape and size). 
This scenario involves presenting the child with a single or a combination of objects in 
a task requiring recognition of every day objects through a) meaningful or adaptive 
use of the objects or b) meaningful labelling or selection of objects (usually observed 
in older children). Even though this scenario may be derived from the Sensory Motor 
subtest for younger children and from the Verbal comprehension subtest for older 
children, it is chosen as it involves the same toys and places equivalent cognitive 
demands on the children. For instance, younger children are presented with up to 3 
objects (e.g., cup, spoon and brush, usually one after another) and are assessed on 
their ability to recognise these objects by their adaptive use or labelling them correctly. 
Older children are presented with up to 2 arrays of 3 objects (e.g., cup, spoon and 
brush; shoe, sponge and comb) which they are asked to label, select based on the 
labels provided or show their adaptive use. 
In this scenario the examiner engages the child in a combination play with every day 
objects, which follow up from the items in Scenario 3. The examiner's aim within this 
scenario is to assess further meaningful recognition of the objects through their 
adaptive use and pretend play where possible; imposing the same cognitive demands 
like Scenario 3. 
An additional scenario where the examiner engages the child in free play with a single 
or multiple toys (e.g., telephone on its own or in combination with a doll/ teddy bear). 
This scenario places the cognitive demands required for meaningful recognition and 
adaptive use of objects from the Sensory Motor subscale and usually incites pretend 
play in children. 
248 
Appendix 02: Attention behaviours coding schedule 
Attention category Code Behaviours 
Establishing: Immediately Begins manipulating introduced objects (e.g., prolonged looking, 
listening or reaching out to objects leading to exploring the 
objects using hands or mouth; manifesting adaptive use of the 
objects; manifesting pretend play) 
The baseline 
criterion: Child's 
attention is directed 
by the examiner 
using visual, tactile 
and/or auditory 
means onto a task 
involving single or 
multiple objects. 
Maintaining: 
The baseline 
criterion: Child's 
attention has been 
established by the 
examiner 
Shifting: * 
Baseline criterion: 
Adult directs child's 
attention away from 
the object they are 
engaged in onto a 
novel object using 
visual, tactile and/or 
auditory means. 
successful 
(scores 2) 
Delayed/ 
Successful with 
difficulty 
(scores 1) 
Unsuccessful 
(Scores 0) 
Continuous 
(Scores 2) 
Somewhat 
disrupted 
(Scores 1) 
Disrupted 
(Scores 0) 
Immediately 
successful 
(Scores 2) 
Successful with 
difficulty 
/Delayed 
(Scores 1) 
Child's attention is gained onto the task after some effort, 
usually if the child is passive initially and/or is reluctant to 
engage with the introduced toys straight away (even though 
child's attention may be shifted onto these toys - see Attention 
Shift below) 
Child does not establish attention onto the task after numerous 
attempts by the assessor. 
Child's attention is successfully maintained on the task by the 
assessor until a new task (involving single or multiple objects) is 
introduced (Le. child plays with or explores the toys). Some 
distraction may be observed allowing for other things or people 
in room, and the child may try and direct the assessor's 
attention within the task but child's attention can generally be 
redirected onto the task without difficulty. 
Child shows some difficulty in holding attention on the task (.e., 
child may get easily distracted and may engage in stereotypical 
behaviours but the assessor can generally with some effort 
redirect the child's attention on the task). Also, child may 
maintain attention well for quite a while but then breaks the 
interaction and cannot be redirected onto the task, leading to 
the assessor having to introduce new toys. 
Child does not hold attention on the task or maintaining is very 
brief; there may be extensive use of stereotypical behaviours 
(e.g. whistling, casting) or distress at the assessor's attempt to 
engage the child. 
Child shifts attention onto the novel object straight away (Le., 
child 'stills' while listening or looking at novel objects; releasing 
the object they are engaged in and or/ reaching for the novel 
object). Children who have completed the task (maintained 
continuously) and are waiting for the examiner to introduce a 
new toy should not be penalised on Shift. 
Assessor has to re-introduce the novel object before the child 
switches attention (including multiple modalities in children with 
VI) 
Unsuccessful Child does not shift attention onto novel object after numerous 
(Scores 0) attempts by the assessor 
*In contrast to Attention Establish, which requires the child to engage with a novel object, this measure takes into 
account the flexibility of switching attention between objects and tasks without having to engage with them. For 
instance, child may momentarily 'stili' and listen (PVI children) or look (SVI and S) at the new toy, but may not 
engage with it. 
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